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ABSTRACT 
Price and Trade Relations and Market Integration in Pacific Pork Markets 
by 
Jau-Rong Li, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1997 
Major Professor: Dr. Christopher B. Barren 
Department: Economics 
Ill 
Market integration testing is important to agricultural marketing, industrial 
organi zation, international trade, and international model design. With reliable market 
integration information, decision makers can undertake appropriate actions to maximize 
profits, welfare, or both. Level I market analysis, which uses price data solely, has 
proved unreliable especially in the presence of di scontinuous or bidirectional trade, or 
significant or nonstationary transactions costs. 
Level II market analysis methods, which incorporate both transactions costs and 
prices, permit spatial markets to be integrated in some periods and segmented in others, 
thereby obviating many level I method problems. However, level II methods still fail to 
di stinguish between market integration and spatial market equilibrium. Both level I and 
level II methods omit the rich information provided by trade flow data. 
This dissertation develops the first level III method-combining price, transactions 
costs, and trade flow data, and thus can move beyond the flaws remaining in levels I and 
IV 
II methods. The full information parity bounds model (FIPBM) enables researchers to 
distinguish between market integration, a concept of market "conduct," and spatial 
market equilibrium, one of market "performance." FIPBM also shows real promise in 
signaling the importance of unobservable transactions costs, the frequency of nontrading 
periods of competitive disequilibrium likely due to nontarifftrade barriers, and the effects 
of asymmetric trade policies. FIPBM seems better suited to international markets 
analysis than do other existing methods. 
This di ssertation applies levels I, II, and Ill methods to analyze price, trade, and 
market relationships in the product and f.1ctor markets of pork industries in key Pacific 
Rim countries. This empirical work highlights the superiority of the FIPBM approach. 
FIPBM finds that pork , hog, and feed grain markets between Canada and the United 
States are almost always integrated. But they are not in competitive equi librium, 
implying that there frequently exist posi tive accounting profits to arbitrage. By contrast, 
markets between Asian (Taiwan and Japan) and North American countries (Canada and 
the United States) are integrated less frequently than are intra-North American markets. 
This reflects greater trans-Pacific transactions costs that reduce tractability. However, 
markets between Asian and North American countries are commonly in competitive 
equilibrium. 
(170 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND 
Market analysis plays a crucial role in economics. As generally defined, a market 
is a place where exchanges take place, and thus it is the area within which price is 
determined. Therefore, examination of the nature of price relati onships and traders' 
behavior is the essence of market analysis. As Stigler and Sherwin point out, if one 
draws demand and supply curves that do not represent the traders in a market, the 
intersection of the curves is economica lly meaningless. One cannot analyze a market 
wi thout accounting fo r traders' behavior. The extent of a commodi ty market may include 
(omit) some domesti c regions (not) linked by arbitrage urs. A market can also extend 
internationally when separate countri es trade with each other. 
Trad itional market integration analysis foc uses mostly on price relati onships. If 
two locations are in the same economic market, then prices of the two locations should 
move together. In the fi eld of international economics, thi s relationship is captured by 
the "law of one price" (LOP), which states that prices in different countries, appropriately 
adjusted fo r exchange rates and transactions costs, should be equal. The same principle is 
commonly applied to domestic market analysis. Thus the law of one price offers 
evidence of market integration, thereby helping identi fy the extent of markets. But 
traditional market analysis methods generally assume that transactions are zero or at least 
constant over lime. This assumption may be improper when studying the international 
market, especially over a period including sharp changes in transacti ons costs, such as 
during recent episodes of trade liberali zation. The conventional presum ption about 
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transactions costs is generally unrealistic and probably leads to biased conclusions 
(Goodwin, Grennes, and Wohlgenant; Goodwin). Moreover, traditional market analysis 
methods typically assume linear price relations, implying an assumption of continuous 
trade. This assumption too is regularly false in empirical work. 
Price series alone are not sufficient to draw inferences concerning market 
structure and relationships. Methods utilizing transactions costs, trade flow, and price 
data, preferably combined with microeconomic data on traders' behavior, are desirable 
and promise better insight into market performance (Barrett 1996). 
A Definition of Market Integration 
A market is the domain over which people exchange goods and services with one 
another. Thus, a market is not necessarily located in one particular place, it has spatial 
characteristics. Two individual markets belonging to the same economic market are said 
to be spatially integrated. By one popular definition, two regions are said to be in the 
same economic market for a homogeneous good if the prices for that good differ by 
exactly the interregional transactions cost (Sexton, Kling, and Carman). By extending the 
definition above to the international sphere, two markets are spatially integrated if price 
differences between the importing and exporting countries equal the transactions costs 
associated with trade, including storage costs, freight, insurance, tariffs, etc. When the 
price differential is greater than the transactions costs, it should be profitable for 
arbitrageurs to ship a commodity from the lower-priced market to the higher-priced one; 
therefore, trade should occur. In competitive equilibrium, such trade shou ld exhaust 
potential profits, unless there exist barriers to trade that create economic rents. 
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Though price comovement is only one of several necessary conditions for market 
integration (Lutz, Ti l burg, and Kamp ), market integration analysis is often confined to the 
study of price relationships between distinct spatial markets. Price comovement is the 
outcome of arbitrage activi ti es in which traders in different markets act to take advantage 
of price differences that exceed transactions costs, and in so doing eliminate those profit 
opportunities in equilibrium. Accordingly, one could conclude that price differentials and 
transactions costs are the major determinants of market integration. 
Clearl y, however, prices are endogenous, being simultaneously determined with 
trade vo lumes. Weak comovement of prices might result from imperfect mobility of 
goods arising from transport bottlenecks, especiall y in low-income countries with weak 
physical infrastructure (Lele). The unavailability of transportation faci lities over a long 
period may impede the free now of stocks from low price regions to higher price ones. In 
addition, shipments between di stinct markets usually takes ti me even under ideal 
conditions. Therefore, there may exist delivery lags. Along with shipment delays comes 
uncertainty over how long an advantageous price differenti al wi ll las t. This uncertainty is 
another possible explanation for an observed low degree of market integration. 
Moreover, poor communications infrastructure may be another reason for low degrees of 
market integration as well. If infom1ation transmission is inefficient, traders may not be 
aware of profit opportunities or might find them only with a lag. Also, and especially in 
the international domain, non tariff trade barriers such as quotas and regulatory standards 
can cause weak intermarket price relationships. 
I will therefore argue that conventional market ana lysis methods confuse the 
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notion of market integration-implying tradability, the prospect for earning nonnegative 
profits through spatial arbi trage-with the concept of competitive market equilibrium, in 
which profits should always be zero, whether or not a product is tradable between 
markets. This di ssertation offers a methodological innovation that, for the first time, 
permits this more nuanced and more informati ve type of market analysis. 
The Implications of Market Integration 
Information about market integration is important for the following reasons. 
First, estimation of market integration informs economic assessment of the extent of the 
market, as necessary for evaluating market structure, conduct, and performance for 
antitrust and other purposes. Although market integration is neither necessary nor 
sufficient fo r perfect competition in a market (Barrett 1996), it answers some intriguing 
questions, such as whether the market moves commodities towards their higher value 
users, and whether it is able to absorb large shocks (e.g., abundant or failed harvests, 
large swings in international prices) without breakdown (Fackler). Market integration 
may signal that the market is a linked oligopoly (or ol igopsony) whereby firms compete 
only within a limited service area (Faminow and Benson). Spatial price analysis is 
commonly used to examine the organization of markets. For instance, economists use the 
empirical results of market integration tests to investigate whether some regions exercise 
price leadership in a certain di stri ct. 
Second, aggregate data are frequent ly used to calibrate economic models. One 
must establish the spatial extent of markets before undertaking sectoral or 
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macroeconomic analysi s, for if markets are not spatially integrated, cross-sectional 
aggregation of demand and supply loses its logical foundation (Barrett 1996). Third, for 
agricultural and development economists, empirical assessment of spatial market 
integration also sheds light on questions concerning famines (Ravallion). Spatial 
arbitrageurs induced to trade by price differential s can resolve domestic food scarcity 
problems. Markets may or may not be able to mitigate potential human crisis, but 
knowledge about food market integration can help governments and international 
organizati ons react appropriately to prospecti ve famine. 
Introduction to Pacific Pork Markets 
In this di ssertation, price and trade relationships and market integrati on in Pacific 
Rim pork markets will be studied. The relative importance of the Pacific Rim region to 
international trade and the international economy in general has increased rapidl y in the 
last decade. In 1982, trans-Pacific trade of $1 12 billion exceeded trans-Atlantic trade by 
$I 2 billion. By 1989, trans-Paci fic trade amounted to about $300 billion where trans-
Atlantic trade totaled only$ I 15 billion (Dangler). The Pacific Rim region accounted for 
28.5% of world trade by 1988. Due to the relatively important role which the Pacific 
Rim is play ing in the world economy, we focus on pork price behavior in this region . 
There is not a precise definition for the Pacific Rim region. 1 In this study, we 
focus on the price, market, and trade relationships of the key pork markets in the Pacific 
1 One of the common definiti ons for the Pacific Rim region is comprised of fort)'- two independent 
nation-states along with Hong Kong, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and the Republic of Palau 
(Dangler). 
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Rim region. Due to limited data availability and the relative importance of each country, 
we study the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Japan in particular. 
Among the Pacific Rim countries of interest, the United States records the largest 
pork production, about 7.6 million metric tons yearly, 1990-94. During the same period, 
Japan ranks second, then comes Canada with average production of 1.5 and 1.2 million 
metric tons per year, respectively. Pork production in each country for the last decade is 
shown in figure I. U.S. pork production grew from 6,379 metric tons in 1986 to 8,027 
metric tons in 1994, increasing by 20%. Pork production in Taiwan, though not as much 
as the United States in abso lute quantity, grew faster, by 29% during the last decade. 
Canada maintains a relative stable pork output leve l, while Japan's pork production 
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Figure I. Pork production in Pacific Rim countries 
Data source: U. Department of Agriculture. 
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decreased from I ,594 metric tons in 1989 to I ,390 metric tons in 1994. This fact may 
account fo r the significant export changes of the United States and Japan. 
Figure 2 indicates the per capita pork consumption of these four key Pacific Rim 
countries. The Taiwanese consume more pork per capita than the others (about 38 
kilograms per capita annually), whi le the Japanese have the lowest pork consumption per 
capita, less than half that of Taiwan or Canada. This implies that individuals in these 
countries have different preferences and consumption habits toward pork. 
Regarding world pork trade, figure 3 shows the net exports of the four key Paci fie 
Rim countries in 1985, 1990, and 1994. Taiwan has become the main exporter in the 
region, thanks to a 79% increase in net exports. Because of improved productio n 
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Figure 2. Per capita pork consumption in Pacific Rim countries 
Data source: U.S Department of Agriculture. 
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technology and quality, Taiwan began to export pork into Japan in 1973, and now 
competes with the United States, Denmark, and Canada for the Japanese pork market. 
Due to the geographic proximity, Japan accounts for 95% of Taiwan's pork exports since 
1990 (Shu). Despite being the largest pork producer among these countries, the United 
States has been a net importer of pork. Yet, the net imports of the United States have 
decreased sharply from 454 metric tons in 1985 to 96 metric tons in 1994. Up to 90% of 
U.S. pork imports come from Canada and Denmark.2 Major importers of U.S. pork are 
Japan and Mexico, which together accounted for 73% of U.S. pork exports in 1994. 
b' 
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. 80() 
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Figure 3. Net exports of pork in Pacific Rim countries 
Data source: U.S Department of Agricu lture. 
200 400 
2 U.S. trade information is based on statist ics reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
Bureau of Census 1995. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
The purpose of this di ssertation is to develop an improved market analysis method 
to study price and trade relationships in the factor and product markets of the major pork 
producers of the Pacific Rim region. Instead of selecting one particular testing approach, 
the dissertati on compares the results from conventional methods with those derived from 
the fu ll in formation pari ty bounds model (FIPBM) developed in this dissertation. By 
doing so, l hope to arrive at a more accurate understanding of the relationships among the 
pork industries in the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Japan. 
Toward thi s end, l first present a comprehensive review of the literature on market 
integrati on testing in Chapter 2. Prev ious studies in thi s field are categori zed into fi ve 
groups based on the testing techniques adopted: simple bivariate correlation coeffi cients, 
Granger causality testing, Ravallion's model, cointegration testing, and a switching 
regimes model. l summari ze the interpretations and backgrounds o f each of these 
traditional methodologies, and identi fy the shortcomings of each. The role that 
transacti ons costs play in testing market integration is also di scussed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 introduces a new approach, which I label the full information parity 
bounds model (F!PBM). This new testing technique overcomes the principal 
imperfections of each of the conventional methods. The F!PBM improves the existing 
switching regimes model by including trade flow data, thereby enabling us to di stinguish 
between market equilibrium and market integrati on. Unlike existing methods, thi s model 
is able to account for discontinuous and bidirecti onal trade, costly, varying, and even 
nonstati onary transactions costs. as we ll as the effects of unobservable transactions costs 
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and nontari ff barriers to trade. 
Chapter 4 presents the data used in the empirical analysis and reports results of 
conventional market integration tests as well as the results from FIPBM. Implications for 
the Pacific pork markets under study are di scussed. Chapter 5 offers a brief summary of 
empirical fi ndings, implication, and directions for future research. 
II 
CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: MARKET ANALYSIS METHODS 
Conventional approaches to testing for spatial market integration rely heavily on 
measuring the comovement of prices in different markets and ignore the role transactions 
costs play in influencing patterns of trade and thus price comovement. In general, prices 
in different locations are subject to similar trends, such as inflati on and climatic 
conditions. The existence of price comovement between spatial markets is thus not a 
sufficient condition for concluding that the examined markets are integrated. Moreover, 
due to supply fluctuations and seasonal demand shocks, trade does not occur between 
integrated markets all the time. Thus, the absence of a strong comovement in regional 
price series does not imply inefficient market segmentation. It may be soc ially optimal 
for trade to be episodic rather than continuous. As a result, conventional market analysis 
methods that fail to consider discontinuous market integration fail to interpret spatial 
market re lationships accurately. This section reviews the conventional approaches to 
testing fo r market integration. The discussion of each method includes its conceptual and 
stati stical framework as well as its drawbacks. 
Before comparing various methods of testing market integration, it is necessary to 
clearly define the term "integration" for this study. In time series analysis, "integration" 
refers to the level of differencing required to render a data series stationary. That 
statistical definition of integration is not the one of relevance here. We are more 
interested in the economic concept of integration. Market integration concerns the free 
fl ow of goods and infonnation- and thus pri ces-over space, fom1, and time and is thus 
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closely re lated to, but di stinct from, concepts of efficiency (Barrett 1996). The 
observation of trade is sufficient to demonstrate market integration, although markets 
may be integrated even if trade does not take place. Market integration is thus colsely 
related to intermarket tradability; if there are nonnegative returns to spatial arbitrage and 
trade occurs, those markets are integrated. Two markets are said to be in competitive 
equi librium if intermarket price differentials are equal to transactions costs when trade 
takes place, and price differential s are less than or equal to transactions costs when trade 
does not take place. This is the classic Samuelson-Takayama-Judge spatial equilibrium 
concept (Samuelson; Takayama and Judge). 
Conventional market ana lysis methods fail to distinguish between equilibrium and 
integration, defining "market integration" as the intersection of these definitions (price 
differential s exactly equal to transactions costs). An alternative definition of market 
integration is that when a price shock takes place in one location, it will be perfectly 
transmitted to the other if and only if the two markets are integrated. Therefore, prices in 
the two regions are said to be integrated if they exhibit one-to-one changes (Goodwin and 
Schroeder 1990). In the literature on international trade, this phenomenon is known as 
the "law of one price" (LOP) (Ardeni ; Richardson). Analogously, efficient intertempora l 
market integrati on implies that there exist rationally speculative arbitrageurs who 
extinguish positive profit opportunities associated with commodity storage across 
periods. As a result, the price differentials between markets should be identical to the 
storage costs or processing costs if there is market integration across time or form 
(Baulch). Among the three forms of integration, measuring spatia l market integrat ion 
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causes most controversy and rece ives most attention in the literature (Dahlgran and 
Blank; Faminow and Benson; Goodwin and Schroeder 1991; McNew). 
Spatial Market Integration Analysis-
Some Methodological Review 
Many methodologies have been proposed to examine spatial price relationships. 
However, some of the early approaches have proved unreliable or inadequate to measure 
spatial price relationships correctly. In what follows, we review five different methods: 
simple bivariate correlation coefficients, Granger causality, Rava ll ion's method, 
co integration, and the switching regimes model , each of which has been applied to test 
for market integration across various goods and industries. 
Bivariale Correlation Coefficients 
Early research on market integration focused on measuring the comovement of 
two price series in distinct markets. The correlation coefficient, designated ( ~ , is a 
relative measure of the linear association between two series. Though there exist some 
limitations in using correlation coefficients to express the relationship between time 
series variables, it is still one of the most popular and easy-to-calculate tools. The 
formula for the correlation coefficient is as follows: 
(I) p = -r==·==' ======== 
1=1 1=1 
Cov(P, ,P) 
~v(P,)· v(P) ' 
where P, and PJI are the prices at timet in regions i andj, respectively, and P, and P, are 
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the means of the series P;, and PJr, respectively. The numerator of p is the covariance of 
the two series, while the denominator is the product of the standard deviations of each of 
them. Therefore, the coefficient of correlation corrects the unit scale problem that exists 
in the magnitude of covariance. Correlation coefficient values range from -1 to+ I. In an 
integrated market system, the coefficient of correlation should be positive, indicating a 
common positive relationship over time between the price series. That is, the prices are 
positively related and tend to move in the same direction. The higher the coefficient, the 
more strongly associated are the market prices. When two regions are integrated 
perfectly with each other, the measured correlation coefficient is supposed to be I if 
transactions costs are additive . Hence, the label "law of one price" represents a one-to-
one mapping between price series. 
Researchers have used correlation coefficients as an index of market 
competitiveness and integration in price analysis of staple foods in developing countries 
(Barrett 1995; Jones; Lele; Timmer) . Lele used the correlation coefficient approach to 
study weekly sorghum prices in western India. She found that the price correlation 
coefficient between the markets with lower sh ipment costs is higher than that between the 
markets with higher shipment costs. Timmer calculated the spatial correlation 
coefficients between various stalk paddy prices and the retail prices of milled rice 
reported by the Bureau of Logistics in several provinces in Indonesia, and found the 
coefficients to be uniformly high, even on the outer islands. As contrasted with Timmer's 
results, Jones got low correlation coefficients for various agricultural commodities in 
Nigeria. Of 4,836 coefficients, only 19 were as great as 0.9, and 424 were zero or 
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negative. This inconsistency, Jones suggested, is perhaps due to defects in data, poor 
information systems, and insufficiently strong motivation for traders. Recent research, 
such as that by Stigler and Sherwin, uses correlation coefficients of commodity prices and 
the logarithm of prices between cities to determine the range of product markets and 
substitution effects between products. Barrett ( 1995) uses simple correlation coefficients 
to test spatially distinct effects of economic liberalization on food markets in Madagascar. 
The correlation coefficient approach has important weaknesses as a tool for 
market integration testing. The most frequently referred drawback is the existence of 
common trends within price series over time. The common price trends, such as general 
inflation, gro.,.th in population, production seasonality, or other contemporaneous shocks, 
wi ll drive the numerator in price changes, thus yielding a high correlation coeffic ient. 
Harriss points out that increased effective demand relative to supply over time will 
likewise increase the correlation coefficient, particularly when the time period is long. 
She notes that prices from markets, which do not trade with each other, might be highly 
associated via the price and trading relationship of a joint destination market. On the 
other hand, high correlation coefficients may also be caused by the intervention of some 
public authorities, private cartel, or monopoli sts who set price levels (Harriss ; Heytens). 
Another problem associated with the bivariate correlation coefficient method, as 
indicated by Baulch, is that trade does not take place consistently among markets. Trade 
is profitable and occurs only when the price differential exceeds the transfer costs. As a 
result, the correlation coefficient might not be high even though markets are well 
integrated in the economic sense that arbitrageurs are wi lling and able to exploit profit 
16 
opportunities as they emerge. Furthermore, the contemporaneous correlation between 
two price series fails to investigate the true relationship if there are delivery or 
information lags in responding to price fluctuations. One needs to determine a proper lag 
time to accurately calculate the respondent bivariate correlation coefficient. In the wake 
of these problems, Haugh proposed the cross-correlation approach to calculate correlation 
coefficients in a more general dynamic setting. The contemporaneous correlation 
coefficient is thus a special case of the cross-correlation function. Briefly, the bivariate 
correlation coefficient by no means indicates the extent to which markets are integrated. 
Integrati on analysis demands more information about market conditions. 
The Granger Causality Test 
Another commonly used approach to testing market integration is the Granger 
causality test, first proposed by Granger in 1969. There are three major patterns of 
temporal relationships between two series. First, the series X "Granger causes" Y, 
denoted by X-? Y, if the values of Y could be better predicted by including the past 
values of X than by not including them. Second, there may be feedback (or bi-
directional) causality, usua lly denoted by XH Y, if X Granger causes Y and Y Granger 
causes X. The last option is instantaneous causality, wherein including both past and 
present values of X increases the predictability of Y, while just including past values of X 
does not (delineating thi s from the first alternative). However, if including 
contemporaneous X in the explanatory variable set does not improve the predictions of Y, 
then X and Y have no causal relation with one another. The above possible causality 
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relations are based on all available relevant information in the universe, excluding Y. ln 
practice, causality tests are made after narrowing the available relevant information set to 
a few time series, customarily just X and Y themselves. 
A widely utilized and standard test is demonstrated by Granger ( 1969) and 
Geweke, Meese, and Dent. They suggest identifying the causal relation from X to Y by 
estimating the following equations: 
" (2) Y, = a10 + :L, a,. Y, _, + e11 , 
k: l 
(3) ~ = a2o + f.a .:!k >~-* + f bu X,_k + e2,' 
k =l 4-=:1 
(4) }~ = aJo +f.. au Y, _k + fbJkX,_k + eJ, . 
k=l k=O 
Equations (2) and (3) together are used to test if X Granger causes Y, while the 
combination of (2) and (4) is performed to test if X Granger causes Y instantaneously. 
One obviously reestimates these equations, letting X1 be the dependent variable and Y1_, 
the third term regressor in equations (3) and (4). Here nand mare the optimal lags to be 
included in each equation3, and X,, Y, are two stationary time series with zero means 
(Granger 1969, p. 431). As assumed by Granger, e11 , e2, and e3, are uncorrelated white-
noise series and are independent of any of the right-hand side variables in the equation. 
The null hypothesis for the Granger causality tests is that b21=bn=b23= . .. =b2m=O. The 
3 The most common selection criteria for lag length, n and m, are the Akaike infonnation criterion 
(A I C) and Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) (Enders). The length of lags is often referred to as the speed 
of adjustment or the period during which a price shock in one market is transmitted to another. 
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Granger test is equivalent to testing the joint hypothesis by the following F test. 
(5) F" = SSE, -SSE, I SSE, . 
m N-n-m -1 
Within equation (5), SSE1 and SSE2 are the sums of squared errors from ordinary 
least square regressions on equations (2) and (3) when testing causality, or on (3) and (4) 
fo r testing instantaneous causality. N is the number of total observations on Y. If the F' 
test statistic is larger than the appropriate critical value from the F di stribution with (m, 
N-n-m-1 ) degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y is 
rejected. 
Slade appli ed standard Granger causa lity tests to detect if the petroleum product 
price in one region is exogenous to the price determination process in another. She also 
fo und that causality tests are invariant with respect to strictly monotonic transformations 
of the data. The direct Granger approach is employed by Dries and Unnevehr to test fo r 
leads and lags in the process of price di scovery. They found that the United States and 
Austral ian beef prices are close ly integrated and that the United States acts as a leader in 
the world beef market due to its market size and trade policy. Other applications of this 
methodology include Bessler and Brandt in American livestock markets; Adamowicz, 
Baah, and Hawkins in Canadian and U.S. hog markets; Blank and Schmiesing in the U.S. 
midwestern corn markets; and Benson and Faminow in Alberta hog prices. More current 
research using causali ty tests was done by Jordan and VanSickle, analyzing the 
integration of Florida and Mexico's tomato markets. 
An alternati ve stati stica l methodology for testing Granger causality was proposed 
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by Pierce and Haugh. Unlike the standard Granger causality method discussed above, 
which regresses the original time series on each other, they ftrst detrend (X., Y,) to (x., y1) 
so that it is a stationary, purely nondeterministic time series. That is, they "pre-whiten" 
the series to ensure that the apparent causality is not due to common autocorrelation. 
Assume that there exist uni variate linear processes representations for x, and y, 
with estimated residuals £1 and 11" respectively. The test that X Granger-causes Y is equal 
to test that £1 Granger-causes !11, i.e. , the relationship should appear in pre-whitened 
series. Therefore, one needs to estimate: 
(6) !1 , = L c-r , )~:: , _, + L (-o , )!l ,_, + w, . 
1>0 1>0 
In short, one can deduce that a causa l relati nn ex ists if and only if the past values 
of £1 are jointly significantly related to the current value of !11• That is, when r/s are 
jointly and significantly di fferent fro m zero, X is said to Granger-causeY. Analogously, 
the significance test of y0 can be used to test the instantaneous causality between the time 
series. Several subsequent studies have adopted Pierce and Haugh's methodology (e.g., 
Klein, RifKin, and Uri ; Uri , Howell , and RifKin; and Uri et al.). 
Besides the two primary stati stical techniques discussed above, Holmes and 
Hutton ( 1988, 1990) modified the classical Granger causality test, and advocated a 
distribution-and-functional-form-free, nonparametric alternative to the Granger causality 
test. The procedure is primarily based on the rank ordering of each variable based on the 
concept that any strictly monotonic transformation of some or all of the variables wi ll not 
affect the causal relationship between the ori ginal series. They suggest ranking each 
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series and then using the rank value as a replacement of the original data. Holmes and 
Hutton ( 1990) argue that the rank orderings approach is robust when the assumption of 
normally distributed errors is violated, and yields similar results under the maintained 
hypotheses. Gordon, Hobbs, and Kerr extended the Holmes-Hutton nonparametric 
testing procedure to a trivariate model specification, and tested the price integration in the 
British-French markets for lamb after the introduction of the European community 
sheepmeat regime. 
Although the causality test in Granger's definition has some advantages over the 
correlation coefficient (Benson and Faminow), there are some weaknesses in using it to 
describe market relationships. First, the results of a causality test are sensitive to the 
particular statistical forms of tests (Chowdhury; Holmes and Hutton 1988) and the 
functional form specification• (usually assumed to be linear in the literature) of the test 
regressions (Roberts and Nord). McNew pointed out that spatial prices are likely to be 
nonl inearly related. Therefore, the assumed linearity relationships in the literature are not 
always appropriate. Various stati stical procedures suggest different functiona l forms to 
test causal relationship based on Granger's definition. The outcomes have been found to 
be sensitive to the analyst's choice 'Of functional forms. This implies that in some 
situations these tests might be unreliable. 
The second criticism relates to the ad hoc choice of detrending filter. It is argued 
that when the prechosen filter fails to whiten the serial corre lation in the test series, it is 
4 By varing the functional form of the test regressions, Roberts and Nord found the F·statistics for 
causality test range from almost zero to over ten. 
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possible that one ends up with an artificial causal relationship between the variab les 
under studys It has al so been shown that the remaining autocorrelati on with in the series, 
and thus the residuals, will generate a downward bias in the lowest significance level at 
which the null hypothesis that causality does not occur could be rejected (Pierce and 
Haugh), thereby leading one to reject the null hypothesis too often. 
The third shortcoming of Granger causality is the fundamental assumption on the 
error terms. The conventional technique relies on homoscedastici ty and normality of the 
disturbance terms. One needs to perfo rm diagnosti c tests on these assumptions before 
making in fe rence fro m traditi ona l Granger causality testing. The fo urth controversy 
within the methodology is the omission of other variables which have some influence on 
the two series being examined. Like most stati stica l methods, the neglect of re levant 
variables wi ll render the test results spurious. 
Fackler proposed that if unidirectional causa li ty is di scovered in a market that 
should not exhibit dominant/sate llite relationships, it implies that the market shou.ld be 
analyzed carefully. It is improper to deduce that markets are ineffi cient and spati ally 
segmented when bidirectional causa lity is not found . The finding of unidirectional 
causa lity is not a sufficient condition for market ineffi ciency (Gupta and Mueller). Lag-
length selection in Granger's causality testing is also a subject of controversy. As 
summarized by Thornton and Batten, lag-length selection is directly linked to the 
j The Box and Jenkins approach serves as a tool to identify the time series generming process. The 
Lj ung-Box-Pierce Q-statistic is the corresponding diagnostic test with the null hypothesis of no sign ificant 
autocorrelat ion (Enders). 
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appropriate trade-off between model parsimony and efficiency associated with 
overparameterization. The estimates are unbiased but inefficient with too many lags, and, 
conversely, biased but relatively efficient (with smaller variance) with too few lags. 
When causality is used to test spatial market integrat ion, lag length se lection is closely 
related to delivery lag between two regions. Thus lag length should be determined 
according to the actual duration of shipments as established empirically. The last 
problem with Granger causality testing is the omission of transactions costs. The 
ex istence of essential transactions costs wi ll cause di scontinuous trade, thus leading to 
piecewise relationships between spatial price series (McNew). Therefore, the assumption 
of linear price relations in causality tests is not always appropriate. 
To sum up, Granger causality testing may be superior to simple bivariate 
correlation coefficients in establish ing comovement between price series because it 
accounts for the leading or lagged effects in price movements. In addition, the testing 
approach proposed by Pierce and Haugh solves the problem caused by common trends, 
wh ich is the main criticism of simple correlation coefficients. However, causal ity tests 
alone are not sufficient for an individual to infer market integration, especially when 
transactions costs complicate the price generating process. The best suggestion is to start 
by assuming that the inherent problems in using the statistical methods mentioned above 
do exist in the price series of interest, then test the market relations with caution. 
Ravallion's Model 
Martin Ravallion proposed a new approach to market integration testing in 1986. 
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Rather than test the direction of causal dependence between markets, Ravallion assumed 
that direction and constructed a dynamic model with a central urban market, from which 
price shocks originate, and a rural (local) market linked to the central one by traders. 
Ravallion's model enables an investigator to distinguish between short-run 
(i nstantaneous) market integration and the long-run (i.e., equilibrium) integrati on, i.e., the 
end of short-run, disequilibrium dynamic adjustment processes. The model is based on 
est imating the following equations. 
II N , 
(7) ~~= L a,, ~.~-~~ + LLb,', ~.,-h +ctXt, + et, , 
h=l 1:::2 h=O 
II II 
(8) P,, = Ia,,P,,_;, + Lb,, ~ , _, +c,X, +e, (i = 2, ... , N), 
h=l h :.O 
where market l is the centra l market and P 1 is the price series in the central market, and 
the P,'s are the prices in the N- 1 local markets. X1 and X; are the vector influences on the 
urban and local markets, respecti vely, i.e., seasonality or inflation. Assume there is a 
total of N markets, including the central one. The idea behind the Ravallion model is to 
regress the current local market price on its own lagged prices and present and past prices 
from the central market, as we ll as on common trend variables like inflation and 
seasonality. This model is sui ted to a simple radial configuration (Rava llion). The 
centra l market price is taken as an exogenous variable in predicting the local markets' 
prices. The relevant hypotheses about market integration can be formed using the 
parameters in equation (8). The hypotheses of relationships tested by Ravallion's model 
include: 
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(a) Market segmentation: 
Markets are said to be segmented if price changes in the central market are not 
passed to the other markets. In Ravallion's model, this is equivalent to a joint 
test that b,h = 0 (for h = 0, I, ... , n). 
(b) Short- run market integration (strong fom1): 
Short-run market integration means the price shocks in the central market are 
fu ll y and instantaneously transmitted to the local markets without any delay. 
To define short-run market integration strictly, thus the labe l "strong form," 
past central prices have no lagged effects on the current local prices. 
Therefore, a joint test of the hypothesis that b10 = I and ail, = b,h = 0 (for h = 0, 
I, .. . , n) eva luates strong form market integration. 6 
(c) Short-run market integrat ion (weak form): 
A less restricti ve concept of short-run market integration, defined by 
Ravallion as the weak form of market integration, is to regard the lagged 
effects as no cumulative effect. The joint hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is: 
bw = I and L(a,h + b,h )= 0 (for h = 0, I, ... , n) . 
(d) Long-run market integrati on : 
Long-run market equilibrium and integration mean that prices in local and 
central markets are fully related over time. The criterion for this situation is: 
6 The strong-fonn shon-run integration test is simi lar to Richardson's law of one price (LOP) test 
in internat iona l economics. LOP involves regress ing the current prices in one market on a constant and 
prices in another market, then testing whether the estimated price coefficient is equa l to I by using the 
simple two-s ided t test. 
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LP•h + '[b;h = I (for h = 0, I , ... , n). 
There may, however, be a problem due to nonstationarity of price series and 
multicollinearity (Lutz, Tilburg, and Kamp) . To get more powerful and efficient 
estimates of the parameters, Ravallion transformed equation (8) to an error correction 
fo rm, as shown by equation (9). The error correcti on mechan ism (ECM) is : 
~P;, =(a, - l)(P;_,_1 - P, _,_,) + I a ;h (P;_,_" - P, _,_h) + b ;0 ~P,, 
h=2 
n- 1 h 
(9) + .L, (b ,0 - 1 + .L, (a ,, + b,, )]~P, _t-h 
h=l k=l 
+[b,0 - 1+ I (a,, +b ,; )] P,_,_, +c ;X ;, +e., , 
J=l 
where ~P, = P, - P;,r. 1 , i.e., the price changes in the ith market. The interpretation of 
equati on (9) is straightforward. One can omit the third to last tem1 by imposing the long-
run integration condition, if long-run integration is found to exist. The error correction 
mechanism implies that local price changes are attributed to the previous price 
differentials between local and central markets, the past and present price changes in the 
rural market, and common trend vari ables. The parameter restrictions for short-run 
market integration hypotheses are a,1 = 0 and b;o = I. It is worth noticing that the strong-
form short-run integration implies weak-form short-run integration, which then implies 
long-run integration. 
The Ravallion model and its adapted versions have been applied to examine the 
degree of market integration in different areas. For instance, Heytens tested the market 
integration of agricultural products in Nigeria. Faminow and Benson used the Ravallion 
method on Canadian hog prices. Based on the concept that price shocks in a market may 
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be absorbed by the equilibrium within the contiguous but discontinuous market, Dahlgran 
and Blank applied the ECM to evaluate the integration of contiguous but discontinuous 
markets in western alfalfa hay markets. In short, when a discontinuous market is a part of 
a spatial market system, the degree of market integration of the continuous markets 
depends on whether the discontinuous markets are operating. Precisely, they found 
continuous markets are less integrated during the period when the discontinuous markets 
are working. Other researchers have mostly concentrated on analyzing agricultural 
produce markets in developing countries (e.g. , Alderman; Alexander and Wyeth; Lutz, 
Til burg, and Kamp; Timmer). 
There are some limitations to Rava llion's model. First, Ravallion's model 
assumes a rad ial market system in which the central market is a demand surplus market, 
and any demand shock in it causes price variations in outlying markets. It is presumed 
that central market prices need to be exogenous in estimating the parameters in equati on 
(8). However, this supposition is rarely true. In reality, not only do demand shocks in 
ci ties affect the price-generating process, so do supply shocks in production areas cause 
price variations. One remedy for the potential simultane ity bias is to choose appropriate 
instrumental variables and use two-stage least squares. Being aware of this problem, 
Ravalli on uses the estimated P11 , which is obtained by regressing P;, against its past 
values, the lagged prices in all other markets and other influencing variables (e.g., 
seasonality, famine, and time trend) as instrumental variables to estimate equation (8). 
Neverthe less, it is questionable to employ such an instrumental variable for P,, may be 
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correlated with the residuals in (8). Rather than use the predicted prices as an 
instrumental variable, Baulch suggests other nonprice instrumental variables, such as 
rainfa ll or produce flows. Moreover, by using lagged prices from local markets as 
instruments for current central market price, Ravallion's instrumental variables approach 
itself undermines hi s claims of a radial market structure. 
Like most conventional market integration testing methods, the Ravallion model 
fa ils to deal with the transactions costs. The strong- form short-run criterion is only true 
when transactions costs exhi bit no persistence (Fack ler). Therefore, the strong-fo rm 
short-run hypothesis might be rejected due to nonstationari ty in transport costs even 
under the circumstance that markets are integrated . A problem also ari ses when trade 
takes place between local markets. In Rava llion's model, such trade is assumed to 
operate only through the central market in the radia l market configuration. Furthemw re, 
when there are bidirectional commodity flows between the dominant and hinterland 
markets, the model will generally favo r rejecting the hypothesis of market integration 
(Barrett 1996; 1-leytens). Moreover, Ravallion's model leads to biased conclusions when 
trade does not happen continuously over the study period. Violations in either the 
assumptions of constant or trivial transport costs or continuous or bid irectional trade may 
cause incorrect rejection of the market integration hypothesis. Finally, by employing an 
error correction mechanism, Ravall ion's method implicitly assumes, by Granger's 
representation theorem, that the price seri es under study are cointegrated. Recognition of 
that point led to another test of market integration, cointegration tests. 
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Cointegration Testing 
Due to the nonstationarity of many economic time series, the concept of 
co integration has become wide ly used in econometric analysis over the last decade. 7 
Before proceeding to the definition of co-integration, the term "integration" should be 
defined . In forma lly, a series is said to be integrated if it accumulates some past effects. 
Such a series is not stationary because its future path depends on the past va lues/shocks, 
and is not bo und to some mean to which it will eventually converge (Banerjee et a l.). An 
integrated process is one that can be transformed to stationarity by differencing. More 
precisely, a series is integrated of order d if it is nonstationary after differencing d-1 times 
and becomes stati onary after diffe rencing d times. Two variables, which are both 
integrated o f the same order, are cointegrated if some linear combination of them is 
sta tionary. For example, if series {X,} and { Y,) are integrated of order I (custo marily 
denoted 1(1)), and {X,+ aY,) is a stationary series, then X, and Y, are said to be 
cointegrated wi th the cointegrating vector a8 The cointegration testing framework has 
been well developed by Engle and Granger; Engle and Yoo; and Johansen. 
7 The intuitive concept of stationarity is that the discrepancies between the observations and their 
postulated equilibrium have a constant-mean (typically zero) according to a fi xed distribution over time. 
Stat ionary series are thus sometimes described as "mean-revening" but not conversely. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fu ller) is usua lly used to test the stationarity of a series, say P, . The 
first step for testing the stationari ty in levels is to regress the first differences (AP,) on one-period lagged 
levels (P1• 1) , lagged first differences ( l:t. P1. 1) , a constant and trend. while the last two regressors are optional. 
If the estimated coefficient on P,. 1 is significantly negative by comparing to the critical values establ ished by 
Dickey and Ful ler. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the series under test is nonstationary. 
The process is repeated until the null hypothesis is rejected, and l(d) is found . Another commonly used 
testing for unit root was proposed by Philips and Perron. 
8 There might be more than one cointegrating vector, and the vector may also inc lude a constant 
tem1. 
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The concept of cointegration is related to the definition of a long-run equi librium 
and can serve as a statistical description of some long-run equilibrium relationship 
(Banerjee et al.). The fact that two series are cointegrated implies that the integrated 
series move together in the long run. The variables might diverge in the short run, but the 
deviations cannot grow over time. That is, two cointegrated variables cannot move "too 
far away" from each other, though short-run volatility in price differentials may be 
observed. As has been discussed in the previous sect ions, prices in different markets 
have comovement if the markets are integrated. Therefore, testing cointegration of two 
price series is sometimes believed to be equivalent to detecting long-run market 
integration. 
Another important property of cointegrated variables is the ex istence of a 
corresponding error-correction representation between any two cointegrated variables. 
This is known as the Granger Representation Theorem9 (Granger 1986). Granger's 
theorem enables the use of a forrn like Ravallion's model, as long as one has already 
established cointegration. 
Engle and Granger proposed a standard procedure for testing co integration. First, 
one needs to pretest the integrating orders of the series. By definition, two series with 
different orders of integration cannot be cointegrated (Baffes). That is, cointegration 
necessitates that the variables of interest be integrated of the same order. Variables that 
9 The Granger Representation Theorem (G ranger 1986) proves that a set of cointegrated va riables 
can be presented in three forms: the vector autoregressive (V AR), error-correction, and moving average 
fonns. 
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are individually stationary are trivially cointegrated. Some previous studies, such as 
Ardeni ,10 tested for cointegration without first checking the integration order of each 
price series. Cointegration does not exist between variables integrated of different orders. 
The second step is to estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship, i.e., Y1=bo+b1 X,+e,. 
This is the well known "cointegrating regression. " 
The third step is to recover the residuals from the cointegrating regression. Since 
the residuals represent the deviations from long-run equilibrium, if those departures are 
fo und to be stati onary, it implies that short-run divergences from the long-run equili bri um 
disappear in the long run. Hence, the next step is to test the stationarity of the recovered 
res iduals. The most commonly employed test for stationarity 11 is the augmented Dickey-
Full er (ADF) unit root test (Dickey and Full er). To perform the ADF test, the 
autoregression, equation ( I 0), must be estimated. 
( 10) 6e, =a 1e,_1 + f a,+16e,_i +E,. 
,,, 
The null hypothesis of the ADF test is a 1 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothes is 
that the series is nonstationary in favor of the negative one-sided alternati ve hypothesis 
means the two series are cointegrated o f order ( 1, 1), provided both series are 1( 1). 
10 Ardeni tested the law of one price between di fferent countries across various commodities. He 
first tested the stationarity of each price leve l, and fou nd that on ly one price series out of nineteen was 
stationary in leve ls. Then he directly ran the regression of one price on the others and tested the stationarity 
of the res iduals recovered fi"om the cointegrating regression. 
11 Other test stat istics, as pointed out in Engle and Granger's seminal paper, are the Durbin-Watson 
statistic, the Dickey-Ful ler test, the restricted vector autoregression test (RV AR), the augmented RVAR 
(ARVAR), the unrestricted vector au toregress ion test (U VAR), and augmented or higher order version of 
the above tests. 
31 
Based on the Granger Representation Theorem, if variables are cointegrated, then 
there ex ists an appropriate error-correcti on model (ECM). To confi rm the test result by 
the standard Granger procedures above, one might want to estimate the ECM (expressed 
by equati ons ( II ) and (12)), and assess the adequacy of the model. 
" m ( II ) !'!.Y, =a0 +a,e,_, + I, a,,!'!.Y,_, + I, a ,;LlX,_; +£", 
i =l i=l 
( 12) 
The coeffi cients in equati on ( II ) and ( 12) have important implications for the 
speed of adjustment in the system. If neither a 1 nor ~ 1 is significantly di ffe rent from 
ze ro, it im plies that an error-co rrecti on mechanism does not exist. 
An alternative test fo r cointegration proposed by Johansen is based on max imum 
li ke lihood estimation. This technique is part icu larly important when testi ng mult ivariate 
cointegration, i.e., cointegration among more than two variables {Alexander and Wyeth; 
Silvapulle and Jayasuriya). Rather than test every pairwise comparison in the whole data 
set, Johansen's approach deals with the relations among all series simultaneously. That 
is, it tests the number of cointegrating vectors within a price system of interest. 
Johansen's test starts from testing the null hypothesis that there is no co integration 
between variables. If this is rejected, it then proceeds to test the null hypothesis that there 
is onl y one cointegrating relationship. It repeats the same procedure unt il fa iling to reject 
the null hypothesis. When r cointegrating vectors are fo und to ex ist among k price series, 
it implies that there are r cointegration re lationships among k series and (k-r) common 
32 
trends. 12 
Cointegration testing has some anractive features that do not ex ist in the other 
market integration testing approaches. First of all, a cointegration test does not require 
the tested series to be stationary. The controversy surrounding prefiltering and stationary 
transformations can thus be avoided. A cointegration test can be applied to any pair of 
series provided they are integrated of the same order. This approach also need not 
assume any variable to be exogenous, which is a problem in Ravallion's model. 
However, there still are important limitations to the usefu lness of cointegration 
tests. Though cointegration tests di spense with the assumption of constant transactions 
costs, they nonetheless assume that transactions costs are stationary. Cointegration is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for market integration if transactions costs are 
nonstationary (Barren 1996; Fackler). Goodwin, and Davutyan and Pippenger found that 
ignoring the influence of transactions costs seriously distorts cointegration test results. 
Furthermore, trade does not occur all the time, especially between those markets where 
transactions costs are relatively high and the price differentials are not always large 
enough to offset the transactions costs. This discontinuity in trade flows results in 
nonlinear (kinked, piecewise linear) relationships between market prices (McNew; 
McNew and Fackler). Therefore, linear cointegration testing may be problematic if the 
nonlinearity introduced by trade discontinuities is pronounced. 
Despite the defects in cointegration testing, it is still a popular methodology for 
12 For more de£ails on the Johansen coi ntcgration test, refer to Johansen; Johansen and Juselius, or 
Banerjee et al. 
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testing market integration in the recent literature. Cointegration tests have been applied 
to examine the market for hogs by Benson et al. ( 1994, 1996). Goodwin and Schroeder 
( 1990) used cointegration with rational expectations to test regional U.S. cattle markets. 
Another study by Goodwin and Schroeder ( 199 1) found that distances between markets, 
industry concentration ratios, market volumes, and market types have significant 
influence on cointegration relations between markets. t3 
Furthermore, cointegration tests have been used to test for market integration in 
some developing countries. For instance, Dercon applied a seven-step procedure of 
cointegration testing to evaluate the effects of liberali zation and war on food markets in 
Ethiopia. Pa laskas and Harri ss-White, and Alexander and Wyeth offer a reduced form of 
an error-correction mechanism to exami ne the food economy in West Bengal and the 
Indonesian rice markets, respectively. The Johansen test was also adopted by Si lvapulle 
and Jayasuriya to test the Philippines rice market. 
In international commodities markets, Ardeni , Baffes, Goodwin, and Michael, 
Nobay, and Peel have used cointegration methods to test the law of one price (LOP). 
Goodwin and Michael , Nobay, and Peel considered the role of transportation costs on 
co integration test results (long run LOP). They found omission of transport costs will 
produce results unfavorable to the LOP. When transportation costs are explicitly 
identified, the LOP still holds. Muscatelli and Hurn applied both Engle and Granger's 
13 Goodwin and Schroeder ( 199 1) found that distances and lower market volume have negative 
innuences on the level of cointegration and that with all else constant, increased concentration in the beef-
slaughter industry enhanced spatial market cointegrat ion. 
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procedure and Johansen's method to estimate the money demand in the Uni ted Kingdom. 
They provide the detail s for executing each approach and comparisons of the two testing 
results. 
Swi1ching Regimes Model 
As emphasized from the outset of this dissertation, market integration is closely 
related to transactions costs. Not only does the magnitude of transactions costs affect 
arbitrage conditions, transactions costs also determine the occurrence of trade between 
markets. When transacti ons costs are too high to be covered by price differences, trade 
does not take place. This causes trade flows to be discont inuous, resulting in piecewise 
linear relations between market price series which the linear estimation methods 
discussed above might not handle well. Therefore, transactions costs ought to play a 
crucial role in market integration testing. 
Traditional market integrati on testing methods, however, assume that transactions 
costs are either constant or proportional over time. This happens because market analysis 
using on ly price data-what Barrett ( 1996) labels "level 1" market analysi s methods-does 
not employ data on the costs of arbitrage. Considerable academic research has revealed 
that neglecting the characteristics of transacti ons costs will lead to incorrect results when 
testing market integration (Baulch; Fackler; Goodwin; Goodwin and Grennes; McNew 
and Fackler; Michael, Nobay, and Peel; Roehner) . When regions are integrated in some 
periods and separate during others, conventional methodologies fail to represent the 
relationship between the markets accurate ly. To capture perhaps-discontinuous market 
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relationships, switching regime models employing transactions cost in fo rmation have 
been constructed. Because these techniques use data on arbitrage costs as well as prices, 
Barrett ( 1996) labels these "level II" methods. 
A switching regimes model was first introduced by Spiller and Huang to examine 
the economic market for wholesale gasoline in the northeastern United States. They 
designed a two-regime model and estimated the transactions costs required to arbitrage 
between regions and the probabili ty of two markets being integrated. Spi ller and Wood 
then ex tended the model to a three-regime model, and again applied thi s switching 
regimes model to gasoline markets in the northeastern United States. 
The first study to apply the switching regimes model to an agricu ltural commodity 
was done by Sexton, Kling, and Carman. They deve loped three different regimes-
relative shortage, equilibrium and relative glut- to analyze U.S. ce lery markets. The 
similarities o f the three previous studies are that they estimated the switching regimes 
models by max imum likelihood methods, treating interregional transport costs as an 
endogenous variable estimated within the model. The switching regimes model estimates 
the probability that markets are integrated over time. This improves upon conventional 
approaches, which test for market integration based on an "all or nothing" binary 
hypothesis. The switching regimes model also overcomes the problem caused by 
arbitrarily choosing one price seri es as exogenous, as occurs in Ravalli on's method. 
The scenario in Sexton, Kling, and Carman's spatial market structure assumes that 
some region acts as a major exporter with others as terminal markets. If price spreads 
between the main export market and the terminal market differ exactly by the shipment 
36 
costs, the two markets are in equilibrium, i.e. , the arbitrage condition binds. A relative 
shortage (glut) situation occurs if the price spread is larger (less) than transportation 
costs. To simplifY the analysis, they assumed that prices in supplier markets are always 
lower than those in terminal markets. Accordingly, they defined three regimes which 
describe all possible arbitrage conditions. 
Regime I : Price differentials equal transactions costs. 
( 13) ~ ' -P/=T,e +v, ' with probability /1.1. 
Regime 2: Price differentials exceed transactions costs. 
( 14) ~ I - ~ C = r,C + v,' + d with probability "-2· 
Regime 3: Price differentials are less than transactions costs. 
( 15) with probability 1..3. 
where P,' is the price at time t in terminal markets i, and P,' is the price in supplier 
market, T,. is per unit shipping cost between markets i and e, v,' is a randomly distributed 
di sturbance term, and u,' is a positive random variable. 
Regime I corresponds to market equilibrium and integration with binding 
arbitrage conditions . Regime 2 is a relative shortage situation with di storted product 
allocations, i.e., perhaps a market in di sequilibrium, creating positive profit opportunities. 
Shipping product from market e to i is still profitable for arbitrageurs. The opposite 
circumstances is regime 3, where price differentials do not cover shipping costs, again 
presumably a situation of market disequil ibrium since shipments are presumably taking 
place nonetheless. It implies that there are excess shipments relati ve to the effi cient 
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arbitrage amount. The estimated probabilities, A.~, A.2 and A.3, must sum to I. 
Assume the error terms, v, are independently and identica lly di stributed normal 
variables with zero mean and variance, a/. Then assume u, is independent of v, and 
di stributed as a half-normal di stribution truncated from below at zero with a variance a./ 
(i. e., the variance of original nom1al distribution). The maximum likelihood function for 
this switching regime model relies on the di stribution of the sum of a symmetric normal 
and truncated (positive) normal distributions. 14 The likelihood function of the model is : 
,. 
( 16) L= fl[A.,J;' +A. ,!, ' +A. ,!, ' ]. 
1= 1 
where [A.; = I, andf,1,}/ andf,3 are the joint density functions of v, and u, in equations 
( I 3) to ( 15). As shown by Sexton, Kling, and Carman, the density functions of these 
three regimes can be expressed as follows: 
!,' =_]_¢[Y, - T,] 
a , a , 
/, , _ [ 2 ] . [ Y, - T, ][I _ <t>[ -< Y, - T, )a . I a , ]] 
' - (a .,' +a ,. 2 ) 112 ¢(a ., ' + a , 2 ) 112 (a ., ' +0" , 2 ) 11 2 ' 
r'- [ 2 ]· [ Y,-T, J[l-<t>[(Y,-T,)a.,/ a,]] 1
' - (a .' +a ,. 2 ) 11 2 ¢ (a, 2 +a,2 ) 112 (a .' +a,.2 ) 112 ' 
where ¢ is the standard normal density function and <t> is the cumulati ve distribution 
14 An analogous concept is discussed in the frontier production function estimation literature. The 
error tenn of a frontier function is composed of a nonpositi ve disturbance associated with deviations from 
the output funct ion and a random disturbance assoc iated with measurement of sampling error {A igner. 
Lovell , and Schm idl). 
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function for the standard normal; T, and Y, are the transport costs and price differences 
between the terminal and producing markets at time t. The probabilities of the three 
regimes, transportation costs, and the variance of u1 and v1 are then estimated using 
max imwn likelihood methods. 
Sexton, Kling, and Carman also proposed that the above switching regimes model 
can be applied to test price discrimination, and thus, market competitiveness and product 
substitution. The model may be used to test for price discrimination by decomposing the 
estimated T, into pure shipment cost and an incremental mark-up to the price. According 
to Sti gler and Sherwin's definition of the extent of a commodity market,15 Sexton, Kling, 
and Carman replaced T, in the model with a price premium. The estimate of A. 1 is, 
therefore, directly related to the degree of substitution. They found the introduction of 
delivery lags did increase the probability of binding arbitrage conditions. 
The current state of the art in the switching regime models in level II market 
anal ysis methods is due to Baulch. His parity bounds model (PBM) departs from the 
original switching regimes model by inc luding transportation costs explicitly rather than 
estimating them within the model. 16 He pointed out that it is improper to estimate 
transactions costs based on market price differences. Price differential s consist not on ly 
o f transactions costs, but also of other influences such as quality differences, the effect of 
u Two varieties of a commodity are sa id to be in the same market if they are perfect substitutes. 
Therefore, the degree of substitution can be seen as an index for testing market extent. 
16 There are three similar regimes in Baulch's parity bounds model (Baulch). Regime I is the 
situat ion where price differentials equal transactions costs; regime 2 (regime 3) is the situat ion where price 
differenlials are less (greater) than transactions costs. That is, Bau lch's regimes 2 and 3 are the opposite of 
the deli nitions used by Sexton, Kling, and Carman. 
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transportation bottlenecks (Baulch), or the presence of nontrivial risk prem ia (Barrett 
1996). As a result, it is problematic to assess whether markets are integrated or not when 
transactions costs are estimated endogenously. Baulch therefore exogenizes transport 
costs in the model. In other words, by including observed shipping costs, Baulch's PBM 
estimates the probability of market integration based on price differentials as well as 
transport costs. 
Due to the unavailability of complete transportation costs series, he used a single 
peri od's transportation costs and adj usted it by the consumer price index to generate an 
estimated transportation cost time series. The generated series is hand led as a proxy for 
the rea l transactions costs. PBM compares price differential s with the estimated 
transportation costs to establish the probabili sti c bounds where arbitrage cond itions bind, 
and thus markets are integrated and in equilibrium. Monte Carlo testing shows that the 
parity bounds model significantly enhances accuracy in estimating the probabilities of 
market integration or segmentation, i.e., that arbi trage conditions bind over level I market 
analysis methods (Baulch). 
Though the switching regimes model hurdles some remaining prob lems that ex ist 
in traditional methods, such as trade discontinuity, time-varying transactions costs, the 
binary hypothesis of market integration, and the linear relation assumption about 
intermarket price relations, there remains some room to improve the model by including 
trade flow information, provided data are available . Trade does not necessarily (not) take 
place when interrnarket margins are greater (less) than related transactions costs. Trade 
fl ows reveal traders' preferences. Since we can never observe all poss ible transacti ons 
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costs involved in trade (e.g. , subjective risk premia or discount rates used to calculated 
the net present value of trading relationships), trade flow information can offer indirect 
ev idence of the effects of unobservable or omitted transactions costs, thereby providing 
full er information with which to analyze market relationships. 
The Role of Transactions Costs in Market 
Integration Testing 
The terms "transportation cost," "trading charges," "transfer cost," and 
"transactions costs" are sometimes used synonymously. At this point, it becomes 
necessary to distinguish between them precisely. Transportati on costs are the simplest 
and narrowest of these. They re fl ect the costs associated with shipping acti vities. 
Transportation costs therefore include the costs of renting a vehicle or container, freight 
charges, fue l costs, and so forth. Transportation costs are usually the easiest of these four 
measures to obtain. Recent spatial market ana lysts sometimes use freight rates (Baulch; 
Davutyan and Pippenger; Goodwin; Michael, Nobay, and Peel; Roehner) as a proxy for 
transactions costs. In a similar spi rit, Parsley and Wei used di stances between ci ties as 
approximations for transport costs. 
As shown in figure 4, trading charges are a broader category than transportati on 
costs. Trading charges include not only the transportation costs but also the relevant 
insurance costs and loading and unloading fees. The first market integration paper that 
accounted for trading charges appears to be Le le. She collected data on handling, 
switching and miscellaneous charges, truck fares, depreciation of transport equipment, 
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Transactions Costs 
( includin g a ll nonmarket costs) 
Figure 4. Subsets of transactions costs 
unload ing and storage fees. municipal tax. and wholesaler's commiss ion. 17 Some 
countries, most notably the United States, co llect trading charge data and report these 
with other customs data in a disaggregated form (U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. 
Imports of Merchandise). 
Transfer costs are more inclusive than trading charges. Transportation costs are a 
proper subset of trading charges, which are in tum a proper subset of transfer costs. In 
addi ti on to the physical costs of shipping commodities from one region to another, 
insurance expenses, and loading/unloading fees, transfer costs also include tariff duties. 
ln domestic markets or within free trade areas, the absence of tariffs on internal trade will 
mean that trading charges equal transfer costs. Most international trade, however, is still 
17 Le le used the tenn of transport costs 10 describe these costs. However, they fal l under our 
definit ion of lrad ing charges. 
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subject to tariffs, so this distinction matters in the international domain. These too are 
directl y observable, though less commonly measured and made avai lable to analysts. 
Transfer costs, therefore, can also be named as measurable transactions costs. 
Some agricultural products, such as fruits and meat, are perishable during the 
duration of delivery. These perishable commodities, including pork products in our 
study, demand better delivery equipment and higher insurance. Consequently, the 
transfer costs of these goods are at least as high as those of nonperishable goods shipped 
over like distances in the same economic environment. Also, since trade liberalization 
has come re latively later to agricultural commodities than to manufactures, tari ffs remain 
relative ly high on food stuffs, making the distinction between trading charges and transfer 
costs important. Perhaps most importantly, while it is often reasonable to assume 
ymmetric trading charges-i.e., identical costs to move foods either direction between 
two trading partners-tariff rates usually vary across countries, so transfer costs are 
generally direction-of-trade specific. 
Transport, trading, and transfer costs are all proper subsets of transactions costs. 
Transactions costs include not only directly measurable (transfer) costs, but also any 
unobservable costs related to contracting, including search and infonnat ion costs, 
monitoring and enforcement costs, risk premia, and time discount rates (Magnusson and 
Ottosson). The transactions costs involved in international trade may be more 
complicated than those between domestic markets due to differences in culture, language, 
and laws, difficulties of enforcing contracts, and political risk. lnfonnation costs 
surrounding government regulations and po li cies in foreign markets, for instance, 
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currency exchange restrictions, foreign contract law, and nontariff barriers (including 
sanitary or phytosanitary standards), can be great. Unfortunately, the costs associated 
with these phenomena are generally unobservable and often highly idiosyncratic, varying 
markedl y across traders. The costs of financing the transactions before the exporters get 
the final payment, costs of default risk, and brokerage costs are also counted in 
transactions costs (Abdel-Lati f and Nugent). Due to the complexity and inherent 
unobservability of transactions costs, researchers have not yet attempted to incorporate 
them in empirical market analysis. 
Transactions costs play a crucial role in market integration tests. High 
transacti ons costs will impede trade, even though they might be unobservable. Trade is 
profit able onl y when price differentials exceed the related transactions costs. Profit-
max imizing arbitrageurs will not ship commodities between two regions unless it is 
profitable to do so. In a static world, effi cient arbitrage in integrated commodity markets 
implies that prices in two spati ally separated markets will not differ by more than the 
transacti ons costs. Therefore, one should be able to test market efficiency and market 
integration more effectively by incorporating transactions costs in the model. 
Some problems of traditional approaches to studying market integration are 
associated with transactions costs. First, level I market analysis methods either omit the 
influences of transactions costs or simply assume constant transactions costs. When 
transactions costs are stationary, their effects will be included in the error terrns of 
regressions used to test market integration . Therefore , omitting transactions costs will 
not bias the testing results. However, thi s simplified assumption is problemati c when 
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transactions costs are time-varying or nonstationary. In other words, when the 
transactions costs are not stationary, neglecting transactions costs will lead to artificially 
high rates of rejecting the hypothesis of market integration (Goodwin; Goodwin and 
Grennes; Michael , Nobay, and Peel). Second, the existence of substantial transactions 
costs will introduce considerable nonlinearity into (piecewise linear) spatial price 
relationships between markets with discontinuous trade (Fackler; McNew). 
Unfortunately, most conventional approaches rely heavily on the assumption of linear 
price relations, so the first-order approximation becomes less accurate the greater the 
transactions costs involved. 
Third, since the components of transactions costs are diverse and often subjective, 
direct and exact measurement of transactions costs is essentially impossible. Yet, since 
transactions costs are a major determinant of market integration, we ought to relate price 
spreads with the true associated transactions costs to infer whether trade is potentially 
profitable or not. However, there exist some unobservable components to transactions 
costs which cause any estimate of transactions costs based on observable transfer costs to 
be downwardly (upwardly) biased if total unobservable costs are positive (negative). We 
suspect the net unobservable transactions costs are almost always positive. The parity 
bounds model , in which one compares the magnitudes of price differences adjusted for 
the (probably underestimated) transactions costs to infer market integration probabilities, 
may thus yield biased estimates. For instan~e, when the price differential is three dollars 
in a certain period and the observable transfer costs are also three dollars, one will infer 
thi s as a boundary arbitrage condition, thus competitive market integration. However, if 
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the true transactions costs between these markets are, say, four dollars, then perhaps no 
trade occurs and these markets are, in fact, segmented. 
Though the true transactions costs cannot be estimated directly, because of a 
potenti ally large unobservable component, trade Oows between two markets offer an 
indirect measure of the effects of unobservable transactions costs. When there are 
significant unobservable transactions costs, trade will not take place even though the 
observable transfer costs might suggest that trade would be profitable. Therefore, 
incorporating trade flow data into market analysis should enhance the power of the tests 
by capturing the revealed preferences o f traders. The effects of unobservable transactions 
costs can be investigated by combining observable trade flows with observable price and 
transfer cost data. This motivates the market integration testing approach in thi s study, 
i.e., the full information parity bounds model (FlPBM), which ex tends the traditiona l 
switching regimes model by including trade flow information. 
CHAPTER3 
THE FULL INFORMATION PARITY BOUNDS MODEL 
Motivation of the Full Information Parity 
Bounds Model 
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The full information parity bounds model is an extension of the parity bounds 
model (PBM) proposed by Baulch. Baulch pointed out that PBM exhibits superior 
performance in Monte Carlo tests when pitted against leve l I market analysis methods. 
First, PBM measures market integration based on the spatial arbitrage conditions, thereby 
accommodati ng discontinuous trade. Second, PBM need not assume prices in one market 
are exogenous. The maximum likelihood procedure permits prices in spati al markets to 
be determined simultaneously. Third, PBM offers a continuous, probabilisti c measure of 
market integration instead of the conventional binary response to a hypothesis test. 
Nonetheless, although PBM improves some weaknesses of the traditional methods, it is 
still fl awed. In particular, it assumes transport costs are a good proxy for transactions 
costs, thereby neglecting the probable influences of unobservable transactions costs, and 
it employs a spatial market equilibrium standard in trying to measure market integration. 
As discussed previously, the two concepts are quite distinct. 
Data on trade flows between markets provide some pivotal information on market 
re lationships. It is common to find that trade does (not) occur even when price 
di fferentials exceed (are less than) observable trans fer costs. This implies that some 
unobservable effects, e.g. , trade barriers, risk premia, or traders' preferences, ex ist and 
influence trade between markets. Moreover, the basic spatial equilibrium model that 
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motivates market integration testing is a static one, and markets are not always in 
competitive equilibrium. If businesses believe there are first mover advantages 
(disadvantages), they might (not) begin arbitraging between two markets despite negative 
(positive) current period returns to arbitrage. The net present value of trade may be 
positive (negative) despite negative (positive) current period returns. If markets are 
imperfectly competitive, there may be positive rents associated with arbitrage in 
equi librium. And if one or both markets experience shocks, there may be temporary 
di sequilibrium that violates the parity bounds arbitrage condition. If traders are rational 
profit-maximizers, trade flow data convey add itional information about market 
integration beyond that offered by observab le price and transfer cost data. Due to the 
importance of trade flow information, thi s study develops a full information mode l based 
on augmenting the PBM with trade fl ow data. I therefore labe l this approach the full 
information parity bounds model (Fl PBM). 
Specification of the Full Information 
Parity Bounds Model 
The main concept behind FIPBM is to measure the probabili ty of binding 
arbitrage conditions and infer the probability of different sorts of intermarket 
relationships. That is, FIPBM assumes that when price differentials equal transactions 
costs, i.e. , arbitrage conditions bind, two geographically distinct markets are 
competiti vely integrated. It is, however, common to observe that trade does not always 
occur when intermarket price di ffe rentials exceed or equal transactions costs. As a result, 
estimating the probability that arbitrage conditions bind may yie ld imperfect evidence 
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wi th which to assess market integration. Baulch's PBM fails to account fo r the situations 
in which ( 1) arbitrage conditions bind but two spatially separated markets operate 
independently or (2) arbitrage pricing conditions do not bind yet trade between the two 
markets takes place. 
In other words, when price differentia ls are greater than transfer costs, it implies 
that the product is tradable and positive profits can be earned by traders. If trade takes 
place under thi s circumstance, markets are still spatially integrated thought they are not in 
competiti ve equilibrium in which profits should be zero. That is, following the defi nition 
of integration which is defined close ly with tradabili ty, whether or not arbitrage 
conditions hold is not the only determinant for inferring market integration. When price 
di ffe rentials are less than transacti ons costs and trade does not take place , the two distinct 
markets are in equilibrium even though they are not integrated. That is, arbitrage 
conditions alone are not enough to distinguish between market in tegration (defined by 
intermarket tradability) and market equilibrium (zero profit condition). By being aware 
of this possible weakness of PBM, and the importance of trade flow data in prov iding 
informati on on market re lationships, FIPBM inc ludes trade flow data and extends the 
three-regime model to a six-regime one. The following are the specification for the six 
regimes of FlPBM. 
Regime I : Price differentials are equal to transfer costs, and trade is observed, i.e., 
trade = I and P,' - P,' = T" + v,' with probability A-1. 
Regime 2: Price differentials are equal to transfer costs, and no trade, i.e., trade = 
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0 and P, ' - P,J = T" + v, ' with probability A.2. 
Regime 3: Price differentials are greater than transfer costs, and trade is observed, 
i.e., trade = I and P, ' - P, J = T" + v,' + u' with probability A.3. 
Regime 4: Price differentials are greater than transfer costs, but no trade occurs, 
i.e., trade = 0 and P, ' - P, J = T" + v,' + u' with probability A.4• 
Regime 5: Price differentials are less than transfer costs, but trade takes place, i.e. , 
trade = I and P,'- P,J = T" + v,' - u' with probability A.5. 
Regime 6: Price differenti als are less than transfer costs, and no trade is observed, 
i.e., trade = 0 and P, '- P, J = T" + v,'- u' with probability A.6. 
where trade = I, trade occurs, and if trade = 0, trade does not occur. P' and pi are the 
prices in locations i andj, respectively; Yj, is the observable transfer costs from marketsj 
and i ; A; is the corresponding probability for each regime and the !..is sum to I. The error 
terms, v,, are independently and identically distributed normal variables with zero mean 
and variance a/ u, is independent of v1 and is derived from a N(O,a/) distribution 
truncated below at zero. 
Figure 5 shows the stylized relationships between price spreads and transactions 
costs in the six regimes. The gray parts between T 1-T2 and TrTs are the periods when 
trade does not occur between countries. The dotted lines are the upper and lower parity 
bounds, respectively. Regimes I, 3, and 5 are the situations where price differentials are 
equal , greater, and less than transactions costs, respectively, with trade occurring (i.e., the 
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white areas in figure 5). The relationships between price spreads and transactions costs 
within regimes 2, 4, and 6 are the same as regimes I, 3, and 5, respectively. However, 
trade is not observed in regimes 2, 4, and 6. 
FIPBM, li ke other switching regimes mode ls, is thus a mixture of different 
di stributions corresponding to different regimes. We have only partial information as to 
the particular regime from which a given observation is drawn. That is, we have only the 
binary observation of trade or no trade. The empirical task is to estimate the population 
probabilities associated with each of the different regimes for any given time period, 
commodi ty, and pair of trading regions. 
Price Differentials -- Transfer Costs 
Lower Parity Bound Upper Parity Bound 
US$/Kilogram No trade occurs CJ Trade occurs 
5.0 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime3 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 Regime& Regime 5 Regime 5 Regime 5 
0.0 Time 
0 Ts 
Figure 5. The six regimes in the FIPBM 
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To estimate the probabilities of each regime, we first need to construct the 
likelihood associated with the particular regime frequencies found in samples, conditional 
on the distributional assumptions made about v, and u,. The distributions of observations 
in each regime are related to the distribution function of the sum of a normal random 
variable, v, and a truncated normal random variable, u,.18 After variable transformation 
(see Appendix A), we can derive the density function of (v1+u,) as follows. 
( 17) f(v, + u, ) = 2 ¢( v, + u, )[1-<I>C(v, + u, )u" I CJ ' )] ' 
CJ CJ CJ 
where u=u/ +a-/; ¢ is the standard normal density function and <I> is the cumulative 
di stribution function for the standard normal distribution. Based on the density function 
( 17), we can derive the distribution functions of the observations in each regime as: 
(18) ;;' = !,' =_]_¢[Y, -T, ] . 
(j I' (J' I' 
(19) !. , _ /,' _ [ 2 ] . [ Y, - T, ][I _<I>[-( Y, - T, )a-" I a- , ]] 
' - ' - cu,' +a- ,' )'" ¢(a- ,' +a- ,' Y" cu,' +a- ,.' Y" ' 
(20) /, ' -!.' -[ 2 ]· [ Y, - T, ][I-<1>[(Y, -T,)u,l u,]] 
' - ' - (a-., ' +a-,.' )'" ¢ (u.,' +a- ,' )'" (a-., ' +a- ,' )'" ' 
where T, and Y, are the transfer costs and price differentials between spatial markets at 
time t. The full time series of price differentials comes from a mixture density comprised 
of the six regimes identified earlier. The task, therefore, is to estimate the relative 
18 The distribution funct ion of the sum of a symmetric nonnal random variable and a truncated 
normal random variable was first derived by Wein stein . 
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weights of each of these different regimes, i.e., A;, in the observed aggregate price series. 
The likelihood function of FIPBM can be expressed as equation (2 1 ): 
T 
(2 1) L =II {A- [A.J;' + A.J, 3 +A. ,!, ' ]+ (1- A)· [A. ,/, 2 +A.,[,'+ A. ,!,' l} -
1=1 
where A is a dummy variab le fo r the occurrence of trade: A= I if trade is observed and 
A=O otherwise. The probabilities of each regime and the variances of variables v, and u, 
can be estimated by maximizing the logarithm of equation (2 1 ). Again, the constraints 
that the values of A; sum to I and nonnegative A./s need to be imposed on the maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
When (no) trade occurs continuously, the dummy variable A, which denotes the 
occurrence of trade, will be a series of one (zero), and the second (first) tenn in equation 
(2 1) wi ll equal zero. Under this circumstance, the maximum likelihood function of 
FIPBM (i.e., equation (2 1)) converges to that of the switching regimes model (i.e. , 
equation (16)) . Therefore, FIPBM wi ll converge to PBM results when (no) trade takes 
place continuously. 
Economic Inference from the Full 
Information Parity Bounds Model Results 
To demonstrate the definitions of each regime clearly, table I shows the six 
regimes in the FIPBM. 
Table I. The Six Regimes in the FIPBM 
Trade 
No trade 
P;-P = T , 
Regime I 
Regime 2 
P,-P > T·; 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P,-P < T , 
Regime 5 
Regime 6 
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Regimes I and 2 are the situations where arbitrage conditions bind exactly; i.e., 
they are competitive market spatial equilibria. With zero profit, arbitrageurs could decide 
either to trade or not to trade. Thus, the product is tradable between integrated markets 
that are in a competitive equilibrium. Regime 6 represents the situation in which trade is 
not profitable between markets and trade does not take place. This, too, is an efficient 
static spatial equilibrium although regime 6 prices can move independently in the two 
locations, unlike in regimes I or 2. Markets are not integrated in regime 6. The value of 
A. ,+?..2+A.6 can be interpreted as the unconditional probability that markets are in effi cient 
spati al competiti ve equilibrium relationshi ps at any given time. The higher the sum of 
the three probabilities, the more likely there is a zero profit, competitive market 
equilibrium. More formally, the presence of constant market equilibrium can be tested 
statisti cally with the null hypothesis of ?..1+?..2+?..6 = I versus an alternative hypothesis that 
?.. , + ?..z+~ < I. For reasons that become apparent momentarily, thi s is a strong form test of 
market effi ciency. The opposing, weak form test is that A.1+A2+A.6=0, versus an 
alternati ve hypothesis of A.1+A.2+A.6>0. This obviously tests whether intermarket trade is 
never in a competitive equilibrium. 
In regime 3, there exists trade that earns positive observable profits. Thi s implies 
that either ( I) the markets arbitraged, but insufficiently to full y extinguish profit 
opportunities, or (2) there exist considerably unobservable transactions costs such that 
P,-P1=r. Under interpretation ( I), regime 3 represents an ineffi cient relationship perhaps 
best understood as dynamic disequilibrium. According to Barrett's ( 1996, p. 825) 
definition of market integration, "market integration concerns the free now of goods and 
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information-and thus prices-over form, space, and time and is thus close ly related to 
concepts of efficiency." Under this definition, regime 3 implies market integration-for 
there are trade flows sufficient to demonstrate tractability-but not fully efficient 
integration. lf interpretation (2) is true, that is, P1-P1=r, then regime 3 is another efficient 
spatial equilibrium. But this interpretation is not feasible, so we do not invoke it in the 
empirical analysis of Chapter 4. Figure 6 shows the relations between FIPBM regimes, 
market integration, and market equilibrium. 
Regime 5 captures states where trade does not appear profitable, but takes place 
nonetheless. This may be due to business's belief in first mover advantages that offset 
current period losses. The net present returns to trade may be positive even though the 
current period value is negative. Or this may be due to asset fixity or contract lags that 
Regime4 
Figure 6. Relations between FIPBM regimes, market integration, and market 
equili brium 
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cause fim1s to sustain occasional short-term losses. Observations in regime 5 appear an 
inefficient form of market integration like regime 3. In short, both regimes 3 and 5 are 
market disequilibrium situations characterized by inefficient market integration. The 
value of A.3+ A,5 is an estimate of the probability that two markets are in di sequilibrium at 
any given time. Therefore, the ratios, A./(A-1+ A.3+ A.5) and (A.1+ A.2)1(A.1+ A-2+ A.3+ A.5) are 
bounding values on the frequency with which integrated markets are efficiently linked. 
Regime 4 describes the circumstance under which trade appears profitable but 
trade does not take place between markets. That is, no one is taking advantage of what 
seem to be positive profit opportunities. Like regime 5, one reason for this situation may 
be arbitrageurs' expectations of future profitabilities. If traders expect that transactions 
will not be profitable in the future, or there may exist early mover disadvantages, they 
may decide not to trade between two markets even though current returns are positive. 
An example might be links to a market requiring sunk investment in an overseas 
distribution network, but there is considerable political or financial risk associated with 
the investment. 
An alternative reason might be unobservable transactions costs, for instance, 
information costs, risk premia, nontariff trade barriers, and trade restrictions, etc. 
Moreover, some nontariff barriers such as an import quota may create a wedge between 
intercountry prices, i.e., quasi-quota rents. Therefore, the magnitude of A.4 signals the 
extent of unobservable transactions costs on market integration. The higher A.4 is, the 
more probable markets are segmented. The ratio of A..;(A.2+A.4+~) shows the proportion 
of nontrading periods likely due to other assoc iated unobservable transac tions costs and 
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nontari ff trade barriers. Trade barriers discussed above include not only the barriers set 
up by government, but also nongovernment trade barriers, such as consumers' preference 
and the pork cutting differences between countries. 
Moreover, the relative frequencies with which trade takes place under 
supranormal and infranormal price differentials, i.e., the ratios, AyA4 and A./A., may 
signal a great deal about the unobservable transaction costs between the two locations. If 
Ay A4 is large, this suggests the unobservable components of transactions costs are less 
significant than if AyA4 is small. Similarly, a small ratio of A-5 to A-6 indicates that the 
probability for the observations to be in regime 5 is relatively small, as is the influence of 
unobservable transactions costs. 
CHAPTER4 
PRICE AND TRADE RELATIONSHIPS IN PACIFIC 
PORK MARKETS 
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This chapter applies the various market integration testing methods previously 
discussed to a new data set on factor and product markets of the pork industries of Pacific 
Rim economies. The chapter is organized as follows. The first part describes the primary 
data used and presents descriptive stati stics. The second section describes the trade 
relationships in these commodities between the sample countries. The third section 
discusses the data on trading charges and transfer costs associated with spatial arbitrage. 
The fourth section presents conventional, level I market integration test results, i.e., those 
which rely exclusively on price data. These approaches include simple bivariate 
correlation coefficients, Granger causality tests, Ravallion's model and cointegration 
tests. Then the fifth section presents empirical analysis using the parity bounds model, 
the current state of the art and a level II method (i.e. , combining price and trading charges 
data). The last section presents results from the FIPBM approach developed in thi s 
dissertation. Finally, I highlight how results from this level Ill market analysis method-
i.e., combining price, transfer cost and trade flow data-differ from those of levels I and II 
approaches of the previous sections. 
Data Descriptions and Statistics 
The price data in this dissertation include primal pork cut prices, slaughter hog 
prices, carcass prices, and feed grain prices. The pork cuts studied are loins, spareribs, 
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hams, and bellies, while the feed grains are com and soybean meal. Prices are monthly, 
generally from 1990-96, and were collected from domestic reporting agenc ies in local 
currency terms and converted into U.S. dollars per kilogram using the monthly exchange 
rates reported by the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics . 
For precise data definitions and sources, refer to Barrett et al. 
These eight commodities are studied in the four principal pork-trading countries 
of the Paci fic Basin: the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Japan. However, not all 
commodity price series are avai lable for a ll countri es in all months. The ava ilab le data 
fo r anal yzing price relationships and market integration are summari zed in table 2. All 
ava il able price series are continuous monthly series, starting from January 1990. 
However, the series lengths vary. For instance, U.S. loin prices range from January 1990 
to June 1996, and slaughter hog prices for Japan run from January 1990 to October I 995. 
Table 2. Price Series Used 
U.S. Canada Taiwan Japan 
Loins 9001 to 9606 900 1 to 9605 9001 to 9605 9107 to 9604 
Spareribs 9001 to 9606 900 1 to 9607 9001 to 9605 NA 
Hams 9001 to 9606 900 1 to 9607 9001 to 9605 NA 
Bellies 9001 to 9606 900 1 to 9607 9001 to 9605 NA 
Slaughter hogs 9001 to 961 2 900 1 to 9607 9001 to 9604 900lto9510 
Carcasses 9001 to 9606 900 1 to 9607 NA 900 1 to 9605 
Com 9001 to 9608 900 1 to 9608 9001 to 9605 NA 
Soybean meal 900 1 to 96 12 900 1 to 9608 900 1 to 9605 900 1 to 9603 
Note: 900 I represents January of 1990, and 9605 means May of 1996. NA means the data seri es is 
unavailab le. 
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In general, market integration testing usually involves pairwise comparisons 
between price series. Therefore, some observations need to be dropped when comparing 
the price series of different lengths. For example, when analyzing price relationships 
between the slaughter hog markets of the United States and Taiwan, U.S. data from May 
1996 to December 1996 must be omitted to fit the number of observations available from 
Taiwan. In other words, the number of observations depends on the length of series used. 
Figures 7 through 10 show the pork price series in the four main trading countries. 
Figures I I and 12 display the price series of slaughter hogs and carcasses in each 
countries, whi le figures 13 and 14 di splay feed grain prices in the four countries, 1990-
96. A ll prices are measured in U.S. doll ars per kilogram. 
Based on a visual review of the figures, it is apparent that U.S. and Canadian 
prices are consistently close across all commod ities and lower than the other two 
countries. The obvious comovement suggests that commodity prices are highly 
correlated in these two North American countries. Japanese prices are un iformly much 
higher than other countries for all commodities, with Taiwanese prices in between. It is 
obvious that there exist price differential s between As ian and North American countries. 
These apparent price gaps between Asian (Taiwan and Japan) and North American 
(Canada and the United States) countries provide clear incentives for trading these 
commodities to from east to west across the Pacific. However, whether or not the 
markets are integrated or in equilibrium cannot be inferred by solely observing these plots 
o f price series. 
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Figure 7. Loin prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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Figure 8. Sparcrib prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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Figure 9. Ham prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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Figure 10. Belly prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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Figure II. Slaughter hog prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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Figure 12. Carcass prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
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0.60 
0.50 
10.40 
;§030 
"" ~020 
0.1 0 
0.00 
Year, Month 
-o- Taiwan -+--Canada ~Japan - US 
~ 
""' a- a-
Figure 14. Soybean meal prices in Pacific Rim countries, 1990-96 
63 
~ 
a-
64 
The means and standard deviations of each price series for each country are 
presented in table 3. Among the primal cuts, loins have the highest prices in every 
country except the United States and are a close second to ribs in the United States. 
Bell ies are the cheapest of the four cuts. Ribs are, on average, more expensive than hams 
in the United States and Canada, but are less expensive than hams in Taiwan. Prices in 
Japan, especially for loins, are extremely high compared with the others. Hence, the 
strong incentives facing North American processors to sell high value-added pork 
products into Japan. Prices for carcasses are, as expected, greater than those of slaughter 
hogs. Soybean meal prices are higher than corn prices in each country. 
Japan has the highest average prices for all commodities, while, with the 
exception of carcass, U.S. prices are the lowest among the major Pacific Rim pork 
trading countries. Hence, the Uni ted States is a relatively low cost producer and the 
United States has enjoyed rapid expansion of net pork exports (see figure 3 in Chapter I). 
The plots and descriptive statistics provide a summary view of pork, hog, and feed grain 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Each Price Series (US$/kg) 
us Canada Taiwan Japan 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Loins 2.37 0.25 3. 13 0.29 6.07 0.26 19.21 2.25 
Ribs 2.39 0.31 2.68 0.38 4.00 0.27 
Hams 1.45 0.25 2.07 0.27 4.30 0.24 
Bellies 0.97 0.27 2.07 0.32 3.99 0.22 
Slaughter hogs 1.03 0. 15 1.20 0.19 1.87 0.35 2.72 0.44 
Carcasses 1.40 0.17 1.21 0. 17 4.19 0.74 
Corn 0.10 0,03 0. 11 0.03 0.17 0.02 
Soybean meal 0.20 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.31 0.02 0.42 0.04 
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prices in the four countries. To better understand the price and market relationships 
among these economies, further analysis is required. 
Trade Relationships in Pacific Pork 
Markets 
Trade flows between markets provide crucial information about market 
relationships. We use the term "market integration" synonymously with the concept of 
intermarket "tractability." Thus flows between two markets are sufficient to demonstrate 
market integration, albeit not necessarily a competitive spatial market equi librium. Trade 
fl ows reveal market participants' preferences to arbitrage spatially di stinct markets. This 
points to the common di stinction between "traded" and "tradable" commoditi es . Two 
markets between which a commodity is tradab le-although not necessarily traded-are 
considered "integrated" because participants in one market could compete with those in 
the other. This is consistent with the notion of contestable markets (Baumol). 
Due to episodically excessive transactions costs, however, neither tractability nor 
trade occurs all the time. Therefore, it is common to find discontinuous trade, espec ially 
between international trade partners with stochastic costs of intermediation. Trade 
discontinui ty implies a nonlinear or piecewise linear relationship between price series 
(see figure 15). When two markets are integrated, their prices comove positi vely (under 
certain ci rcumstances with correlation coefficients one), but when markets are 
segmented, their prices are independent. 
Pa 
Segmented 
Markets 
Integrated 
Markets 
Integrated 
Markets 
Pb 
Figure IS. Relationships between spatial market price series under discontinuous 
tractability 
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Unfortunately, most conventional testing approaches, such as bivariate corre lation 
coeffic ients, Granger causality tests, Ravallion's model , and cointegration tests, impose 
the assumption of linear price relationships on the model specification. This implies an 
assumption of continuous trade. Violations of that basic assumption may substantially 
degrade the inferential power of these conventional market integration tests. 
Furthermore, the direction of trade matters in some testing methods, e.g., 
Ravallion's model. The Ravallion model assumes a radial market system in which goods 
flow from peripheral markets to the central one in response to price signa ls emanating 
from the central market. The radial markets assumption is problematic in the presence of 
bidirectional trade. A significant literature and body of international economic theory is 
based on such intraindustry trade. As a result, we first examine the empirical evidence on 
trade relationships in our sample in order to better eva luate the assumptions underpinning 
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conventional level I or II market integration tests. 
Tables 4 to 7 present the frequencies with which trade occurred between each 
country pair in each commodity during the study period. The data reveal both the 
frequency of trade (i.e ., trade discontinuity) and the common feature of bidirectional 
trade. Trade data for Taiwan were collected from Monthly Statistics of fmports , the 
Republic of China, Taiwan District, and Monthly Statistics of Export, the Republic of 
China, Taiwan Districl (Statistical Department, Inspectorate General of Customs, the 
Republic of China). U.S. trade data were collected from US. Imports of Merchandise 
and US. Exports of Merchandise (U.S . Department of Commerce). Japanese trade data 
were co llected from .Japan Exports & !mports (Japan Tariff Association). 
The matrices in table 4 show the trade relationships in loins and spareribs between 
each country pair. Bidirectional trade in loins occurs in all periods between Canada and 
the United States, while bidirectional trade in spareribs takes place in only 47.5% of the 
periods. It is obvious that Japan is the main importer among these countries and Taiwan 
tends to be a net exporter. Trade flows in loins and spareribs from Taiwan to the United 
States occur in approximately I 0.4% of the periods and 23.8% from the United States to 
Taiwan with contemporaneous bidirectional trade in 2/74 periods. We cannot define 
either one as the central market. Japan imports loins and spareribs from the United States 
and Taiwan in almost every period, and spareribs from Canada in 59.5% of the periods. 
There is no trade from Canada to Taiwan and from the United States to Taiwan in these 
products continuously. Half the country trading pairs in table 4 show discontinuous 
trade. Bidirectional and discont inuous trade are clearly common in these data. 
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Table 4. Trade Frequencies: Loins and Spareribs 
(-+) Loins Spareribs 
From\ To us CA JP TW us CA JP TW 
us 100% 98.7% 23 .8% 100% 98.7% 23.8% 
CA 100% 98.8% 0% 47.5% 59.5% 0% 
JP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
TW 10.4% 0% 100% 10.4% 0% 100% 
Note: Bidirectional trade in loins and spareribs between the United States and Taiwan occurred in 3% of 
the period. 
Table 5. Trade Frequencies: Hams and Bellies 
(-+) Hams Bellies 
From\ To us CA JP TW us CA JP TW 
us 93 .8% 98.8% 12.5% 100% 98.8% 0% 
CA 98.8% 90.5% 0% 98.8% 98.8% 0% 
JP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
TW 10.4% 0% 100% 10.4% 0% 100% 
Note: The frequency of bidirectional trade in hams between the United States and Canada (Taiwan) is 
92.5%(0%). 
Table 6. Trade Frequencies: Carcasses and Slaughter Hogs 
(-+) Carcasses Slaughter Hogs 
From\ To us CA JP TW us CA JP TW 
us 13.8% 81.3% 0% 18.5% 29.6% 0% 
CA 97.5% 15.5% 0% 100% 5.8% 0% 
JP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
TW 0% 0% 13.0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note: The frequency of bidirectional trade in carcasses between the Un ited States and Canada is 13.8%. 
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Table 7. Trade Frequencies: Corn and Soybean Meal 
(-+) Com Soybean Meal 
From\ To us CA JP TW us CA JP TW 
us 100% 88.9% 35 .8% 100% 81.5% 54.3% 
CA 67.9% 20.2% 0% 88.9% 100% 20.2% 
JP 0% 0% NA 38.3% 78.6% NA 
TW 0% 0% NA 12.3% 58.3% NA 
Note: The frequency of bidirectional trade in soybean meal between the United States and Taiwan (Japan) 
is 7.4% (30.8%). The frequency of bidirectional trade in soybean meal between Canada and Taiwan is 
10.7%. 
Table 5 shows the trading relationships in hams and bellies between the Pacific 
Rim countries. Bidirectional trade between the United States and Canada for both 
commodities took place in more than 90% of the periods. Bidirectional trade between 
Canada and the United States for hams and bellies occurs in 92.5% and 98.8% of all 
periods, respectively. These facts indicate that Canada and the United States are frequent 
trade partners and bidirectional trade occurs almost continuously between them. Japan 
imported hams and bellies from the other three countries in more than 90% of the survey 
periods. This again reflects Japan's position as a net pork importer. Taiwan had few 
trade flows in hams with the United States and Canada during the sample period. 
Table 6 presents trade frequencies for carcasses and slaughter hogs. There is no 
trade in carcasses and slaughter hogs between either Canada or the United States and 
Taiwan. Even though slaughter hog prices in Taiwan and Japan are generally higher than 
those in the United States during the study periods, trade did not always take place. This 
is probably due to the relative high transactions costs associated with shipping live swine 
across the Pacific and with national epidemiological controls that significantly impede 
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trans-Pacific trade in meats and live animals. Compared with the trade flows of primal 
cuts, the United States exported carcasses and slaughter hogs to Canada less frequently 
(in on ly 13.8% and 18.5% of the periods, respectively). However, trade flows from 
Canada to the United States are almost continuous in both commodities. Japan did not 
import carcasses or hogs as frequently as it imported primal cuts. 
Trade frequencies in com and soybean meal are displayed in table 7. The United 
States exports com and soybean meal to Canada continuously. Feed grain trade is 
di scontinuous between all other partners for which data are available. Bidirectional trade 
took place between Canada and the United States in 67.9% and 88.9% of all periods for 
corn and soybean meal , respective ly. The United States exports feed gra ins to Japan in 
about 80% of all periods. The United States did not import any corn from Taiwan or 
Japan during the study periods. Trade flows in soybean meal from Japan and Taiwan to 
the United States are obviously discontinuous. These facts may cause some conventional 
testing methods to be unreliable. 
In general, trade between the United States and Canada was almost always 
continuous in each product. This reflects that markets in Canada and the United States 
are well integrated and that market ana lysis methods that assume continuous trade likely 
generate plausible results. Trade in all products except slaughter hogs was likewise 
common, occurring in at least 80% of sample periods. Japan imported pork from the 
other thn:e countries in almost every period in our study, showing Japan's position as the 
key net importer in the Pacific Rim. By contrast, Taiwan seldom imported fresh or 
chi ll ed pork from the other three countries during the study period, 1990-96, showing that 
71 
Taiwan is a key pork exporter in the Pacific region. Trade between some country pairs, 
such as the United States-Taiwan and Canada-Taiwan, is demonstrably discontinuous. 
Overall, trade between countries has more often than not been discontinuous. 
Sixty-two percent (26/42) of the commodity-specific country pairs evince discontinuous 
trade in the study period (counting continuous zero trade; only I 0/42 pairs show 
continuous positive trade). Trade is also commonly bidirectional with more than one-
third of the country pairs (16/42) showing intracommodity trade in the study period. As 
already di scussed, these features of the trade relationships between the sample countries 
in these products have significant implications for the appropriateness and power of 
stati stical market integration tests based on linear price relationships. 
The Nature of Trading Charges and 
Transfer Costs 
The key innovation of levels II and Ill methods over Ievell methods is the explicit 
introduction of the costs of arbitrage. As already di scussed in Chapter 3, it is impossible 
to measure true transactions costs, especially in the case of international market trading 
where cultural differences and additional dimensions of risk likely add to these 
unmeasurable costs. So we use measurable costs as a lower bound estimate of 
transactions costs. There are two basic sorts we measure and employ: trading charges 
and transfer costs. Trading charges include all the costs of freight and insurance incurred 
in bringing the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of lading in the 
exporting country and placing it alongside the carrier at the port of entry. That is, the 
charges include transport costs, insurance fees. and loading/unload ing costs. Though 
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trading charges are only a subset of true transactions costs, they are a closer 
approximation than transportation costs. 
Transfer costs are the sum of internationally symmetric trading charges and the 
tariffs specific to each product and importing nation. Transfer costs are thus 
internationally asymmetric because of international di fferences in tariffs. Transfer costs 
are therefore one step closer still to the true, unmeasurable transactions costs than are 
trad ing charges. Trading charges include all the costs of freight and insurance incurred in 
bringing the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of lading in the exporting 
country and plac ing it alongside the carrier at the port of entry. That is, the charges 
include transportation costs, insurance fees, and loading/unloading costs; thereby they are 
trad ing costs as defined in Chapter 3. 19 Though trading costs are only a subset of true 
transactions costs, they are closer to the true ones than transportation costs are. In thi s 
section, we proceed to discuss the nature of trad ing costs. 
Trading Charges 
Since the PBM was first proposed and designed to analyze domestic intermarket 
re lationships, Baulch used transportation costs as a proxy of transactions costs. To 
implement the PBM analysis, we collected the whole time series of trading charges from 
U.S Imports of Merchandise (U.S. Department of Commerce). Because detailed time 
seri es of trading charges are only available fo r imports into the United States, we assume 
symmetric trad ing charges between countries. For example, we used the shi pp ing 
''' For more deta ils about each count ry' s tar iff schedules. please refer to Barre tt ct a l. ( 1997). 
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charges from Canada to the United States as a proxy for shipping the same commodity 
from the United States to Canada. 
Another complete trading cost time series that can be obtained is for U.S. imports 
from Canada, for U.S. soybean meal imports from Japan, and for U.S. imports of lamb 
from Australia. Unfortunately, there are insufficient chilled meat exports from east Asia 
to the United States to build that trading charges series directly, so we assume the 
Australia-United States trading charges are those incurred shipping pork between Asian 
countri es (Japan and Taiwan) and North American countries (the United States and 
Canada). Similarl y, we assume the trading charges associated with Japanese soybean 
meal exports to the United States proxy sat isfactorily for all cross-Pacific trading charges 
on bulk grains, which are uniformly less than for refrigerated cargo or li ve animal. 
Table 8 shows the means and standard deviations of trading charges for each 
country pair used in the PBM and FlPBM estimation later in this chapter. As we can 
observe in table 8, the associated trading charges between Canada and the Uni ted States 
are much lower than those between Asian and North American countries, but with a 
higher coefficient of variation (i .e., standard deviation/mean). Moreover, trad ing charges 
of pork between Canada and the United States are, in average, lower than those of 
slaughter hogs or feed grains. In contrast, pork trading charges between Asian and North 
American countries are relatively higher than others. 
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Table 8. Mean International Trading Charges 
(US$/kg) CA-US Asia-North America 
Primal Pork Cuts and Carcass 0.01 1.12 
(0.01) (0.24) 
Slaughter hogs 0.03 1.12 
(0.02) (0.24) 
Com 0.04 0.21 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Soybean meal 0.02 0.21 
(0.05) (0.07) 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Transfer Costs 
A matrix of transfer cost to export price ratios is shown in table 9. Countries in 
the first co lumn are exporting countries while those in the header row are importing ones. 
Higher ratios imply that transfer costs are relatively more important, creat ing a wider 
band in which equilibrium prices can fluctuate without any occurrence of profit-
maximizing trade. That is, big transfer costs induce discontinuous or absence of trade. 
As already discussed, this can undermine the usefulness of level I market analysis 
methods. These ratios reveal the importance of distance: Asia-North America ratios are 
much higher than United States-Canada ones. They show product characteristics, 
particularly price per unit weight, matter: The ratios are higher for lower value 
commodities. Trade policies of these four countries are different, too. Compared with 
Asian countri es, the two North American countries have less tariff duties imposed on 
imported pork products. Therefore, the transfer costs of exporting pork into these Asian 
countries are relatively higher. 
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Table 9. Ratios of Transfer Costs to Export Country Prices 
{-+) U.S. Canada JaEan Taiwan 
Loins 
U.S. 0.0 14 1.642 0.888 
Canada 0.015 1.1 56 0.666 
Japan 0.06 1 0.060 
Taiwan 0.197 0.192 
Hams 
U.S. 0 .023 1.290 
Canada 0.022 0.890 
Taiwan 0.277 0.272 
Spareribs 
U.S. 0.014 0.752 
Canada 0.017 0.67 1 
Taiwan 0.300 0.444 
Bellies 
U.S. 0.036 1.956 
Canada 0.022 0.874 
Taiwan 0.298 0.293 
Slaughter hogs 
U.S. 0.023 1.447 
Canada 0.019 1.100 
Japan 0.437 0.437 
Taiwan 0.651 0.651 
Carcasses 
U.S. 0.023 2.851 
Canada 0.038 3.49 1 
Japan 0.283 0.283 
Corn 
U.S. 0.236 2.406 
Canada 0.522 1.393 
Taiwan 0.760 
Soybean meal 
U.S. 0.115 1.206 1.257 
Canada 0.105 1.075 1.091 
Japan 0.542 0.542 
Taiwan 0.760 0.760 
Note: Dashes in the tab le are either data not available or no price data on one of the countries. 
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In other words, the ratios also show the role of duties20 The ratios on the routes 
between Canada and the United States are lowest for all commodities and nearly 
symmetric, thanks to short distances and minimal , largely harmonized trade po licies 
especially tariff duties. By contrast, the ratio for products exported from the United 
States to Taiwan is always at least double that exported from Taiwan to the United States. 
Combining the ratios and trade frequencies, we found that commodity-speci fie 
country pairs with lower ratios (i.e. , less transfer costs are relatively less important), 
especially those under I% of export prices, trade a lmost continuously. Country pairs 
with higher transfer costs to export price ratios, in contrast, exhibit discontinuous trade 
more frequently. One exception is trade between North American countries and Japan. 
Even though transfer costs are much higher than the export prices, shipping pork to Japan 
is still profitable due to the extremely high prices in Japan's pork markets. 
Another crucial factor, which can influence the reliability of conventional market 
integration testing approaches, is the stationarity of transactions costs. For example, 
cointegration is not a necessary condi tion for market integration if transactions costs are 
20 Among the four countries, Canada is the only one that imposes no duty on imported pork or 
slaughter hogs. The Un ited States imposed spec ific duties on pork, 2.2 cents per ki logram (United States 
International Trade Commission 1990-96). Pork from Canada to the United States became duty free under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was effective January 1994 by Presidential Proclamation 
664 1 of December 15, 1993. The United States imposes no duties on carcasses or slaughter hogs. 
Compared with the North American countries, Taiwan and Japan have heavier impon duties on pork. 
Taiwan imposed a 15% (10%) ad valorem duty on pork and carcasses (on slaughter hogs). Japan's custom 
duties on pork are more complex. When each kilogram in value for custom duty is not more than the upper 
limi t prices, spec ific duties are app lied. When each kilogram in va lue for customs duty is higher than the 
gate prices, ad va lorem duties are applied . When each kilogram in va lue for customs duty lies between the 
upper limit prices and the gate prices, the difTerence between the standard import prices of the specific 
commodities and the va lues for which customs duty is taxed . 
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nonstationary. Therefore, as Barrett (1996) pointed out, failure to find cointegration 
between two markets' price series may be completely consistent with market integration if 
transactions costs are nonstationary. More generally, nonstationarity in transactions costs 
will lead to artificially high frequencies of rejecting the hypothesis of market integration 
(Goodwin; Goodwin and Grennes; Michael , Nobay, and Peel), i.e ., level I methods' 
statistical tests become biased. Given secular trends in trade liberalization, with virtually 
all nations in the world undertaking trade liberalization leading to permanently lower 
tariff rates, it is intuitive that many international transfer cost series should be 
nonstati onary. 
Table I 0 presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller testing results of each transfer 
cost series used in FIPBM estimation. The header row in table l 0 indicates the direction 
of trade flow. For instance, the first co lumn represents trade flows from the United States 
to Taiwan. In other words, the left country in each pair is the exporting country, while 
the right country is the importing one. The transfer costs of shipping commodities from 
Japan to Canada (the United States) are identical with those from Taiwan to Canada (the 
United States). Therefore, these two directions of trade are summarized in the same 
column (co lumns 6 and 7). Approximately 30% of the transfer cost series (18/64) are not 
stationary, including those involved in the shipment of loins from Canada or the United 
States to Japan and in all corn trade among sample countries. 
The transfer costs for teed grains are mostly nonstationary except for those of 
soybean meal from Canada to the United States. Those for meat and live animals are 
largely stationary, probably due to the small ro le of tariff reduction since many trade 
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restrictions are nontariff technical barriers that have been less subject to liberalization to 
date. 
The stationarity of transfer costs can affect statistical inference from conventional 
market integration testing methods, such as co integration tests, that depend on the 
assumption of stationary cost of arbitrage. Moreover, high transactions costs will more 
commonly disrupt trade flows , thereby generating nonlinear price relationships and 
nonstationary transactions costs. Conventional market integration tests assume linear 
re lationships. Unfortunately, the transfer costs data studied here show these assumptions 
are routinely violated in the real world. As a consequence, the findings of conventional 
market integration tests may be unreli ab le. Level II or leve l ITI market integration testing 
methods-such as Baulch's PBM, or the FlPBM method developed here-do not rely on 
any assumptions about the nature of transactions costs. 
Table 10. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for the Transfer Cost Series 
JP-CA JP-US 
US-TW CA-JP US-JP CA-US TW-CA TW-US US-CA CA-TW 
Loins -3.57* * -2.25 -2.49 -3 .18* -3.63** -3.64** -4.28** -3.84** 
Spareribs -3.20* -3. 18* -3.63** -3.64** -4.28** -3.45* 
Hams -3.22* -3.18* -3.63** -3.64** -4.28** -3.93** 
Bellies -3.39* -3.18* -3.63** -3.64** -4.28** -3.56** 
Slaughter hogs -3.87** NA NA -3. 18* -3.63** -3.63** -3.28* 
Carcasses -1.77 -2 .36 -4.28** -3.63** -3.64** -4.28** 
Corn -2.71 -2.84 NA -2 .82 3.69** -2.8 1 
Soybean mea l -2.71 -2.82 -2.82 -3.69** -2.82 -2.82 -2.84 -2.82 
Note: * denotes that transfer costs are stationary at the 95% confidence leve l. 
**denotes that transfer costs are stationary at the 99% confidence level. 
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Levell Market Analysis Methods: 
Test Results 
In thi s section, I investigate price relationships among these series using 
conventional market integration testing approaches including bivariate correlation 
coefficients, Granger causality, Rava llion's model, and cointegration. As Chapter 3's 
critical assessment of these methodologies pointed out, their reliabili ty is suspect in an 
environment of discontinuous or bidirectional trade, and whenever transfer costs are large 
or nonstationary. The last section showed these to be regular features of these data. 
These confo unding characteri sti cs are likely to be quite widespread in international trade. 
These are a ll methods based only on price data, what Barrett ( 1996) labels "level I" 
market analys is methods. Each of the di ffe rent tests may yield markedly different results 
from the same data because of: ( I) di fferent assumptions about the speed of intermarket 
price transmission and the structure of the market network, (2) di fferent impacts of 
di scontinuous trade patterns on the power of tests, (3) di fferent natures of null 
hypotheses, and ( 4) di fferent assumptions about the level and stationarity of transactions 
costs to intermarket arbitrage. In the next section, I will apply and critique the ex isting 
"level II" (i.e., combining price and trading cost data) analytical method: Baulch's parity 
bounds model (PBM). In the chapter's concluding section, I will report the results o f the 
new FI PBM method developed in this di ssertation. Before launching into presentation of 
test results, let me highlight the key issues. 
Those tests (e.g. , bivariate correlation coeffici ents) that do not permit price 
transmiss ion lags implicitly assume instantaneous market integration, quite a strong 
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assumption. As a consequence, they tend to suggest a lower rate of market integration 
than do those tests that permit both instantaneous and lagged relations between markets 
(e.g., Granger causality, Ravallion's model, and cointegration). Secondly, all the level I 
analytical methods suffer from the implied assumption of continuous trade. However, 
many of the market links under study exhibit considerable trade discontinuity, thereby 
making the assumed linear price relationships potentially poor approximations to the true, 
nonlinear intermarket price relationships. 
Trade patterns are also often bidirectional, implying that models ass uming radial 
markets, such as Ravallion's model , are ill-posed. Some of the conventional market 
integration testing methods test a null hypothesis of perfect market segmentation while 
others test a null hypothesis of perfect market integration. Intuitive ly, these methods 
might yie ld contradictory results when markets exhibit moderate levels of integration, as 
one would typically expect in an environment of discontinuous trade . Finally, the 
stationarity of measurable transfer costs plays a role in influencing the inferential power 
of market integration tests. As we have shown in the previous section, measurable 
transfer costs to spatial arbitrage are nontrivial and, in some cases, nonstationary. This 
renders unreliable inference based on the tests that ignore these costs. 
Bivariate Correlation Coefficients 
Bivariate correlation coefficients measure the comovement of price series in 
di stinct markets, and thus they have been used as a measure of market integration . Prices 
in two well-integrated markets tend to move in the same direction. Therefore, the 
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measured correlation coeffi cient is expected to be statisticall y significantly greater than 
zero. Tables II through 14 show the bivariate correlation coefficient matrices for each 
commodity. In table II , the correlation coefficients between U.S. and Canadian loin and 
sparerib prices are significantly positive. This implies that prices in the two countries do 
comove significantly. These results are consistent with figures 7 and 8. Not only are the 
other esti mated price correlation coeffi cients not significantly positive, but loin prices 
between Japan and Taiwan, and between Japan and Canada are also negatively correlated . 
Table II. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of Loin and Spare rib Prices 
Loins St>areribs 
Countr~ U.S. Taiwan Canada Jat>an U.S. Taiwan Canada Jat>an 
U.S 1.00 1.00 
Taiwan 0.09 1.00 0.2 1 1.00 
(0.77) ( 1.80) 
Canada 0.83* 0.03 1.00 0.87* 0.09 1.00 
{I 0.28) (0.24) ( 11.62) (0.74) 
Japan 0.22 -0.17 -0.05 1.00 NA NA NA 1.00 
{1.64) ( -1.30) (-0.39) 
Note: Values in parentheses are the test statistics (follow ing standard normal distribution) for p > 0. 
• represents p > 0 at 99% level of confidence (cri tical value is 2.327). 
Table 12, Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of Ham and Belly Prices 
Hams Bellies 
Country U.S. Taiwan Canada U.S. Taiwan Canada 
U.S. 1.00 1.00 
Taiwan -0.35 1.00 -0.27 1.00 
(-3. 14) (-2 .40) 
Canada 0.91* -0.52 1.00 0.73* -0.42 1.00 
(1 3. 13) (-4 .92) (8 .04) (-3.87) 
Note: Values in parentheses are the test statistics (fo llowing standard normal distribution) for p > 0. 
* represents p > 0 at 99% level of confidence (cr itical va lue is 2. 327). 
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Table 13. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of Slaughter Hog and Carcass Prices 
Slaughter Hogs Carcasses 
Countii U.S. Taiwan Canada JaEan u.s. Taiwan Canada JaEan 
U.S. 1.00 1.00 
Taiwan -0.43 1.00 NA 1.00 
(-3.29) 
Canada 0.68* -0.45 1.00 0.74* NA 1.00 
(7.28) (-4.14) (8.29) 
Japan -0.34 0.76* -0.30 1.00 -0.25 NA -0.07 1.00 
~-2.88} ~8.12} ~-2.64} ~-2.20} ~-0.60} 
Note: Values in parentheses are the test statistics (following standard normal distribution) for p > 0. 
* represents p > 0 at 99% leve l of confidence (critical value is 2.327). 
Table J 4. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of Corn and Soybean Meal Prices 
Corn So~bean Meals 
Countti U.S. Taiwan Canada JaEan U.S. Taiwan Canada JaEan 
u.s. 1.00 1.00 
Taiwan 0.82* 1.00 0.10 1.00 
( I 0.15) (0.87) 
Canada 0.9 1* 0.72* 1.00 0.85* 0.2 1 1.00 
(13. 19) (7.79) ( 1 1.05) ( 1.80) 
Japan NA NA NA 1.00 0.07 -0.39 -0. 10 1.00 
~0.59} (-3.46) (-0.82) 
Note: Values in parentheses are the test statistics (following standard normal distribution) for p > 0. 
* represents p > 0 at 99% level of confidence (crit ical value is 2.327). 
Table 12 presents the correlation coefficient matrices for hams and bellies. 
Again, Canadian and U.S. prices have statistically significant positive bivariate 
correlation coefficients, while the other correlation coefficient estimates are all negative. 
These negative coefficients, as indicated by Jones, might be due to poor information 
systems and insuffic iently strong motivation for arbitrageurs. Another possibility is 
discontinuous or no trade due to excessive transaction costs of arbitrage between the 
country pairs. For example, trade frequency percentages in table 5 indicate that trade in 
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bellies between the United States and Taiwan occurred in about 24% of the study periods 
( 19/80 of eighty periods). This discontinuity in trade reflects a weakness of the 
correlation coefficient approach to inferring market integration. 
Table 13 shows the correlation coefficients of slaughter hog and carcass prices in 
Pacific Rim countries. Again, the correlation coefficients between Canada and the 
United States are all significantly positive. ln part, thi s reflects the fact that these two 
countries trade with each other in almost every period. Trade di scontinuity does not 
affect the inferential power of the correlation coefficient method in this case. The price 
correlati on coefficient of slaughter hogs between Taiwan and Japan is significant ly 
pos iti ve. However, trade in slaughter hogs between Taiwan and Japan did not occur 
during our study periods. This significant positi ve correlation coefficient may be caused 
by the common trends, such as production seasonality or other contemporaneous shocks. 
The correlation coefficients between U.S. and Japanese slaughter hog prices and 
between U.S. and Taiwanese slaughter hog prices are both negative. According to the 
trade relat ionship shown in table 6, there is no trade in slaughter hogs between Taiwan 
and the United States and trade flows are discontinuous between the Un ited States and 
Japan. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to use the correlation coeffic ient approach, 
which basically measures the comovement between price series assumed to be linearly 
related , to analyze market relationships between nontrading countries. The measured 
correlation coefficients may be stati stically significant between the nontrading markets or 
discontinuous trading partners, but they are not economically meaningfu l. All of the 
discuss ion above highlights the fac t that one should use the bivariate co rre lati on 
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coefficient approach to infer market relations with caution. 
Table 14 shows the calculated correlation coefficients of com and soybean meal 
prices. All com price series are significantly positively correlated across these four 
countries. All correlation coefficients in soybean meal prices are also positive with two 
exceptions-those between Taiwan and Japan, and between Canada and Japan. By 
accompanying these results with the trade relationships across the countries (see table 7), 
we found that trade in these feed grains took place in more than 80% of all periods 
between the United States and Japan and continuously between Canada and the United 
States. Therefore, the correlation coefficient testing power is not affected by trade 
discontinuity in these two country pairs . The significant positive correlation between 
Taiwanese and U.S. com markets may be also problematic because trade was 
di scontinuous during the study periods. 
As suggested by the calculated correlation coefficient results, the Canad ian and 
U.S . markets are well integrated across all commodities and corn markets are well 
integrated across all sample countries. Due to the trade discontinuity and absence of 
trade between some countries, we fail to infer market relationships solely by using the 
bivariate correlation coefficient method. In short, the bivariate correlation coefficient is 
unreliable in some situations, especially in the presence of discontinuous trade. More 
precisely, without better understanding of trade patterns between markets, one might 
make incorrect inferences about market integration using bivariate corre lation 
coefficients. 
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Granger Causality Tesling Resulls 
Instead of measuring the comovement between market prices as the correlation 
coefficient approach does, Granger causality testing enables researchers to identify the 
price leadership between markets and to measure the speed of price transmission. That 
is, Granger causality testing allows price changes in one market to take several periods to 
be fully transmitted to the other. 
Ordinary least squares regressions were estimated to test the Granger causality 
relationship between every country pair for each commodity price series. One-way 
Granger causality tests were performed by estimating equations (2) and (3), i.e ., 
" Y, =a 10 + Ia~~.. Y, _ -" +e1, and 
h d 
Y, = a 2o + Ia2k Y, _* + fb2* X, _k + e21 · 
k=l h i 
Instantaneous Granger causality relationships are tested by estimating equations 
(3) and (4), i.e., 
" m 
Y, = a 20 + L au Y,_, + L bu X, _, + e,, and 
h :.l k= l 
" m 
Y, =a30 + Ia3, Y,_, + Lb3,X,_, +e3,. 
k:: l k=O 
All equations are estimated in levels with a constant term. The Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) was used to choose the optimal specifications among the 
regressions with white noise residuals. The smaller the SBC, the better the model 
specification. Once the optimal lags for equa tion (2) were selected, lagged prices in the 
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other market were added and an optimal specification was chosen for equation (3) by the 
SBC. Because residual autocorrelation would compromise the reliabili ty ofF tests on the 
nu ll hypothesis of no Granger causality, diagnostic Liung-Box-Pierce Q-statistics were 
computed to ensure autocorrelation had been removed from each regression. The same 
procedures were used to perform instantaneous Granger causality tests. 
Tables 15 through 22 present both one-way and instantaneous Granger causality 
testing results. The first column in each table shows the direction of the hypothesized 
causa l relationship, as indicated by the rightward arrow. The second column is the 
number of observations used in the testing regress ions. The last two co lumn pairs display 
the F-stat isti cs and the assoc iated distribution for the one-way Granger causality and 
instantaneous causali ty relationships, respecti vely. A significant F-statisti c implies that 
the null hypothesis of no one-way (i nstantaneous) causality is rejected, supporting the 
al ternati ve hypothesis of transmission of price shocks from one market to another 
(perhaps bidi rectionally), presumably through arbi trage. 
The results for loin and sparerib prices are given in tables 15 and 16. Significant 
instantaneous causal relationships run both ways between Canada and the United States 
in loin and sparerib markets. The simultaneous feedback between the two countries' loin 
and sparerib markets suggests that they are in the same geographic market. Significant 
one-way causal ity with one period lag runs from Japan to Taiwan for loin markets. 
Taiwan ships loins to Japan continuous ly and never imports any from Japan. Thus Japan 
appears as a demand surplus market where price shocks flow to Taiwan wi th a modest 
lag. 
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Table 15. Granger Causality Testing Results for Loin Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causality Number of Causalin: Test Causalit~ Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F(v~, v2) F-Stat. F(v~, v2) 
CA 
--> us 72 !.015 F(l,65) 27.464** F(2,64) 
us 
--> CA 73 4.788* F(1 ,67) 24.820** F(2,66) 
JP 
--> us 58 1.507 F(1,51) 2.7 15 F(2,50) 
us 
--> JP 55 0.720 F(2,49) 0.183 F(3 ,48) 
TW 
--> us 72 0.006 F(l ,65) 0.004 F(2,64) 
us 
--> TW 73 1.867 F(1,67) 0.092 F(2,66) 
JP 
--> CA 58 0.369 F(1 ,52) 1.322 F(2,51) 
CA 
--> JP 55 2.578 F(2,49) 0.032 F(3 ,48) 
TW 
--> CA 73 0.832 F(1,67) 0.122 F(2,66) 
CA 
--> TW 73 0.590 F(1 ,67) 0.040 F(2,66) 
TW 
--> JP 55 0.495 F(1 ,50) 0.806 F(2,49) 
JP 
--> TW 58 4.114* F(1,52) 1.053 F(2,51) 
Note: * denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
**denotes s ignificance at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 16. Granger Causality Test Results for Sparerib Prices 
One-way l nstantaneous 
Causality Number of Causalin: Test Causality Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F(v 1, v2} F-Stat. F(v~, v2) 
CA 
--> us 72 4.209* F(l ,64) 12.788** F(2,63) 
us 
--> CA 74 8.500** F(2,67) 18.544** F(3 ,66) 
TW 
--> us 72 0.508 F(1,64) 0.309 F(2,63) 
us 
--> TW 73 0.061 F(l,70) 1.043 F(2,69) 
TW 
--> CA 74 0.228 f'( I ,68) 1.522 F(2,67) 
CA 
--> TW 73 0.683 F(l ,70) 0.340 F(2,69) 
Note: * denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 17. Granger Causality Testing Results for Ham Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causality Number of Causali~ Test Causalit~ Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F{v~, v2) F-Stat. F{v 1, v2) 
CA ~ us 76 4.329* F(2,71) 13.768** F(3,70) 
us ~ CA 75 39.378** F(2,68) 14.375** F(3,67) 
TW ~ us 76 0.539 F(1,72) 0.602 F(2,71) 
us ~ TW 74 5.704** F(3,67) 0.002 F(4,66) 
CA ~ TW 75 7.547** F(1,71) 1.846 F(2,70) 
TW ~ CA 74 2.128 F(l ,68) 2.4 13 F(2,67) 
Note: * denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
**denotes s ignificance at the 99% confidence leve l. 
Table 18. Granger Causality Testing Results for Belly Prices 
One-way r nstantaneous 
Causa li ty Number of Causali~ Test Causalit~ Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F(v 1, v2) F-Stat. F(v 1, v2) 
CA ~ us 77 4.488* F(l,74) 3.579* F(2,73) 
us ~ CA 78 23 .175** F(l ,75) 5. 111 ** F(2, 74) 
TW ~ us 77 2.609 F( l ,74) 2.719 F(2,73) 
us ~ TW 76 0.372 F(1 ,73) 0.929 F(2,72) 
CA ~ TW 76 3. 183 F( l ,73) 0.092 F(2,72) 
TW ~ CA 77 5.669* F(l ,74) 0.093 F(2,73) 
Note:* denotes significance at the 95% confidence leve l. 
**denotes s ign ificance at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 19. Granger Causality Testing Results for Slaughter Hog Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causality Number of Causali~ Test Causali~ Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F[v 1, v2} F-Stat. F[v~, v2} 
CA ~ us 77 1.230 F(1,73) 5.482** F(2,72) 
us ~ CA 77 5.509* F(1,73) 4.739** F(2,72) 
JP ~ us 68 3.038 F(l,64) 1.630 F(2,63) 
us ~ JP 67 7.735** F(2,61) 0.407 F(3,60) 
TW ~ us 74 0.378 F(l ,70) 0.876 F(2,69) 
us ~ TW 72 4.407** F(4,65) 0.072 F(5,64) 
JP ~ CA 68 4.659* F(2,63) 0.351 F(3 ,62) 
CA ~ JP 67 9.26 1** F( 1,62) 1. 520 F(2,61) 
TW ~ CA 74 1. 858 F(1,70) 0.094 F(2,69) 
CA ~ TW 74 5.402* F( l ,70) 0.335 F(2 ,69) 
TW ~ JP 67 8.044** F(2,61) 1.463 F(3,60) 
JP ~ TW 68 3.77 1 F( 1,64) 2.289 F(2,63) 
Note: • denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
**denotes s ignificance at the 99% con fid ence leve l. 
Table 20. Granger Causality Testing Results for Carcass Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causality Number of Causali~ Test Causali t~ Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F(v 1, v2) F-Stat. F(v~, v2) 
CA ~ us 76 0.058 F(1,72) 12.739** F(2,7 1) 
us ~ CA 77 2.364 F( 1,73) 13.473** F(2,72) 
JP ~ us 76 0.030 F(l ,72) 1.439 F(2,71) 
us ~ JP 75 4.652* F(1 ,71) 0.942 F(2,70) 
JP ~ CA 76 4.018* F(2,71) 0.999 F(3,70) 
CA ~ JP 75 3.660 F(1 ,71) 1.409 F(2,70) 
Note: • denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 2 I. Granger Causality Testing Results for Soybean Meal Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causali ty Number of Causali~ Test Causality Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F~v~, v22 F-Stat. F~v~, v22 
CA ---7 us 79 1.634 F(1 ,76) 19.256** F(2, 75) 
us ---7 CA 78 8.257** F(2,74) 8.413** F(3 ,73) 
JP ---7 us 74 0.025 F(1 ,71) 0.000 F(2,70) 
us ---7 JP 73 0.047 F(1,69) 0.001 F(2,68) 
TW ---7 us 76 1.490 F(l ,73) 0.387 F(2,72) 
us ---7 TW 75 11.055** F(1 ,71) 1.744 F(2,70) 
JP ---7 CA 72 11.913** F(3 ,67) 0.068 F(4,66) 
CA ---7 JP 73 0.027 F(l ,69) 0.002 F(2,68) 
TW 
---7 CA 76 0.647 F( 1,73) 1.618 F(2,72) 
CA ---7 TW 75 10.873** F(1,7 1) 2.052 F(2,70) 
TW ---7 JP 73 0.435 F(l ,69) 0.243 F(2,68) 
JP ---7 TW 73 0.380 F(l ,69) 1.327 F(2,68) 
Note: * denotes significance at the 95o/o confidence level. 
** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 22. Granger Causality Testing Results for Corn Prices 
One-way Instantaneous 
Causali ty Number of Causali ty Test Causality Test 
Direction Observations F-Stat. F(vt , v2) F-Stat. F(v t, v2) 
CA ---7 us 76 1.097 F( 1,70) 1.607 F(2,69) 
us ---7 CA 79 18.288** F(l , 76) 1.552 F(2,75) 
TW ---7 us 73 5.006* F( l ,67) 4.522* F(2,66) 
us ---7 TW 76 20.1 76** F( l ,73) 6. 137** F(2,72) 
TW 
---7 CA 76 20.709** F(l ,73) 3.467* F(2,72) 
CA ---7 TW 76 6.594* F( l ,73) 3.467* F(2,72) 
Note: * denotes signi fi cance at the 95% confidence leve l. 
**denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
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Other country pairs, including Taiwan-U .S., Taiwan-Canada, and Canada-Japan, 
exhibit no causal relationships in loin and sparerib markets. Therefore, Join and sparerib 
market pricing across these country pairs appears independent by this test, even though 
trade occurred between them. This is somewhat incredible and suggests the role that 
trade discontinuities might play in biasing Granger causality tests, like tests for 
statistically positive bivariate correlation coefficients, towards accepting the hypothesis 
that price series are statistically independent. 
Tables I 7 and 18 present the Granger causali ty relationships for ham and belly 
prices. Again , Canada and the United States have one-way and instantaneous 
bidirectional causality with each other in ham and belly markets, suggesting the two 
markets are integrated. Significant one-way causality from the United States and Canada 
to Taiwan in ham prices suggests that the Uni ted States and Canada play a leadership role 
in Taiwanese ham markets. 
One-way causality runs from Taiwan belly markets to Canada's. However, 
accord ing to the trade data in table 5, there was no trade in either hams or bellies between 
Taiwan and Canada during the period and very little ham trade between Taiwan and the 
United States. One possible reason for finding a causal statistical relation between 
nontrading countries may be the existence of a common trade partner; for example, 
Japan. Canada, Taiwan, and the United States are contestants in the Japanese pork 
import markets. The price changes in Canadian and U.S. pork markets may be 
transmitted to Taiwan through Japan with some lags. Without Japanese belly or ham 
prices, we cannot test thi s hypothesis. 
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Table 19 presents the Granger causali ty test results for slaughter hog prices. One-
way Granger causality runs from the United States to Japan in slaughter hog prices. That 
is, U.S. prices apparently play a role in affecting Japan's domestic slaughter hog prices 
with a four-period lag. Though there is no trade of slaughter hogs between Taiwan and 
the United States, the slaughter hog prices in the United States Granger-cause the 
domestic slaughter prices in Taiwan. This indicates that two nontrading countries' prices 
may be found to be integrated by Granger causality tests. It makes no sense to find two 
countries that have no trade or any common trade partner to be integrated with each other. 
Therefo re, level I approaches, which emphas ize on analyzing price relationships so le ly to 
infer market integration, may be fl awed. 
Bidirectional Granger causality ex its between Japan and Canada, which suggests 
that the two slaughter hog markets are we ll integrated. However, the speeds of price 
transmissions are different. It takes two periods to transmit Japanese price shocks to 
Canada, while it takes only one peri od in the reverse direction. Canadian slaughter hog 
pri ces are found to Granger-cause prices in Taiwan. Finally, Granger causa li ty tests 
indicate that Taiwanese prices significantly Granger-cause Japanese slaughter hog prices 
with a two-month lag. However, the trade data show that slaughter hogs were never 
shipped from Taiwan to Japan during the study period. Again, the Granger causality tests 
find a causality relation between nontrading countries. It would seem misguided to infer 
from these results that the markets are "integrated" in any economically meaningful 
sense. 
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The Granger causal relations for carcasses are shown in table 20. Granger 
causality testing results for carcass prices suggests that bidirectional instantaneous 
Granger causality runs between Canada and the Uni ted States. That is, a Canadian 
carcass price change is fully transmitted to the United States immediately, and vice versa. 
Carcass prices in the United States Granger cause next period prices in Japan. One-way 
Granger causal ity with a two-period lag was found from Japan to Canada. In other 
words, it takes two months to pass Japanese price shocks to Canada. As we have 
di scussed, contemporaneous bivariate correlation coefficients fail to find thi s lagged 
relation. In general, lags ex ist wi th respect to delivery, infom1ati on, or contract 
exp irat ion especially for the countries that are not close or adjacent, such as Canada and 
Japan. 
Granger causality re lations in feed grai n markets are presented in tables 21 and 
22. Again, the soybean meal markets between Canada and the United States are well 
integrated. One-way Granger causal relations for soybean meal markets run from the 
United States and Canada to Taiwan and from Japan to Canada. Taiwan's and Japan's 
soybean markets are independent. Pacific corn markets, as suggested by Granger 
causality test results, are integrated and belong to the same geographic corn market. This 
is consistent with the results derived fro m bivariate correlation coefficients. 
To summarize, significant bidirectional instantaneous Granger causality between 
the U.S and Canada is found in pork, hog, and soybean meal markets. Therefore, 
Granger causality tests suggest that these markets between Canada and the United States 
are well integrated. Comparing Granger causality resu lts with bivariate correlation 
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coefficient results, we found that when trade is essentially continuous and the associated 
transactions costs are relatively small , instantaneous causality and positive correlation 
coefficients almost go hand in hand, apparently reflecting integrated markets. Only one-
way Granger causality is observed between Asian and North American countries' price 
series. This suggests there ex ist delivery or in formation lags, and thus price transmission 
lags, between countries across the Paci fie Ocean. 
Granger causality tests more commonly find market integration, especially when 
trade is continuous. This is probably because Granger causality testing admits lagged 
price transmiss ion. These price transmiss ion lags are more commonly found in 
international trade than in domestic intermarket relationships. Therefore, Granger 
causa lity testing is able to find rnore stati stically significant price relationships than the 
bivariate correlation coefficient method does. 
In our sample, Granger causality tests suggest that two nontrading markets are 
integrated, such as Canada's and Taiwan's belly markets and Taiwan's and Japan's 
slaughter hog markets. One reason for this might be a shared relationship with the price 
of a third good traded in a common market. Furthermore, we have shown that 
discontinuous trade is commonly observed, and thus, piecewise linear relations between 
distinct market prices can be expected. The linear relation assumed by Granger causali ty 
and the bivariate correlation coefficients does not always hold . Discontinuous trade 
biases Granger causality testing results in favor of accepting the null hypothesis of 
independent prices. 
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Ravallion 's Method 
Ravallion's method permits each price series to adjust dynamically towards the 
long-run equilibrium. This characteristic avoids the inferential dangers of the static 
bivariate correlation coefficient method. Ravallion's model also enables an invest igator 
to distinguish between short-run and long-run market integration, while Granger causality 
provides no means to detect long-run market equilibrium. Ravallion assumes a radial 
market system in which the central market is the source of price shocks transmitted to 
peripheral markets. However, in Pacific Rim countries, it is impossible to defi ne a 
central market since much trade is bidirectional (i.e. , intraindustry) . To implement 
Ravallion's model , we chose the United States as a central market. As indicated by 
Granger causa lity tests, it is more frequent to find one-way Granger causality running 
from the United States to other countries than from any other country. Still , thi s is 
arbitrary and high lights a crucial weakness of Ravallion's method. 
Following Ravallion's two-step testing procedures, we first test the ex istence of 
long-run market integration by estimating equation (8) , i.e., 
n 11 
~~ = L. a~h ~ , t -h + Lb,h ~ .l -h +c1 X11 +e,, for i=2, ... , N. 
h=l h=O 
I used the SBC to select an appropriate time series specification with white noise 
residuals. Ravallion's long-run market integration test is to test the null hypothesis that 
the lagged effect coefficients, including the lagged price in both central and rural markets, 
sum to I, i.e. , [a,h+[b,h= l. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that long-run 
integration ex ists between the local and central markets. Note that the binary hypothesis 
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testing procedure has now been turned around. Where the null hypothesis under the 
bivariate correlation coefficient or Granger causality methods is that prices (and therefore 
markets) are independent, the null hypothesis under Ravallion's method is integration. If 
the test statistics show that long-run integration does not exist, then the second step is to 
test for short-run market integration or market segmentation by the same estimated 
equation (8). If long-run integration is found, the next step is to impose this condition in 
order to rearrange equation (8) into an error-correction mechanism (ECM) representation, 
i.e. , 
!1P,, =(a" - I)(P,_,_, -!;_,_,)+ Ia,,(P,,,_, -P, ,,_,)+b,0 M, , 
h=2 
11 - l /! II 
+ 2:,[b,0 -I+ L,Ca,, +b,,)]M,,,_, +[b,0 - I+ L,<au +b" )JP, ,,_, +c,X, +e, 
~ ~ ~ 
and estimate it. Strong-forrn short- run market integration21 can be tested by the error 
correction mechanism. Again, SBC is used to choose a best model. 
Ravallion's short-run market integration test is to test the joint null hypothesis that 
the coefficient of first-differenced central market prices is I and all others are zero, i.e., to 
test that b10 = I and a;k = b;k = aij = bij = 0. The null hypothesis for market segmentation 
is to test that all current and lagged prices in the central market have no influence on the 
local market prices, i.e ., to test that every coefficient b; equals zero. The Ravallion model 
testing results are shown in table 23. 
The first column in table 23 li sts the pairs of countries under consideration with 
21 Weak-form short-run market integrat ion can not be tested by the ECM (Baulch). 
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Table 23. Ravallion Testing Results 
Long-Run Short-Run Strong- Market 
Integration Form Integration Segmentation 
Markets F-Stat. P-value F-Stat. P-value F-Stat. P-value 
Loins 
CA us 0.421 0.518 8.837 0.000 
JP us 0.341 0.976 204.882 0.000 
TW us 17.350 0.934 239.252 0.000 
Spareribs 
CA us 1.467 0.233 18.392 0.000 
TW us 1.338 0.254 156.177 0.000 
Hams 
CA us 4.832 O.Q31 31.505 0.000 48.537 0.000 
TW us 15.1 22 0.000 623. 157 0.000 13.587 0.000 
Bellies 
CA us 0.024 0.876 18.257 0.000 
TW us 6.411 0.0 14 280.067 0.000 120.900 0.000 
Slaughter hogs 
CA us 0.044 0.834 51.389 0.000 
JP us 12.933 0.001 1.519 0.227 3.032 0.087 
TW us 14.953 0.000 11.31 5 0.000 22.095 0.000 
Carcass 
CA us 0.937 0.336 52.733 0.000 
JP us 7.059 0.010 0.543 0.583 1.857 0.177 
Com 
CA us 31.497 0.000 53.617 0.000 1.552 0.217 
TW us 0.112 0.739 31.492 0.000 
Soybean meal 
CA us 6.543 0.013 6. 122 0.000 1.051 0.309 
JP us 0.511 0.477 13.940 0.000 
TW us 0.613 0.436 141.206 0.000 
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the United States treated as a central market and Canada, Japan, and Taiwan treated as 
local ones. The second column is the long-run integration testing results including the F-
statistics and their associated probability values. The null hypothesis of long-run 
integration testing is that long-run market integration exists . Therefore, a high 
probability value in this column implies a failure to reject the null hypothesis of existence 
of long-run integration. Similarly, the third column presents the results for short-run 
market integration tests, while the last column presents the testing results of market 
segmentation. 
By Ravallion's method, all loin and sparerib markets are integrated in the long 
run . However, strong-form short-run market integration relationships are rejected for all 
loin and sparerib markets. That is, no instantaneous integration ex ists between any pair 
of countries. Again, this suggests that intermarket arbitrage occurs with some lag, as 
suggested previously by Granger causality test results. Long-run market integration 
relationships exist between the Canadian and American belly, slaughter hog, and carcass 
markets. Long-run market integration is rejected in Canadian and American ham, corn, 
and soybean meal markets. Moreover, the data do not suggest any existence of strong-
form short-run market integration between these markets during the study period. That 
is, by Ravallion's approach, Canadian and American feed grain markets are independent 
with each other. These testing results seem very inconsistent with the previous causality 
test results, which mostly suggest that simultaneous bidirectional causality, thus market 
integration, exists between Canada and the United States. 
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In the case of ham markets, Ravallion's testing approach suggests that no long-run 
market integration ex ists between Taiwan and the United States. It is interesting that all 
long-run and short-run integration, and market segmentation hypotheses are rejected for 
ham markets. It signals that the Ravallion testing approach sometimes fails to find a 
typical market relation empirically. There may be other kinds of market relationships 
than Ravallion's short-run and long-run market integration. Ravallion's approach fails to 
suggest a proper market relationship in the Pac ifi c ham markets. Again, the relationships 
between Taiwanese and American belly and slaughter hog markets are not apparent by 
Rava llion's model. 
Another problem with Ravallion's model should be pointed out. The results 
between Japan and the U.S. slaughter hogs and carcass markets show that the two 
domestic markets are independent (i.e. , failure to reject market segment), but short-run 
market integration is found. These conflicting results demonstrate that Ravallion's 
method can yie ld internally inconsistent results because of the nature of the null 
hypothesis posed. The feed grain markets between Asian countries and the United States 
are integrated in the long run. 
Using Ravallion's model, we found some long-run market integration 
relationships not found by using either the Granger causality or the bivariate correlation 
coefficient approaches. Ravallion's model fails to find a representative relation among 
long-run, short-run market integration and market segmentation in some situations. This 
is probably due to the unreali stic assumption about the market structure, a radial market 
system. Trade fl ow informati on shows hi gh frequency of bidirectional trade or 
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intraindustry trade between trade partners, and thus it is hard to tell which one is the 
"central market," since one may not ex ist. When thi s radial market assumption is 
violated, Ravallion's model is unreliable. For example, Canada and the United States 
traded soybean meal with each other bidirectionally in 88.9% of periods, but Ravallion's 
model found the markets to be segmented. Moreover, many country pairs that were 
found to have instantaneous causality do not exhibit short-run market integration by 
Ravallion's test. 
Ravallion's model tends to reject short-run market integrati on more freq uently 
than Granger causality. This is probably due to the differences in the nature of the 
hypotheses tested in the two approaches. Granger causality tests have a looser definition 
of instantaneous causality. Granger ( 1969) defi ned causality based on the criterion of 
incremental predictability. When including both past and present prices in market A 
increases the predictability of prices in market B, whjle just including the past prices of 
market A does not, an instantaneous causality relation exists. However, Ravallion's null 
hypothesis of strong-form short-run integrati on requires that price changes in the central 
market are passed to the peripheral ones immediately (an estimated coefficient of the 
curren t central prices on rural market prices equal to I) and the past prices in the central 
market have no influence (coeffi cients on the past central market prices are jointly zero). 
These differences in the nature of null hypotheses cause the two approaches to yield 
different (and potentially opposite) results. 
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Cointegration Testing Results 
Cointegration testing is another statistical approach commonly used to test for 
market integration. It tests whether long-run equilibrium exists between two series. 
Cointegration implies that two price series tend to move together in the long run. In thi s 
sense, it is akin to a weak form of Ravalli on's test for long-run market integration. It is a 
weak form test because it does not impose the one-to-one mapping requirement 
Ravallion's hypothesis does. 
The first step of cointegration testing is to establish the orders of integration of 
price levels. To do thi s, 1 employed the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test completing 
the following procedures. First, test the stationarity of price leve ls. If the prices are 
stationary in levels, then stop. The price series are, therefore, integrated of order zero. If 
the price levels are not stationary, i.e. , ADF statistics are insufficiently negative to reject 
the null hypothesis of unit root, then test the first differenced price series. If the first 
differenced price se ries are stationary, it implies that the price series is integrated of order 
I. Repeat the same procedure until a stationary series is found. Tables 24 and 25 present 
the ADF test statistics of each price level, and first-differenced and second-differenced 
series as appropriate. Table 26 summarizes the order of integration of each commodity 
price series in our study. 
Once the orders of integration are determined, series with the same order are used 
to run the co integrating regression. Series that are not of the same order of integration 
cannot be cointegrated, and thus there is no need for testing the cointegrat ion between 
them. Series that are 1(0) are triviall y cointegrated, so there is no need to test those either. 
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The final step is to run the ADF tests on the residuals from the cointegration regressions. 
Since the residuals have a zero mean, there is no need to include an intercept term in the 
ADF tests. 
Table 24. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics for Prices in the United States 
and Canada 
us Canada 
Commodity Levels JSI diff. 2"d diff. Levels J SI diff. 2"d diff. 
Loins -4.30* -3.13 -5.32* 
Hams -2.12 -5.17* -2.85 -4.58* 
Ribs -4.55* -4.10* 
Bellies -0.95 -5.30* -2.28 -4.69* 
Slaughter Hogs -2.47 -5.21 * -2.69 -5.25* 
Carcasses -2.37 -4.82* -2.52 -4.66* 
Corn -0.54 -3.38 -5.76* 3.60 -1.69 -7.64* 
Soybean Meal -1.31 -5.11 * -1.19 -3.73* 
Note: * means that ADF's null hypothes is of unit root is rejected at 99% confidence leve l. 
Table 25. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics for Prices in Japan and Taiwan 
Japan Taiwan 
Commodity Levels I sl difference Levels I s l difference 
Loins -1.93 -3.58* -3.36 -5.18* 
Hams -1.56 -5 .36* 
Ribs -2.28 -4.57* 
Bellies -1.67 -6.25* 
Slaughter Hogs -3.76* -1.46 -5.72* 
Carcasses -3.87* 
Com 0.16 -4.36* 
Soybean Meal -2.74 -6.86* -4.31 * 
Note:* means that ADF's null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 99% confidence level. 
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Table 26. The Order of Integration for Each Price Series 
Commodity us Canada Japan Taiwan 
Loins 1(0) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 
Hams 1(1 ) I(l) 1(1) 
Spareribs 1(0) 1(0) I( I) 
Bellies 1( 1) 1(1) I( 1) 
Slaughter hogs 1( 1) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 
Carcasses 1( 1) !(I ) !(0) 
Com 1(2) 1(2) 1(1) 
Soybean meal I( I) 1(1) I (I) !(0) 
All loin, ham, and belly prices are integrated of degree one except U.S. loin 
prices. The price levels of the United States and Canada spareribs are stationary, while 
the ADF test indicates Taiwan's rib prices are to be integrated of degree one. All 
slaughter hog and carcass prices are integrated of degree one except Japan's slaughter hog 
prices. The ADF tests found both U.S. and Canadian corn prices are 1(2) series, while 
Taiwan's com prices follow an 1(1) process. Finally, soybean meal prices in the United 
States, Canada, and Japan are all 1( 1 ), while Taiwan's soybean meal prices are 1(0). 
The cointegration testing results are displayed in table 27. The ADF test statistics 
indicate that those price series with the same order o f integration are co integrated except 
the belly prices between the United States and Taiwan. Including the price pairs, which 
are initially of different orders of integration (I 5 country pairs), there are 16 country pairs 
that have no long-run cointegration relationships. Ravallion's model (in table 23) also 
rejects the long-run market integration between Taiwan's and the U.S.'s belly markets. 
The trade now shows that no trade in bellies occurs between Taiwan and the United 
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States. Therefore, it makes sense to find that there is no long-run integration relation 
between them . 
The ham prices in the United States and Taiwan are cointegrated at the 95% level 
of confidence, suggesting that the markets are integrated. In reality, the United States and 
Taiwan compete with each other in the Japanese pork market. They both shipped hams 
to Japan every month during our study periods. However, there is little direct trade in 
hams between Taiwan and the United States (see table 5 for details). Thus, the 
cointegrated relationship between them might be due to the price transmiss ion from the 
common and major trade partner, Japan. Similarly, U.S. and Taiwanese slaughter hog 
markets are cointegrated even though they never trade slaughter hogs with each other. 
Again, this may be due to a common third commodity traded in a common trade partner's 
market. 
Table 27. Cointegration Testing Results 
US-CA US-JP US-TW CA-JP CA-TW JP-TW 
Loins -2.8 13** -2.561* -2.625** 
Hams -3.544** -2.472* -2.447* 
Bell ies -2.624** -0.492 -2.727** 
Slaughter hogs -3.399** -3.475** -4.101** 
Carcasses -2.270* 
Com -3 .036** 
Soybean meal -3.463** -2.149* -2. 179* 
Sample size 75 55 75 55 75 55 
Note: • represents significance at the 95% confidence level (the critical va lues are -1 .94 for 75 observations 
and -1.95 for 55 observations) 
** represents signi ficance at the 99% confidence level (the critical values are -2.59 for 75 observations and 
-2.60 for 55 observations) 
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Trade in loins and soybean meal between Canada and Japan is continuous and 
these loin markets are found to be cointegrated. Canadian and Taiwanese markets, as 
indicated by cointegration tests, are integrated for loin, ham, belly, and slaughter hog 
markets. However, the trade data show that they almost never trade with each other 
during the study periods. Thus, like the relationship between the United States and 
Taiwan, the cointegrated prices between Canada and Taiwan might be caused by third 
party effects. Finally, Taiwan's and Japan's loin markets are also co integrated. 
The results suggest that the pork and feed grain markets between the United States 
and Canada are cointegrated, which is, in long-run equi librium, a find ing consistent 
across almost all the leve l l testing approaches. Al l in all , when trade is continuous, the 
bivariate correlation coefficient method, Granger causality tests, Ravallion's model , and 
cointegration almost uniformly infer market integration. Yet, cointegration is likely to 
find more long-run relationships than Ravallion's method. This is probably because 
co integration eschews the assumption of radial market structure, and thus trade flows can 
go either direction between country pairs, and because cointegration takes the opposing 
null hypothesis-market segmentation-to the Ravalli on's null hypothesis of perfect (one-
to-one) market integration. When trade is not continuous, the cointegration approach 
tends to be in favor of accepting the market integration hypothesis. 
ln summary, cointegration at the 95% confidence level or better is found between 
16 country pairs, which is barely half of all 33 possible pairs. Fai lure tu find 
cointegration may be due to the nonstationarity of transfer costs (Barren 1996; Fackler) or 
nonlinear (piecewise linear) relationships between market prices (McNew; McNew and 
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Fackler). For example, cointegration tests fa il to find any long-run equi librium 
relationship between the United States and Japanese loin markets, while trade flow 
frequencies in table 4 show that these two countries trade in loins with each other in 
almost all survey periods. However, table I 0 shows that transfer costs between the 
United States and Japanese loin markets are not stationary. Since nonstationary transfer 
costs may bias cointegration tests in favor of accepting the null hypothesi s of a unit root, 
it would seem preferable to analyze such intermarket relationships using analytical 
methods that can better cope with the empirical regularity of bidi recti onal and 
discontinuous trade with nontrivial and often nonstationary transfer costs. We therefore 
turn now to levels II and Ill market analysis methods better suited to thi s task. 
Level II Market Analysis Methods-The 
Parity Bounds Model Testing Results 
This subsection reports results from Baulch's parity bounds model (PBM). The 
PBM permits prices in integrated markets to vary independently when price differentials 
are withi n the parity bounds and allows transactions costs to vary between periods 
(Baulch). That is, PBM dispenses the assumptions of linear price relations (and therefore 
of continuous trade) and constant transactions costs, which are the main criticisms of 
conventional market integration testing methods. Therefore, markets can be integrated 
spatially in some periods, and segmented in the others. Whether the arbitrage conditions 
hold or not depends on the price margins and the associated transactions costs. PBM is 
thus a "leve l ll" (Barrett 1996) market analysis method; it employs both price and 
transport cost data. 
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There are three regimes in the PBM. Regime I represents the situations when 
price differentials equal transportation costs, and regime 2 (regime 3) is when price 
differentials are greater (less) than transportation costs. The sum of probabilities in 
regime I and regime 3 is the estimated probability of market integration. The estimated 
probabilities provide much more information about market integration than the 
dichotomous hypothesis tests of the conventional approaches. The maximum likelihood 
estimation used to estimate PBM allows prices to be determined simultaneously. That is, 
there is no need to assume one of the market prices is exogenous as Ravallion's model 
does. These characteristics enable PBM to provide more insight than do the conventional 
approaches. 
As pointed out by Baulch, it is not appropriate to estimate transactions costs 
implicitly based on intermarket price spreads, which is the specification of previous 
switching regime models (Spi ller and Huang; Spiller and Wood; Sexton, Kling, and 
Carman). In thi s study, I followed Baulch's PBM testing22 and included the transport 
costs explicitly to estimate the probabilities for which factor and product markets related 
to pork industries in the Pacific Rim are integrated. Instead of using one-period 
transportation costs and extending them across time periods by adjusting by a price index, 
as Baulch did, we used the whole time series of trading charges in the PBM. 
Table 28 shows the period mean and standard deviation of price differential s. 
22 Baulch app lied the PBM to Philippine wholesale rice markets and used transportation costs as 
an approximation for transactions costs in estimating the PBM. 
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Loins have the greatest differential between Japan and the United States or Canada, 
fo llowed by Joins between Taiwan and the North American countries. In general, the 
average price spreads for pork primal cuts are higher than those for carcasses. This fact 
shows higher spatial price spreads than slaughter hogs, which, in tum, enjoy bigger price 
differential s than feed grains. Trading profits are clearly greater in higher value-added 
products. Casual comparison of these figures with table 8 reveals that average price 
differentials exceed average trading charges for most country-product pairs. This 
suggests two things. First, trade can commonly generate accounting profits. Second, 
since we already observed that trade does not occur in some products between the 
countri es, it must be that accounting profits differ from economic profits (i.e. , there are 
unobservable transactions costs) or there are strict binding trade barriers. 
Table 28. Mean Price Differentials (US$/kg) 
Commodit~ CA-US TW-US TW-CA JP-US JP-CA TW-JP 
Loins 0.77 3.7 1 2.94 16.9 1 16.12 13. 16 
(0.16) (0.35) (0.39) (2.22) (2 .29) (2.28) 
Hams 0.61 2.85 2.24 NA NA NA 
(0.11 ) (0.41 ) (0.45) 
Spareribs 0.29 1.6 1 1.32 NA NA NA 
(0. 19) (0.36) (0.45) 
Bellies 1.10 3.03 1.93 NA NA NA 
(0.22) (0.38) (0.45) 
Slaughter hogs 0.19 0.83 0.69 1.64 1.47 0.85 
(0.12) (0.42) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55) (0.30) 
Carcasses 0 .21 NA NA 2.80 2.99 NA 
(0.10) (0.79) (0 .77) 
Corn 0.0 1 0.07 0.07 NA NA NA 
(0.01) (0 .01) (0 .01) 
Soybean meal O.o3 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.2 1 
(0.0 1) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0 .05) (0 .05) 
Note: Values in parentheses are the standard deviat ions of each seri es. 
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The PBM testing results are presented in tables 29 to 33. It should be pointed out 
that when price differentials consistently differ from transfer costs by a significant 
margin, the constrained maximum likelihood method involved here inevitably drives 
parameter estimates to the boundary of the parameter space. This will bias estimated 
standard errors, making inference difficult. We therefore do not undertake hypothesis 
testing with boundary parameter estimates, but only with interior ones. All estimations 
were run using multiple starting values to ensure convergence to a global optimum. 
Table 29. PBM Testing Results Between the United States and Canada 
Country Pair Estimated Probabilities 
US-CA Regime I Regime 2 Regime 3 
Loins 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Hams 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Ribs 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Bellies 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Slaughter hogs 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Carcasses 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Com 0.60* 0.02 0.38* 
Soybean meal 0.94* 0.00 0.06* 
Note:* indicates the interior estimates are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 30. PBM Testing Results Between the United States and Taiwan 
Country Pair 
US-TW 
Loins 
Hams 
Ribs 
Bellies 
Regime I 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
Estimated Probabilities 
Regime 2 
0.99 
0.99 
0.95* 
0.99 
Regime 3 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Slaughter hogs 0.28* 0.08* 0.64* 
Com 0.01 0.00 0.99 
Soybean meal 0.01 0.00 0.99 
Note: * indicates the interior estimates are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence leve l. 
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Table 31. PBM Testing Results Between Canada and Taiwan 
Country Pair Estimated Probabilities 
CA-TW Regime I Regime 2 Regime 3 
Loins 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Hams 0.01 0.99 0.00 
Ribs 0.00 0.74* 0.26* 
Bellies 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Slaughter hogs 0.01 * 0.07* 0.92* 
Corn 0.01 0.00 0.99 
Soybean meal 0.01 0.00 0.99 
Note: * indicates the interior estimates are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 32. PBM Testing Results Between the United States and Japan 
Country Pair Estimated Probabilities 
US-JP Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Lo ins 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Slaughter hogs 0.06 0.92* 0.02 
Carcasses 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Soybean meal 0.90* 0.05 0.05 
Note: * indicates the interior estimates are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 33. PBM Testing Results Between Canada and Japan 
Country Pair Estimated Probabilities 
CA -JP Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Loins 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Slaughter hogs 0.37* 0.62* 0.01 
Carcasses 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Soybean meal 0.01 0.17 0.82* 
Note:* indicates the interior estimates are sign ificant ly different fTom zero at the 95% confidence leve l. 
PBM results suggest an extremely high probability of violating the arbitrage 
conditions for pork and slaughter hogs, i.e., price margins exceed associated trading 
charges. Therefore, pork, carcass, and slaughter hog markets between Canada and the 
United States are not "integrated" in Baulch's view. These conclusions contradict the 
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conventional market integrati on testing approaches. This also confl icts with the trade 
data, which show considerable Canada-U.S. trade in these commodities. The feed grain 
markets between the United States and Canada, however, are integrated with a 
probability of or near one. Thi s implies that feed grain markets are well integrated 
between the United States and Canada, which is consistent with the results of 
conventional approaches. 
Market re lationships between the United States and Taiwan are shown in table 30. 
Rib markets between the United States and Taiwan are not integrated in the sense of 
Baulch, while the slaughter hog markets are integrated with a higher probability of being 
inside the parity bounds. This shows that the price differentials of slaughter hog markets 
are not large enough to offset the transactions costs. This finding is consistent with trade 
flow data in slaughter hogs between Taiwan and the United States, indicating that trade 
did not occur during the study peri od. 
Like the results between the United States and Taiwan, all Canadian and 
Taiwanese pork markets are not integrated, i. e. , there are higher probabilities of finding 
violations in arbitrage conditions, except for ribs and slaughter hogs (see table 31). Rib 
markets between Canada and Taiwan are integrated 26% of the time. However, there is 
no trade in spareribs occurring between Canada and Taiwan during our study period. 
According to the transfer cost and price differential data, trade is non-profitable. 
Compared with the level I methods, only Ravallion's model suggests a long-run market 
relationship between these two markets. Cointegration tests conclude that Canadian and 
Taiwanese sparerib prices are not cointegrated; thus these two markets have no long-run 
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equilibrium. PBM results show that price differentials in slaughter hog markets between 
Canada and Taiwan are more likely to be inside parity bounds (92% of the time), which 
indicates that trade is not profitable and that there are rational absences of arbitrage. 
Finally, feed grain markets between Canada and Taiwan are not integrated due to lack of 
profitable opportunities. 
Market relationships between North American countries and Japan are shown in 
tables 32 and 33. Table 32 shows pork market relationships between the United States 
and Japan, and table 33 presents those relationships between Canada and Japan. The loin 
and carcass markets between the United States and Japan are not integrated for most of 
time. U.S. and Japanese slaughter hog markets are rarely integrated, while the soybean 
meal markets between them are almost a lways integrated. However, there is a 38% 
(83%) probability for the slaughter hog (soybean meal) markets between Canada and 
Japan to be integrated. 
Canada and U.S. pork markets are not integrated according to the PBM . Figure 
16 is a sample plot of price differentials and transfer costs between U.S. and Canada loin 
markets. It is quite obvious that price differential s are much higher than the associated 
transfer costs. Since this violates spatial arbitrage conditions, Baulch labels thi s market 
non-integration or segmentation. However, trade is profitable and trade occurs 
continuously. This should be a fom1 of market integration, as defined by Barrett ( 1996), 
because of traders' revealed preference to arbitrage these markets even though traders do 
not efficiently extinguish profit opportunities. 
11 3 
Year, Month 
--o--- Price differentials --Trading charges 
Figure 16. Price differentials and trading charges between Canadian and the United 
States loin markets 
In short, PBM results indicate that we can find the re lationships generally by 
looking at a plot of price differentials versus transfer costs. The results po int out that 
PBM fa ils to separate market segmentation from market inefficiency or disequilibrium. 
In other words, markets may be integrated but not in a long-run compet iti ve market 
equilibrium. 
The PBM results are consistent with the crude impression le ft by comparing 
average pri ce differentials (table 28) against average trading charges (table 8): tradi ng 
charges creating frequent opportuniti es to earn accounting profits. The true transactions 
costs, which include language and cultural differences, market protecti on policies, taste 
diffe rences, tariff duties, risk premia, etc., may be far higher than the trading charges. For 
example, there are cultural differences concerni ng Japanese preferences in pork marb ling, 
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meat freshness, and cut characteristics. Pork produced for export to Japan thus may need 
to be cut to Japanese specifications, adding further costs (which we are unable to 
measure). This may partially explain the high freq uency of arbitrage equilibrium 
condition violations observed by PBM in our study. Another big reason could be less 
quantifiable trade barriers. 
The discussion above sheds light on the importance of including nontariff transfer 
costs when testing price relationships between disti nct markets, i.e. , the superiority of 
level II methods over level I methods. The main limitation of the PBM is its omission of 
trade flow information and asymmetric transfer costs. Baulch infers vio lations of 
arbitrage conditions as indications of market segmentation. However, if trade occurs 
when price differences are greater than transactions costs, markets are obviously 
"integrated"; they are j ust not in long-run competitive market equilibrium . Similarly, 
Baulch considers regime 3 "market integration," but if trade flows occur despite 
accounting losses, this suggests the markets are likewise not in equilibrium. The FIPBM 
method developed in this study corrects for these limitations by including trade flow 
information in the statistical test. 
Level III Market Analysis Methods-The 
Full Information Parity Bounds Model 
Testing Results 
In order to avoid the shortcomings and limitations of the conventional market 
integration testing approaches, the FIPBM incorporates price differential, transfer cost 
and trade flow information. Though the observation of trade does not necessarily imply 
effic iency, it provides prima .fi1cie evidence of market integration (Barrett 1996). The 
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PBM is a limiting case of FIPBM when (no) trade occurs continuously. The 
characteristics of the FlPBM enable researchers to disengage the study of market 
integration-for which positive trade flows are a sufficient statistic-from the study of 
market conditions such as the probability of long-run competitive spatial market 
equilibrium. The FIPBM also faci litates the distinguishability between a rationa l absence 
of arbitrage (when price differentials are less than transfer costs and no trade takes place) 
and an absence of rational arbitrage (when intermarket margins are greater than transfer 
costs but no trade occurs). Furthennore, the FIPBM offers more information about the 
influence of unobservable transactions costs . 
This section reports and interprets the results of FIPBM estimation of the price 
and trade relationships under study. Due to the importing country-specific tariff duties, 
transfer costs are asymmetric across different importing countries, i.e., two FIPBM 
estimations were run for every country pair and commodity. As we have discussed in 
Chapter 3, the PBM estimation will be identical with that of FIPBM when (no) trade 
occurs continuously. The PBM used trading charges as a proxy of transacti ons costs; 
therefore, FIPBM results coincide with those of PBM only when trade is continuous and 
tariffs are zero. 
There are six regimes in the FIPBM (as shown in table 34). Regime I (regime 2) 
is the situation where arbitrage conditions bind and (no) trade occurs. Regime 3 (regime 
4) is the situation in which price differentials are greater than the associated transfer costs 
and (no) trade occurs. Finally, regime 5 (regime 6) represents the situation where price 
differential s are less than the related transfer costs and (no) trade takes place. 
Table 34. The Six Regimes in the FIPBM 
Trade 
No Trade 
p,. p . = r:, 
Regime I 
Regime 2 
P,-P > T, 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P1-P < T:, 
Regime 5 
Regime'6 
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Regimes I and 2 represent the competitive market spatial equilibria as well as 
market integration. In regime 6, trade is not profitable and trade does not take place, so 
this regime is an efficient static spatial equilibrium. Regimes 3 and 5 can be interpreted 
as market integration for there are trade flows between the distinct markets even though 
they are an inefficient form of market integration. Therefore, the summation of 
probabilities in regimes 3 and 5 reveals the probability that two markets are m 
disequilibrium. Regime 4 is the one under which trade appears profitable but trade does 
not take place. As a consequence, the magnitude of the probability in regime 4 reveals 
the possibility that markets are segmented and in di sequilibrium. 
In general, the FIPBM provides more information about market structure and 
relationships than the PBM does, especially when trade is di scontinuous. Baulch defines 
the situation where price differentials are less than transfer costs as market integration. 
FIPBM sees this as a lack of tradable opportunities between the countries. Whether or 
not the markets are in competitive equilibrium depends on the actual trade flow occurring 
at these periods. If trade takes place under this circumstance, the markets are not in 
equilibrium. That is, Baulch's PBM fail s to filter market equilibrium and disequi librium 
out of market integration. Moreover, Baulch interpreted violations of arbitrage 
conditions as market segmentation. However, if trade occurs when price differenti als 
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exceed transactions costs, markets are integrated by trade flows even though trade does 
not efficiently exploit all possible profits. That is, FIPBM is superior to PBM in 
indicating competitiveness and social efficiency, which is usually of great interest for 
researchers working on welfare ana lysis. Tables 35 and 36 present the FIPBM statistical 
results done by maximum likelihood methods using TSP International (see appendix B). 
The probabi lities of each regime are li sted with a symbol denoting statistical significance 
and hitting boundary estimations. Based on these results, tables 37 to 38 present the 
economic indicators and inference discussed in Chapter 3. 
Based on the FIPBM results reported in tables 35 and 36, table 37 reports the 
relevant economic parameters developed in Chapter 3. The first column indicates the 
trade directions fo r each commodity. The second column shows the probability that 
markets are integrated and in equi librium, i.e ., A. 1+A.2. Values of A- 1+A.2 indicate the 
intermarket "tradedness" frequency defined as that commodities are tradable or trading 
them is profitable and trade occurs. The third colunm shows the probabi lity that markets 
are integrated but in disequilibrium, i.e. , A.3+A.5. The fourth column shows the summation 
of the second and third columns, which can be interpreted as the probability of market 
integration. Therefore, values of A. 1+A.2+A.3+A.5 represent the frequency of existing 
tradable opportunities. The higher thi s summation is, the more tradable are commodities 
between two markets. The fifth column indicates the probability that markets are in 
equilibrium, however, are not integrated, i.e., the values of A-6. The sixth column presents 
the probabi li ty that spatial markets are segmented and in di sequilibrium, i.e., price 
differences are greater than the transactions costs but trade does not occur. Thus, the last 
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co lumn shows the probability for which spatial markets are in equi librium, i.e., either 
P;=P1+r:or P;<P1+r:and no trade occurs. 
Table 35. FIPBM Testing Results for Pork Markets 
Count!}:: Trade No Trade 
Regime Regime Regime Regime Regime Regime 
From To I 3 5 2 4 6 
Loins 
~us --) CA 0.01 0.98 0.01 
CA --) us 0.99t 0.0 1* 0.00 o.oot 0.00 0.00 
JP --) us O.Oit O.Oi t 0.01 O.Oi t O.O it 0.94* 
us --) JP 0.01* 0.98t 0.00 O.O it 0.00 0.00 
CA --) TW 0.01* O.Oit 0.00 0.98* o.oot 0.00 
TW --) CA O.Oi t O.Oit O.Oit O.Oi t O.O i t 0.95 t 
JP --) CA O.O it O.Oi t O.O it O.O it O.Oit 0.95 t 
CA --) JP 0.0 1* 0.98* 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 
us --) TW 0.0 1* 0.2 1* 0.00 O.O it 0.76* 0.00 
TW --) us 0.0 1* 0.01* 0. 10* 0.0 1* 0.0 1* 0.86* 
Hams 
~ us --) CA 0.01 0.98 0.01 
CA --) us 0.51* 0.00 0.00 0.49* 0.00 0.00 
us --) TW 0.01* 0. 17* 0.00 0.01* 0.81* 0.00 
TW --) us 0.01* O.O it 0.01t 0.0 1* O.Oit 0.95* 
CA --) TW 0.01 t 0.00 0.00 0.99t 0.00 0.00 
TW --) CA O.O i t 0.01 t O.Oit O.Oit O.Olt 0.95* 
Spareribs 
~ us --) CA 0.0 1 0.98 0.0 1 
CA --) us 0.98* 0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.00 
CA --) TW 0.0 1* o.oot 0.00 0.98* 0.01* 0.00 
TW --) CA 0.0 1t O.O it 0.0 1t 0.0 1t O.O it 0.95 t 
us --) TW 0.20* 0.0 1* 0.01* 0.78* 0.00 0.00 
TW --) us 0.0 1* 0.0 1* 0.10* 0.0 1* 0.01* 0.86* 
Belli es 
~ us --) CA 0.0 1 0.98 0.0 1 
CA --) us 0.42* 0.02* 0.00 0.55* 0.01 0.00 
us --) TW 0.0 1* O.O it 0.00 0.98* O.OOt 0.00 
TW --) us 0.01* 0.01* 0. 10* 0.0 1* 0.01* 0.86* 
CA --) TW 0.0 1* 0.0 1* 0.00 0.98* 0.00 0.00 
TW --) CA O.O it O.Oit 0.0 1t 0.0 1t O.Oi t 0.95t 
Note: *denotes significance at the 95% confidence leve l. 
t denotes that hypothesis test statistics may be invalid due to boundary solution. 
-:- denotes that resu lts are consistent with PBM's due to continuous (no) trade and free duties. 
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Table 36. FIPBM Testing Results fo r Slaughter Hog, Carcass, and Feed Grain 
Markets 
Count!}: Trade No Trade 
Regime Regime Regime Regime Regime Regime 
From To I 3 5 2 4 6 
Slaughter hogs 
us ~ CA 0.01* 0.18* 0.0 1* 0.0 1* 0.79* 0.00 
CA ~ us 0.99t O.OOt O.OOt 0.01t O.OOt O.OOt 
CA ~ TW 0.0 1t 0.01* 0.00 0.98* 0.00 0.00 
TW ~ CA 0.01t 0.0 1t 0.01t 0.0 1t 0.0 1t 0.95* 
us ~ TW 0.0 1* 0.02 0.01 0.94* 0.02 0.00 
TW ~ us 0.01 t 0.01t 0.0 1t 0.01t 0.01 t 0.95* 
JP ~ us 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.95* 
JP ~ CA 0.0 1t 0.0 1t 0.01t 0.01t 0.0 1t 0.95* 
Carcasses 
us ~ CA 0.13* 0.87* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CA ~ us 0.98* 0.00 0.0 1* 0.0 1 * 0.00 0.00 
us ~ JP 0.78* 0.02 0.00 0.20* 0.00 0.00 
JP ~ us 0.0 1t O.O lt 0.0 1t 0.0 1t 0.0 1t 0.95t 
CA ~ JP 0.14* 0.01 0.00 0.84* 0.0 1 0.00 
JP ~ CA 0.0 1t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.01 t 0.95t 
Corn 
CA ~ us 0.70* 0.00 0.00 0.30* 0.00 0.00 
us ~ CA 0.99* 0.0 1* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CA ~ TW 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 
-o- TW ~ us 0.01 0.00 0.99 
us ~ TW 0.33 * 0.00 0.00 0.67* 0.00 0.00 
Soybean meal 
us ~ CA 0.91* 0.0 1t 0.06* 0.0 1t 0.01 t 0.00 
CA ~ us 0.88* 0.00 0.00 0. 12* 0.00 0.00 
TW ~ CA 0.53* 0.02 0.01 0.4 1* 0.02 0.01 
CA ~ TW 0.22* 0.00 0.00 0.78* 0.00 0.00 
-o- CA ~ JP 0.0 1 0.17 0.82* 
JP ~ CA 0.77* 0.0 1* 0.01 t 0.01* 0.01* 0. 19* 
us ~ JP 0. 14 0.33* 0.34* 0. 18* 0.0 1 0.00 
JP ~ us 0.01 * 0.0 1t 0.39* 0.01 * 0.0 1t 0.57* 
us ~ TW 0.52* 0.00 0.00 0.48* 0.00 0.00 
TW ~ us 0.01* 0.0 1* 0.09* 0.01* 0.0 1* 0.87* 
Note: *denotes signifi cance at the 95% confidence leve l. 
t denotes that hypothesis test statistics may be invalid due to boundary solution. 
-:- denotes that resu lts are consistent with PBM's due to continuous (no) trade and free duties. 
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Table 37. Market Integration and Equilibrium Indicators 
Market Market Market Market 
Integrated Integrated Equil. but Segmented 
and but Market Not and Market 
Eguil. Diseguil. Integrated Integrated Diseguil. Eguil. 
A.,+A.,+ 
Country A., +A., A.,+ A., A.,+A., ~ A. A., +A.,+~ 
Loins 
-o-us __., CA 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CA __., us 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
JP __., us 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.94 0.0 1 0.96 
us __., JP 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
CA __., TW 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
TW __., CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.0 1 0.97 
JP __., CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.0 1 0.97 
CA __., JP 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
us __., TW 0.02 0.2 1 0.23 0.00 0.76 0.02 
TW __., us 0.02 0. 11 0.13 0.86 0.01 0.88 
Hams 
oQo us __., CA 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CA __., us 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
us __., TW 0.02 0. 17 0.19 0 00 0.81 0.02 
TW __., us 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
CA __., TW 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TW __., CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
Spareribs 
-o- us __., CA 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CA __., us 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CA __., TW 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 
TW __., CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
us __., TW 0.98 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 
TW __., us 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.86 0.01 0.88 
Bellies 
oQo us __., CA 0.0 1 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CA __., us 0.97 0.02 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.97 
us __., TW 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
TW __., us 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.86 0.01 0.88 
CA __., TW 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.98 
TW __., CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
Note: -} denotes that results are consistent with PBM's due to continuous (no) trade and free duties. 
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Table 37. Continued. 
Market Market Market Market 
Integrated Integrated Equi l. but Segmented 
and but Market Not and Market 
Eguil. Disegui l. Integrated Integrated Diseguil. Eguil. 
J. ,+f.,+ 
Country J.,+J., J.,+J., f.,+ f., A, f., J.,+J.,+A, 
Slaughter hogs 
us ~ CA O.Q2 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.02 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CA ~ TW 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
TW ~ CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
us ~ TW 0.95 O.D3 0.98 0.00 O.Q2 0.95 
TW ~ us 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
JP ~ us o.oz 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
JP ~ CA O.Q2 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
Carcasses 
us ~ CA 0.1 3 0.87 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 3 
CA ~ us 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
us ~ JP 0.98 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 
JP ~ us 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
CA ~ JP 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.98 
JP ~ CA 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.97 
Com 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
us ~ CA 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
CA ~ TW 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
~TW ~ us 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 
us ~ TW 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Soybean mea l 
us ~ CA 0.92 0.07 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.92 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TW ~ CA 0.94 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.95 
CA ~ TW 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
~ CA ~ JP 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
JP ~ CA 0.78 0.02 0.80 0. 19 0.01 0.97 
us ~ JP 0.32 0.67 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.32 
JP ~ us 0.02 0.40 0.42 0.57 0.01 0.59 
us ~ TW 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TW ~ us O.o2 0.10 0.12 0.87 0.01 0.89 
Note : ~ denotes that results are consistent with PBM's due to continuous (no) trade and free duties. 
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Table 38. Economic Indicators 
Frequency of 
Frequency of Nontrading Significance of 
Equilibrium Periods due to Unobservable 
Market Integration Non tariff Barriers Transactions Costs 
Country (At + A2)/(At + A2+ A3+ As) ""'/~A2+A4+A6) A3/""' AsiA6 
Loins 
->US ..... CA 0.01 
CA ..... us 0.99 0.00 
JP ..... us 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
us ..... JP 0.02 0.00 
CA ..... TW 0.99 0.00 
TW ..... CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
JP ..... CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
CA ..... JP 0.02 0.00 
us ..... TW 0.09 0.99 0.28 
TW ..... us 0.15 0.01 1.00 0.12 
Hams 
->us ..... CA 0.01 
CA ..... us 1.00 0.00 
us ..... TW 0.11 0.99 0.21 
TW ..... us 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
CA ..... TW 1.00 0.00 
TW ..... CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Spareribs 
->us ..... CA 0.01 
CA ..... us 1.00 0.00 
CA ..... TW 1.00 0.01 0.00 
TW ..... CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
us ..... TW 0.98 0.00 
TW ..... us 0.15 0.01 1.00 0.12 
Bellies 
-> us ..... CA 0.01 
CA ..... us 0.98 0.02 2.00 
us ..... TW 0.99 0.00 
TW ..... us 0.15 0.01 1.00 0.12 
CA ..... TW 0.99 0.00 
TW ..... CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.0 1 
Note : -Oo denotes that results are consistent with PBM's due to continuous (no) trade and free duties. 
Dashes mean that the denominators of ratios are zero, thus ratios are not available for these pairs. 
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Table 38. Continued. 
Frequency of 
Frequency of Nontrading Significance of 
Equilibrium Periods due to Unobservable 
Market Integration Nontariff Barriers Transactions Costs 
Cmmtry (AI + A2)/(A 1 +A2+ A3+ As) A4/(A2+""+A6) A3/A4 AsiA6 
Slaughter hogs 
us ~ CA 0. 10 0.99 0.23 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 
CA ~ TW 0.99 0.00 
TW ~ CA 0.50 O.ol 1.00 0.01 
us ~ TW 0.97 0.02 1.00 
TW ~ us 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
JP ~ us 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
JP ~ CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Carcasses 
us ~ CA 0. 13 
CA ~ us 0.99 0.00 
us ~ JP 0.98 0.00 
JP ~ us 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
CA ~ JP 0.99 0.01 1.00 
JP ~ CA 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Com 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 
us ~ CA 0.99 
CA ~ TW 1.00 0.00 
-:-Tw ~ us 1.00 0.00 0.00 
us ~ TW 1.00 0.00 
Soybean meal 
us ~ CA 0.93 0.50 1.00 
CA ~ us 1.00 0.00 
TW ~ CA 0.97 0.05 1.00 1.00 
CA ~ TW 1.00 0.00 
-:-cA ~ JP 0.01 
JP ~ CA 0.98 0.05 1.00 0.05 
us ~ JP 0.32 0.05 33.00 
JP ~ us 0.05 0.02 1.00 0.68 
us ~ TW 1.00 0.00 
TW ~ us 0.17 0.01 1.00 0.10 
Note: Dashes mean that the denominators of ratios are zero, thus ratios are not available for these pairs. 
-}denotes that resu lts are consistent w ith PBM's due to contin uous (no) trade and free duties. 
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Table 38 presents further economic indicators drawn from the FlPBM estimation 
results. The first column shows the trading country pairs, while the second column 
displays the frequencies of observing integrated equilibrium market relationships, i.e., the 
ratio of (Ai+Az)I(A1+Az+AJ+A5). The denominator of (A1+A2)/(A1+Az+AJ+A5) represents 
the probability of tradability between markets, whi le the numerator is the probability of 
markets to be in competitive efficiency. As a result, the higher the first column value is, 
the more frequently that two markets are in equilibrium market integration. The third 
column disp lays the frequency of nontrading periods due to unmeasurable transactions 
costs such as trade barriers, policies, regu lations, and risk. Since transfer costs do not 
contain those nontariff barriers that are commonly ex isting in today's globa l economy, 
they are most likely an underestimate of the true transactions costs. Although regime 4 is 
not always caused by unobservable transactions costs, the ratio, A41(A2+A..+A6) , indicates 
how frequently the nontrading periods may be due to such costs. Finally, the last two 
columns in table 38 show the ratios between A3 to A.. and As to ~. These two ratios 
signal the potential significance of unobservable transactions costs. The lower the ratio 
of AJIA4 (A6iA5) , the greater the probability that unobservable transactions costs are 
important in determining price and trade relationships. 
As shown in table 37, a lmost all commodity markets except for slaughter hogs 
between Canada and the United States are fully integrated with pork. Carcass markets 
with respect to the flows from U.S. to Canada are in equilibrium, whi le the reverse 
directional trade is in disequilibrium. Due to re lati vely fewer imports in slaughter hogs 
from the United States to Canada, the markets between them are segmented about 80% of' 
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the time. Feed grain markets between these two countries are always in competitive 
efficiency, i.e., with most possibilities being in regime I . Therefore, arbitrage behavior 
between these markets is efficient and no remaining profits can be made through trade. 
These results are quite consistent with level I methods, although are opposite to PBM 
results. However, when the trade flow and tariffs are taken into account, markets 
between Canada and the United States are found to be fully integrated. This conflict 
indicates the inferential dangers of the PBM, which omits the trade flows and policies 
(e.g., tariffs), i.e., it demonstrates how level Ill market analysis methods can improve on 
leve l 11 methods. This also shows that transactions costs count when test ing market 
integration. 
The FIPBM results reveal that shipping these products from Taiwan to the United 
States is not profitable, i.e., price differentials are not large enough to offset transfer 
costs. With more than 85% observations in regime 6, we know that markets between 
Taiwan and the United States are in equi librium but not integrated. The reverse direction 
of trade, i.e., commodity flows running from the United States to Taiwan, is almost 
integrated and in equi librium with the exception of loins and hams. The feed grain 
markets from the United States to Taiwan are fully integrated. Market relationships 
between Canada and Taiwan are very similar to those between the United States and 
Taiwan possibly due to the close price relationship between the North American 
countries. These results are consistent with the findings by the Granger causality tests, 
Ravallion's method, and cointegration tests. Again, PBM interpreted these integration 
relationshi ps as market segmentati on. 
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Loin markets from Canada to Japan are integrated, but not in equilibrium, while 
those from Japan to Canada are in equilibrium, but not integrated. The differentials 
between Japanese and Canada loin prices are overwhelmingly greater than the measurable 
transactions costs and trade almost always occurs, so the markets are integrated. Thus 
excessive profit opportunities indicate that trade is not efficient or that there might be 
some unobservable transactions costs, which make the transfer costs greatly 
underestimated. The unmeasured transactions costs may include the costs of cutting pork 
in a different way to meet Japanese preference. The carcass markets from Canada to 
Japan are more likely to be integrated and efficient. Among all conventional market 
integration testing methods, only cointegrat ion tests consistent ly found that the loin 
markets between Canada and Japan are in long-run equi librium and only Granger 
causality tests found carcass markets between them are integrated. Like all other 
conventional market analytical methods, FlPBM results show that soybean meal markets 
between Canada and Japan are both integrated and in equilibrium. The testing results 
between the United States and Japan are similar to those between Canada and Japan. 
This demonstrates that different approaches yield various implications on meat markets, 
wh ich have imposed more technical trade barriers in general , and have considerably 
identical conclusions on feed grain markets, which are relatively less regulated. 
From the discussion above, we found the market relationships between Asian and 
North American (;O untrit:s art: dose to ea"h other. Pri"es are uniformly higher in Asian 
countries and trade flows run from North American countries to Taiwan and Japan. Most 
feed grain markets across country pairs are integrated. signaling more tradability in grain 
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markets than in pork or hog markets. The findings are consistent with what we expect: 
Input markets (feed grain markets) are more likely to be integrated than output markets, 
(pork markets) which have value added opportunities. 
As shown in tables 6 and 38, the markets between the United States and Canada 
have higher frequencies of finding efficient market integration. The frequencies of 
finding efficient integration in rib and soybean meal from the United States to Taiwan are 
high as well. As expected, trade from the North American countries to Asian countries 
has a relatively high incidence of nontrading likely due to trade barriers and unobservable 
transactions costs. Finally, the last two columns in both tables demonstrate the 
significance of unobservable costs. A relatively low ratio of "A.3/"A.4, such as the carcass 
market from Canada to Japan, implies that the unobservable transactions costs are 
important in affecting the market integration between these countries. 
Like the results from the level I market integration testing approaches, which 
almost uniformly found that Canadian and U.S. pork markets are integrated, the FIPBM 
found that the markets are integrated while PBM found them segmented. FIPBM helps 
uncover how trade policy can interfere with market equilibrium and integration. For any 
commodity and pair of trading countries, the efficiency of the price and trade 
relationship-its efficiency-depends on the direction of trade . For example, the loin 
markets of the United States and Taiwan are disequilibrium when one studies flows from 
the United States, but the same commodity from Taiwan is generally in spatial market 
equilibrium. This is probably because Taiwan has more tariff and nontariff restrictions 
on imported pork. However, Taiwan has relative ly little protection on grai n imports; thus 
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the United States and Taiwan soybean meal markets are in spatial equi librium with 
respect to flows from the United States to Taiwan. Just as trade theory suggests, 
commodities imported into countries with significant trade barriers may be in spati al 
market disequilibrium or segmented as a result of the restrictions. 
As a level Ill market analysis method combining price, transfer costs, and trade 
data, FIPBM can distinguish market integration from market efficiency. Although trade 
flows information can demonstrate weak form market integration (that is, tradedness as 
opposed to tradability), trade flows alone are not enough to infer market effic iency. 
Moreover, markets in countries that do not trade may still be in equilibrium. These are 
insights that leve l I and level II methods simply cannot provide. For instance, Baulch's 
PBM lumps together regimes 3 and 4, interpreting the sum of A.3+A.4 as a measure of 
market segmentation. But trade flows observed in regime 3 offer prima facie evidence 
that the markets are not segmented, although they do not appear to be in equi librium. 
Similarly, the PBM approach adds the probabilities of regimes 5 and 6 to come up with a 
measure of market integration. However, markets in regime 6 are in equilibrium 
although segmented, while markets in regime 5 are integrated inefficient ly. Regime 4 is 
the only one that both violates the spatial arbitrage condition, hence representing 
competitive market disequilibrium, and evinces market segmentation. 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Market integration testing is central to agricultural marketing, industrial 
organizati on, international trade, and sectoral , national, or international model design. 
With reli able market integration information, decision makers in business and 
government can undertake appropriate actions to max imize profits, welfare, or both. 
Conventional market integration analysis focuses on analysis of price relationships 
between di stinct markets. However, analyt ical methods which rely on price data a lone 
(i.e. , level l methods) have proved unreliable under certain circumstances, notably in the 
presence of discontinuous or bidirectional trade or of significant or nonstationary 
transactions costs. Since these are regular empirical features of international and nati onal 
marketing systems, thi s is a seri ous fl aw. 
Level ll market analysis methods, which incorporate both transactions costs and 
price data, permit spatial markets to be integrated in some peri ods and segmented in 
others, thereby obviating many of the problems associated with discontinuous trade and 
nontrivial or nonstationary intermediation costs. The state-of-the-art level II method is 
Baulch's pari ty bounds model (PBM). However, PBM still suffers from an inability to 
distingui sh market integration- i.e., tradability, irrespecti ve of efficiency-from spatial 
market equilibrium-which can include nontradability. In short, both leve l I and level II 
analytical approaches neglect the rich information provided by trade flow data. 
Due to the shortcomings o f conventional market integration testi ng methods, this 
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dissertation developed the first level Ill market analysis method, the full information 
parity bounds model (FIPBM), which combines data on trade flows, prices, and transfer 
costs. I implemented the FIPBM to analyze both product and factor markets in pork 
industries around the Pacific Rim. Compari sons among the levels I, II , and Ill market 
integration testing methods reveal that there are important inferential differences among 
the different methods. The more complete model , FIPBM, provides more informative 
and intuitive results than do any of the alternative measures. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
This dissertation applies both existing (leve ls I and II) market integrat ion testing 
methods and the newly developed (leve l Ill) full information parity bounds model to the 
pork, hog, and feed grain markets in major Pacific Rim trading countries. Simple visual 
review of commodity price plots shows that U.S. and Canadian prices are consistently 
close. Japanese prices are uniformly higher, with Taiwanese prices lying between the 
Japanese and North American series. 
The trade flow data indicate that trade between the United States and Canada was 
almost always continuous in each product. Likewise, transfer cost data show that the 
costs of intermediation between Canada and the United States are relati ve ly small, as one 
would expect. Therefore, market analysis methods that assume continuous trade and no 
transfer costs likely generate plausible results for many U.S.-Canada trade and price 
relati onships. However, trade wi thin the broader set of countries has, more often than 
not, been discontinuous. Bidirectional trade is a lso common, with more than one-third of 
the country pairs showing intracommodity trade. And transfer costs can be substanti al or 
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nonstationary for some commodities across international routes. These facts highlight the 
inappropriateness of the asswnptions of continuous trade, linear price relationships, and 
stationary negligible transactions costs, all of which appear in conventional level I 
methods. 
Table 39 shows the summary of trade continuity, stationarity of transfer cost 
series, and level I market integration testing results. The first column shows all 
commodities and country pairs studied. The second column shows trade continuity with 
"Y" representing continuous trade, "0" representing continuous no trade, and "N" 
representing di scontinuous trade in each route. The third column di splays the stationary 
test results of the transfer cost series. "Y" ("N") in the third column denotes that transfer 
costs are stationary (nonstationary). The last four columns present the testing results of 
leve l I market analysis methods. Similarly, "Y" denotes market integration, and "N" 
denotes market segmentation. 
All level I market integration tests (except Ravallion's tests) found the Canadian 
and U.S. markets integrated across al l commodities . Granger causality testing results 
show that on ly one-way causality exists between Asian and North American countries' 
price series. This supports the hypothesis that there are information or delivery lags, and 
thus, price transmission lags between countries across the Pacific Ocean. The bivariate 
correlation coefficients estimate the contemporaneous correlation, while Granger 
causality tests and Ravallion's method allow price changes to be transmitted with some 
lags. Therefore, the latter two tests more commonly find market integration between 
Asian and North American countries than do the bi variate correlation coefficients. 
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Table 39. Summary of Trade Continuity, Stationarity of Transfer Costs, and Levell 
Market Integration Testing Results 
Stationarity Bivariate Granger 
Country Trade of Transfer Correlation Causality Ravalli on Co integration 
Pair Continuity Costs Coefficients Tests Model Tests 
Loin 
US-CA y y y y y N 
US-JP N N N N y N 
US-TW N y N N y N 
CA-JP N N N N y 
CA-TW 0 y N N y 
JP-TW y N y y 
Ribs 
US-C A y y y y y N 
US-JP 
US-TW N y N N y N 
CA-JP 
CA-TW 0 y N N N 
JP-TW 
Hams 
US-CA N y y y N y 
US-JP 
US-TW N y N y N y 
CA-JP 
CA-TW N y N y y 
JP-TW 
Bel lies 
US-CA y y y y y y 
US-JP 
US-TW N y N N N N 
CA-JP 
CA-TW 0 y N y y 
JP-TW 
Note: "Y" in the second column denotes that there is continuous trade, while "0 " represents continuous no 
trade and "N" represents discontinuous trade. "Y" in the third column denotes that transfer costs are 
stationary; ''N'' otherwise. "Y" in the fourth through last columns represents market integration. 
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Table 39. Continued. 
Stationarity Bivariate Granger 
Country Trade of Transfer Correlation Causality Ravallion Cointegration 
Pair Continuity Costs Coefficients Tests Model Tests 
Carcasses 
US-C A N y y y y y 
US-JP N N N y y N 
US-TW 
CA-JP N N N y N 
CA-TW 
JP-TW 
Slaughter hogs 
US-CA y y y y y y 
US-JP N N N y N 
US-TW 0 y N N N y 
CA-JP N N N N 
CA-TW 0 y N N y 
JP-TW 0 y N N 
Corn 
US-C A y y y y N y 
US-JP 
US-TW N N y y y N 
CA-JP 
CA-TW 0 N y y N 
JP-TW 
Soybean mea l 
US-C A y y y y N y 
US-JP N N N N y y 
US-TW N N N y y N 
CA-JP y N N y y 
CA-TW N N N y N 
JP-TW N N N N 
Note: "Y" in the second column denotes that there is continuous trade, while "0" represents continuous no 
trade and "N" represents discontinuous trade. "Y" in the third column denotes that transfer costs are 
stationary; "N'' otherwise. "Y" in the fourth through last columns represents market integration. 
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Failure to reject the null hypothesis of market independence might be due to 
nonlinear price relationships that emerge when trade is discontinuous, as is commonly the 
case in cross-Pacific trade. That is, level I market analysis methods' assumptions may 
make it hard to uncover episodically strong price and trade relationships. Our empirical 
findings found that Ravallion's model fails to suggest a representative market relation 
between some country pairs. Ravallion's model also suggests market segmentation 
between high proportions of bidirectional trade partners, such as the United States and 
Canada, since the high frequencies of bidirectional trade between these countries violate 
the radial markets assumption of his model , creating simultaneity problems in estimation. 
Table 40 summarizes the probabilities of finding market integration by level I, II, 
and Ill market analysis methods. These estimates should increase monotonically as one 
looks across the row, from no trade links to continuous trade links. Values in parentheses 
show the relative frequency of the number of pairs which are found to be integrated to all 
possible trade directions in our study. For bivariate correlation coefficients, we count the 
significantly positive correlation coefficients; for Granger causality tests, we count both 
instantaneous causality and one-way lagged causality. 
For Ravallion's model, we count both significant long-run and short-run strong-
form market integration. Please note that in performing Ravallion's model, we assumed 
the United States to be the central market and then tested the existence of long-run and 
short-run market relationships between the United States and the other three countri es. 
Therefore, there are fewer test observations under Ravallion's method than under the 
other methods. The frequencies of market integration for PBM and FIPBM are calculated 
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Table 40. Frequency of Finding Markets Integrated 
Trading Freguency 
Method 0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99% 100% 
Level I Methods 
Bivariate correl. coeff. 20% 15% 50% 33% 50% 78% 
(5/25) (2/ 13) (2/4) (1 /3) (5/ 1 0) (7/9) 
Granger causality tests 44% 39% 75% 33% 70% 78% 
(11 /25) (5113) (3/4) (1 /3) (711 0) (7/9) 
Ravallion's method 80% 60% 50% 0% 50% 100% 
(4/5) (3/5) (1/2) (Oil) (2/4) (2/2) 
Cointegation tests 48% 15% 25% 33% 100% 67% 
(12/25) (2/ 13) (1 /4) ( 1/3) (10/10) (6/9) 
Level II Method 
PBM 37% 10% 51% 99% 30% 36% 
Levellll Method 
FIPBM 41 % 43% 81% 99% 98% 100% 
Note: Values in parentheses show the relative frequency, where the denominator represents the number of 
est imated relations and the numerator counts the pairs found to be inLegmted. 
by weighting the estimated probabilities with numbers of observations for each series and 
averaging them. 
As shown in table 40, Ravallion's method finds market integration where no trade 
takes place with very high frequency (80%), while bivariate correlation coefficients 
conversely find market integration only about 20% of the time. All other methods 
generate estimates of market integration around 40% between markets that did not trade 
during the sample period. This captures the distinction between "tradedness" in which 
there are observable product flows and "tractability" in which traders should be indifferent 
between trading or not and there thus might be no trade . Although trade might nut o<.:<.:ur 
between markets, the markets may be contestable (Baumol). 
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At the other end of the spectrum, PBM finds market integration only 36% of the 
time between partners who trade in every period. This reflects that its unjustified 
combination of the concepts of market integration and competitive equilibrium yields an 
"integration" criterion that is overly strict because it recognizes only integration that 
coexists with competitive equilibrium. The other methods all find market integration 
with at least two-thirds frequency when the two countries trade continuously. 
Where trade is discontinuous, FIPBM is the only method that yields estimates of 
market integration that increase monotonically with the observation of trade. This is an 
intuitive criterion that market integration testing methods should sati sfy. Moreover, 
FIPBM uses price differentials between spatial markets in testing market integration. 
Therefore, the effects of the third common trading partners do not influence the inference 
of market integration relationships in FIPBM. In contrast, the level I methods use price 
series to test market integration; therefore, they usually found some country pairs with a 
common trade partner to be integrated. In thi s aspect, FIPBM is superior to the level I 
methods. Furthermore, the level I methods routinely fail to sati sfy that criterion because 
they are linear approximations to (sometimes highly) nonlinear price relationships caused 
by discontinuous trade and because they do not account for potentially nontrivial and 
sometimes nonstationary transfer costs. The level II method, PBM, fails the 
monotonicity test because it conflates competitive market equilibrium with market 
integration. When there are significant nontariffbarriers to trade, there will commonly be 
quasi-quota rents (i.e., positive profits) that lead to trade, and hence, market integration 
that is not in competitive equilibrium. Onl y FIPBM is capable of capturing these 
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characteristics of price and trade relationships between markets. 
Table 40 thereby highlights that different market analysis approaches with 
different definitions of market integration can yield markedly divergent results. 
Therefore, the term "market integration" should be carefully defined in empirical work. 
This di ssertation makes a case for a notion of market integration that is divorced from 
issues of efficiency reflected by competitive market equilibrium. We use a concept of 
market integration based on the existence of nonnegative economic profits after one 
accounts for transactions costs, which may differ from the nonnegative accounting profits 
measurable using transfer costs. The observation of trade flows is taken as prima facie 
evidence of market integration in a given period, based on the assumption of profit-
maximizing trader behavior and the principle of revealed preference. 
Implications of the Full Information 
Parity Bounds Model 
By incorporating information provided by trade flow and transfer cost data, the 
full information parity bounds model (F!PBM) enables us to get a very accurate measure 
of market integration, defined as intermarket tractability, as well as an idea whether these 
markets are in equilibrium or not, i.e., an indicator of competitiveness and social 
efficiency. The FIPBM can also distinguish between the absence of rational arbitrage, 
i.e. , profit opportunities not exploited by traders (regime 3) and the rational absence of 
arbitrage, i.e. , transfer costs that choke off trade (regime 6). Like level ll methods such as 
PBM, FIPBM avoids the inferential dangers caused by unrealistic assumptions such as 
linear and unidirectional price relations, and constant and stationary transactions costs. 
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FIPBM does not require one market's prices to be exogenous and testing results will not 
be biased by common trends. 
Moreover, FIPBM measures beyond level II methods by enabling the analyst to 
distinguish between market integration, a "conduct" concept, and spatial market 
equilibrium, a "performance" concept. FIPBM also shows real promise in signaling the 
importance of unmeasurable transactions costs and the proportion of nontrading periods 
due to nontariff trade barriers and the effects of asymmetric trade poli cies on market 
integration and equilibrium. Thus, FlPBM seems better suited to international markets 
analysis than other existing methods. 
Table 41 summarizes the FTPBM empirical results, weighting estimated 
probabilities of market integration (A. 1+A.2+A.3+A.5) and market equi librium (A. 1+A.z+A6) by 
each series' number of observations. Both pork and feed grain markets between Canada 
and the Uni ted States are integrated over time and slaughter hog markets are integrated 
(more precisely, with respect to flows from Canada to the United States). Yet, while pork 
markets are integrated between the United States and Canada, they are not a lways in 
competitive equilibrium, implying that there often exist positive unexploited accounting 
profits to arbitrage between these two countries. This is likely due to non tariff barriers to 
trade including government and nongovernment trade barriers, such as health standards, 
contracting risk, and consumers' preference. 
By contrast, feed grain markets between Canada and the United States (i.e., intra-
North American countries) are fully integrated and in competitive equilibrium 98% of the 
time, implying that feed grain markets are relat ively more efficient or less distorted by 
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Table 41. Frequencies of Market Integration and Equilibrium by FIPBM 
Frequency of Frequency of 
Markets Market Integration Market Equilibrium 
Pork 
Intra-North America 100% 51% 
Asia- North America 46% 82% 
Hogs 
Intra-North America 61% 51% 
Asia - North America 37% 97% 
Feed grain 
Intra-North America 100% 98% 
Asia- North America 75% 80% 
policy than pork markets. Thi s finding is consistent with the international trade theory, 
which tells us that input markets are more likely to be integrated than output markets and 
they generally have fewer barriers and fewer tariff duties. 
The summary results above indicates that pork industries or producers in the 
North American countries can still make profits by trading pork with each other. If there 
are not significant non tariff barriers ex isting in the trade partner, trade is still profitable in 
this region. One of the reasons for the disequilibrium markets might be the imperfect 
inforn1ation about profitability or tractabil ity. Therefore, the government should facilitate 
or distribute market information to enhance market performance as well as soc ial welfare. 
Compared with the intra-North American market relationships, those between 
Asian and North American countries, including Canada-Taiwan, Canada-Japan, U.S.-
Taiwan and U.S. -Japan, are relatively less frequently integrated, especially for the 
slaughter hog markets. This reflects relatively greater trans-Pacific transactions costs, 
which make trade less profitable, thereby reducing tradability. However, markets 
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between Asian and North American countries are generally in spatial market equilibrium 
with higher frequencies than are intra-North American countries. The lack of frequent 
trade between these countries usually reflects a rational absence of arbitrage. Although 
prices in Asia are uniformly higher than in North America, there are not many unseized 
opportunities for making profits through arbitrage. 
It should be noted here that Asian import duties on the products studied here are 
uniformly higher than North American duties on the same products and that these tariffs 
are a centra l component of measured transfer costs. Equilibrium nontradability is partly a 
by-product of high tariff barriers on pork and hog imports into Asia. Trade liberalization 
in agriculture is likely to be at the center of the next round of the World Trade 
Organization negotiations-and thus is likely to increase Asian-North American market 
integration . 
According to the primary results summarized above, trade in pork and hog across 
the Pacific Ocean generally associates with higher transfer costs, counting trading charges 
and tariff duties, and the high transfer costs reduce tradability. This truth implies that 
Japan and Taiwan have stronger protection on domestic pork industries by imposing tariff 
duties. The Japanese and Taiwanese governments should reduce the tariffs as well as 
strengthen the competi tiveness of domestic pork products in order to meet the world 
trends of free trade. 
Directions for Future Research 
The pivotal concept of the FIPBM is to compare price differentials with the 
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transactions costs, i.e. , to test whether arbitrage conditions hold, conditional on trade flow 
patterns. Therefore, accurate measurement of transfer costs is crucial to thi s approach. 
Presently, it is very difficult to build, much less find, reasonable transfer cost series. 
Moreover, there is great room for developing methods to estimate the current costs of risk 
premia, strategic (dis)incentives to trade, and cultural differences. Furthermore, nontariff 
barriers like sanitary and phytosanitary standards, especially for meat products, are not 
easily measurable nor are good data on such barriers presently accessible to market 
analysts. Such barriers are of growing importance to international agricu ltural trade 
(Hillman; Sykes; Thilmany and Barrett). Because it can estimate di sequilibrium excess 
price differentials, FIPBM may offer a good tool for ca lculating the tariff equivalence of 
various nontari ff barriers. 
In thi s study, we used contemporaneous price differentials in the FIPBM without 
laking delivery lags or information transmission delays into account. If it takes less than 
one month (the sample periodicity in the study) to del iver commodities or information 
between the Asian countries and the North American countries, then the FIPBM testing 
results in Chapter 4 are probably reasonable. Given the state of communication, 
financial , and transportation technologies in the 1990-96 period we have studied, 
contemporaneous interactions probably suffice for these economies. But researchers who 
use shorter data periods or who apply these methods to countries where institutions and 
technologies likely cause significant trading and transmission lags should perhaps 
consider Jagged price differences in the FIPBM to capture these dynamics. 
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Finally, we incorporate trade flow information into the FIPBM through a dummy 
variable. However, the absolute magnitude of trade volume may provide further 
information about market relationships. Therefore, a possible extension of the FIPBM is 
to let the A variable be an index function that monotonically maps trade volumes into the 
unit interval (0, 1] . As discussed in Chapter 3, there might be first-mover advantages, 
which motivate arbitrageurs to trade even when current trade is not profitable. 
Intuitively, trade volumes are probably smaller in such periods. Smaller trade volumes 
when price differential s are less than transactions costs may thus signal that there are 
objectives other than making current period profits, with implications for the assessment 
of both market integration and equilibrium. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of the Maximum Likelihood Function in 
FIPBM 
According to the assumptions on the error terms, v1 and u,, v, comes from a normal 
di stribution with a mean of zero and a variance cr}, i.e. , N(O,cr} ). u, is derived from a 
half-normal distribution with parameter cr} and the restriction that u, <:. 0. Therefore, the 
density function for v1+u, is a mixture of a normal distribution and a half normal 
distribution. The probability density functions of v, and u, are as foll owing: 
(A I ) ( 2) 2 __ I V .f(v, )=(2na,,) ' exp -"f2 , a ,. -oo < v, < oo 
(A2) 1
(2rra;,r: ( u,' ) 
----exp - --
g(u, ) = 0.5 2a ;, ' 
0, 
u, <:.0 
u, <0 
Since v, and u1 are distributed independently, their joint probability density 
function is the cross product of equations (A I) and (A2). That is, the joint density 
function of v1 and u1 is: 
(AJ) h( )={.f(v, )·g(u, ), v,, u, 0, 
u, <:. 0 
u, < 0 
The objective here is to get the probabi li ty density function of z,=v,+u,. First, 
{
z, = v, +u, 
transform the variables, letting _ , therefore, the reverse function 
u, -u, 
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is{v, = z, - u,. The joint probabili ty density function of u, and z, is shown as equation 
u, = u, 
(A4). 
I I {f(z, - u, )·g(u,), (A4) Q( z,, u,)= h(z, -u, u, )· J = 0 
u,;::: 0 
u, < 0 
where 1;1 is the absolute value of the Jacobian of the transformation. Therefore, 
dv, 
du, _,1 -I,_ I 
Ju, -0 I - · 
au, 
The last step is to integrate Q(z,, uJ with respect to u, to yield the following 
probability dens ity function (now dropping time subscripts): 
(AS)w(z)= 2 ¢( z ) [1-<1>(-z·(cr.l cr ,)J]· -~$z$~ ~cr ; + cr; ~cr ; + cr; ~cr ; + cr; 
Equation (AS) is the probability density function of v,+u,. We employ this 
function in constructing the associated likelihood function of FIPBM. 
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Appendix B. Sample TSP International Code for FIPBM 
??**************** **** ******************************************* 
?? This program for TSP International version 4.2b is to estimate 
?? the Full In formation Parity Bound Model (FlPBM) 
??*************************************************************** 
OPTIONS CRT; 
FREQN; 
SMPL I 79; 
READ (FILE='c:\rong\fipbm\rib.pm') ribUS ribTw ribCa ribMx ; 
??*************************************** ** 
?? Load Trade Flow data 
??***************************************** 
SMPL I 83 ; 
READ (FILE='c:\rong\fipbm\frib.txt') 
fribJpUS fr ibPhUS fribKo US fribCaUS fribAu US fribCAJP fribTwJp fribTwKo 
fribTwCa fribTwUS fribTwMx fribTwAu fribUSCA fribUSJp fribUSMx fribUSKo 
fribUSPh fribUSTw ; 
??***************************************** 
'!'! Load transacti ons costs data 
??**************************************** * 
SMPL I 84; 
READ (F l LE='c:\rong\fipbm\meattc .txt') 
slaCAUS MeatCAUS MeatUSCA MeatTWUS LoiUSTW HamUSTW RibUSTW 
Be!USTW MeatJPUS MeatAUUS MeatMXUS LoiUSJP LoiCAJP 
slaUSTW MeatJPCA slaJP US SlaCATW slaTWUS; 
??********** ******************************** 
?? Estimate for the pair, US-tTW for ribs 
??****************************************** 
TRENDT; 
set converge=O; 
Y=ribTW-ribUS; 
B=ribUSTW; 
A=fribUSTW>O; 
print Y B A fribUSTW; 
SMPL 4 77; 
?? --- Price Difference ; 
?? --- Transaction Cost ; 
?? --- US exports to TW, dummy variable for trade flow ; 
??***************************************** **** 
?? Constrain sum of the 6 regime probabi lities to one 
??********************************************* 
FRML RLAM I LAM1 =0.0 1+(0.99-0.0I)*CNORM(LAMBDAI); 
FRML RLAM2 LAM2=0.0 1 
+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.01 )*CNORM(LAM BDA2); 
0.01 +(1-(0.0 1 +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.01 +(0.99-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMBDA 1 ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-0.01) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA3); 
FRML RLAM4 LAM4= 
0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 1 +(0. 99-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 1 +( 1-(0.0 I +(0. 99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.01 +(1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0I)*CNORM(LAMBDA3) 
) 
-0.01) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA4); 
FRML I~AMS LAMS= 
0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0. 99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.01 +( 1-(0.01 +(0.99-0.0 1 )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.01 +( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 1 )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0. 99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0 1 )*CNO RM(LAM BDA3) 
) 
-(0.0 I +(1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
) 
-(0.0 I +(1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.01 +(0.99-0.0 1 )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I +( 1-(0.0 I +(0. 99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA3) 
)-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA4) 
-0.01 ) 
*CNORM(LAMBDAS); 
FRML RLAM6 LAM6= 1 
-(0 .01 +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I))-
0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-( 
0.01 +(1-(0.0 1 +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.01 +(1 -(0.01 +(0.99-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMB DA I ))-0.01) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMBOA3) 
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-( 
0.0 I+( 1-(0.01 +(0.99-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I +(1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA l ))-0.0 l) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA3) 
) 
-0 .0 1) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA4) 
) 
-( 
0.0 I+( l-(0 .0 I +(0.99-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA l )) 
); 
-(0.0 l +( l -(0.0 l +(0.99-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA l ))-0.0 l ) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0.0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDAJ) 
) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 l +(0. 99-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0 .0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 l )*CNORM(LAMBDA I ))-0 .0 I) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2)) 
-(0.0 I+( 1-(0.0 I +(0.99-0.0 I )*CNORM(LAMBDA I)) 
-(0 .01 +(l -(0 .0 I +(0.99-0.01 )*CNORM(LAMBDA 1))-0.0 1) 
*CNORM(LAMBDA2))-0.0 I) *CNO RM(LAMBDA3) 
)-O.OI)*CNORM(LAMBDA4))-0.0l)*CNORM(LAMBDA5) 
??********************************** 
?? Log-likelihood function 
??********************************** 
FRML LOGLEQ LOGL= LOG( A *(LAM ! *Fl +LAM3*F3+LAM5*F5) 
+( I-A)*(LAM2*F2+LAM4*F4+LAM6*F6) ); 
??* ************************************************************** 
?? Distribution functions of the 6 regimes in the likelihood function 
??*************************************************************** 
FRML REGIME I F l =(l /SQRT(SIGV**2))*NORM((Y -B)/SQRT(SJGV**2)); 
FRML REG lMEJ F3=(2/(SQRT(SIGU**2+SJGV**2))) 
*NORM((Y-B)/SQRT(SIGU**2+SJGV**2)) 
*( 1-CNORM(( -(Y -B)*(SQRT(SIGU**2)/SQRT(SIG V* *2))) 
/SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGV**2))); 
FRML REG IMES F5=(2/(SQRT(SIGU**2+SJGV**2))) 
*NORM(((Y -B))/SQRT(SIGU* *2+SIGV**2)) 
*( 1-CNORM(({Y -B)*(SQRT(S IGU**2)/SQRT(S I GV* *2))) 
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/SQRT(SlGU**2+S lGV**2))) ; 
FRML REG! ME2 F2=(1 /SQRT(SIGV**2))*NORM((Y -B)/SQRT(SIGY* *2)); 
FRML REGIME4 F4=(2/(SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGV**2))) 
*NORM((Y -B)/SQRT(SlGU**2+SlGV**2)) 
*( 1-CNORM(( -(Y -B)*(SQRT(SIGU**2)/SQRT(SIGV**2))) 
/SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGY**2))); 
FRML REGIME6 F6=(2/(SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGV**2))) 
*NORM(((Y-B))/SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGV**2)) 
*( 1-CNORM(((Y -B)*(SQRT(SIGU* *2)/SQRT(SIGV**2))) 
/SQRT(SIGU**2+SIGY**2))); 
??*************************************************************** 
?? Substitute constraints and distribution functions into likeli hood function 
??*************************************************************** 
EQSUB(NOPRJNT)LOGLEQ RLAMI RLAM2 RLAM3 RLAM4 RLAMS RLAM6 
REGIME! REGIME2 REGIME3 REG IME4 REGIMES REGIME6; 
??*************************************************************** 
?? Set starting values for the Maximum Likelihood estimation 
??*************************************************************** 
SET SIGU = 2. 
SETSIGV = I. 
SET LAMBDA I = .OS 
SET LAMBDA2 = .25 
SET LAMBDA3 = .05 
SET LAMBDA4 = .25 
SET LAMBDAS = .05 
PARAM 
IS6 
SIGU,SIGV ,LAMBDA! ,LAMBDA2,LAMBDA3,LAMBDA4,LAMBDA5,LAMBDA6; 
??****************************************** 
?? Perform maximum likelihood estimation 
??****************************************** 
ML (HITER=D,HCOV=D,MAXIT=SO,TOL=O.OI) LOGLEQ; 
SETN=@NOB; 
SET CONVERGE=@IFCONV; 
??*************************************************** 
?? Use Gallant-Holly method to compute standard errors 
?? and T-statistics of unconstrained regime probabilities 
??*************************************************** 
ANAL YZ(NOPRJNT) RLAM I; 
ANAL YZ(NOPRJNT) RLAM2; 
ANAL YZ(NOPRJNT) RLAM3 ; 
ANAL YZ(NOPRJNT) RLAM4; 
ANAL YZ(NOPRINT) RLAM5; 
ANAL YZ(NOPRJNT) RLAM6; 
set sum I= lam I -t lam3 I JamS ; 
set sum2= lam2 + lam4 + Jam6 ; 
print sum I lam I lam3 lamS ; 
print sum2 lam2 lam4 lam6 ; 
*************************** 
?? Check convergence 
*************************** 
PRINT CONVERGE; 
IS7 
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